
KOICHI YAMASHITA

PĀTAÑJALA YOGA PHILOSOPHY WITH REFERENCE TO BUDDHISM



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with reference to Buddhism

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PREFACE

The present work was originally designed as a Ph. D. thesis titled "Studies in the Formation of the Analysis of Mind in Pātañjala Yoga Philosophy and Buddhism" and submitted to the University of Calcutta in 1987. I have added some papers as Appendix which were not included in the original thesis and rewritten this intro-ductory part.

The philosophical school of Yoga formulated by Patañjali and supplemented with exhaustive interpretation by Vyāsa has its dual aspects both theoretical and philosophical. That accounts for its special distinguished status in the whole range of Brahmanical schools of philosophy. The aphorism of Patañjali, *Yoga-sūtra*, starts with the definition of *Yoga* which is no other than restraint of the function of mind. Through the text we get elaborate analysis of mind, *citta*, and its functions.

In the Buddhist philosophy also we have critical analysis of *citta*, *cetasika* and other matters relating to mind. It has, therefore, deemed worthwhile on our part to initiate a discussion on a comparative basis regarding the analysis of mind as we find in the *Yoga-sūtra*, its commentary and in the Buddhist texts.

My thesis was distributed over five chapters as shown in the present book.

The first chapter is dedicated to the study of the *pariṇāma* theory of the Yoga and the Sāṃkhya, the purpose being that the concept of *pariṇāma* of the Yoga philosophy and the Sāṃkhya philosophy is to form the background of the *pariṇāma* theory.

The elaboration of this *pariṇāma* theory has been extended upto the second chapter, wherein specially the *dharma-pariṇāma* which includes the *citta-pariṇāma* has

been dealt with. It is in this context that we have brought under discussion the facts on the point as contained in the *Abhidharmakośa.*

The third chapter is devoted to the study of the functions of mind as elaborated in the Yoga philosophy as also treated in the texts of the Sarvâsti-vāda school of Buddhism. Attempt has been made to study analytically the similarities and difference in both the schools.

In the fourth chapter, attention is focused on the question of mental process of perception as also relation of mind with the external objects perceived, as viewed by the advocates of the Yoga school refuting the theory of the stand-point of the Yogācāra school of Buddhism.

The fifth, last chapter discusses on a comparative basis the question relating to the Yoga as also the Buddhist concept of *samādhi* and *samāpatti.*

The thesis, thus, was a composite whole in the context of mind. General readers may start with the second chapter as the first chapter is rather the very such textual study. It may humbly be stated that both the schools, the Yoga and the Buddhist schools, have adopted ideas from one another, thereby, enriching the store-house of knowledge relating to mind both in psychological and philosophical aspects.

So far as the methodology is concerned, it is stated that the original sources must be resorted to as far as possible and each question must be looked at from critical and analytical point of view. But all the information cannot be inserted in a book, which should be concentrated on the selected topic in a style characterized by brevity. Of course, references given in foot-notes in bare outlines showing acquaintance with those texts, may be inserted as much as possible. Although knowing many important articles written by Japanese scholars, Professors Shozen

Kumoi, Shingen Takagi, Shinkan Murakami, Jyunkichi Imanishi, Megumu Honda, Jikai Kashio and others, not all of them I could utilize due to the difficulties of obtaining all articles from Japan since 1984.

Regarding the chronology of Indian literature, although it has been stated more or less rightly that the chronology of the history of the Indian literature is shrouded in truly terrifying darkness and most of the riddle still remains to be solved by research as in *History of Indian Literature*, vol. 1 by Maurice Winternitz, I herewith draw a short picture of the chronology of the texts or the authors utilized in the present book. The date is only approximate and the table is prepared on the basis of the following works: *History of Indian Philosophy* 5 vols. by S. N. Dasgupta, *Indian Philosophy* 2 vols. by S. Radhakrishnan and *History of Indian Thought* by H. Nakamura.

	Brahmanical	*Buddhistic*
500—	Early Upaniṣads	Gotama Buddha (463-383)
	Kautilya	
300—	Kaṭh., Śvet. Upaniṣads	
	Aśoka (268-233)	Mahāsaṅgika
		Early Buddhist Cannon
200—	Jaimini (200-100)	
	Patañjali (150)	Kātyāyanīputra
	Pañcaśikha (150-50)	
B.C.		
A.D.		
100—	Vaiśesika-sutra (50-150)	
	Mīmāṃsā-sūtra (100)	Mahāvibhāṣā
	Kaniśika (129-152)	Aśvaghoṣa
		Nāgārjuna (150-250)

200—	Caraka	Āryadeva (170-270)
	Nyāya-sūtra (250-350)	Maitreya (270-350)
300—	Vārṣaganya	
	Vindhyavāsin	Asaṅga (310-390)
	Īśvarakṛṣṇa	Vasubandhu (320-400)
400—	Brahma-sūtra (400-450)	Kumārajīva (401 to China)
	Yoga-sūtra (400-450)	Buddhaghosa (415-450)
	Yoga-bhāṣya (450-500)	Dignāga (400-480)
		Stiramati (470-550)
		Dharmapāla (530-561)
		Paramārtha (546 to China)

I am thankful to Prof. Heramba Nath Chatterjee, of Government Sanskrit College, Calcutta, who has guided me in preparation of the thesis. I am also to thank Prof. Sanghasen Singh, University of Delhi, for some useful suggestion. I am also obliged to Prof. Shozen Kumoi who was my guide at Otani University, Kyoto, Japan.

Santiniketan
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Koichi Yamashita

ABBREVIATION

(For details Bibliography may be consulted)

A	—Anguttara Nikāya.
Akbh.	—Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya of Vasubandhu.
AKkā.	—Abhidharmakośa-kārikā of Vasubandhu..
AN.	—Aṅguttara Nikāya.
BS.	—Brahmasūtra of Bādarāyaṇa.
Cpm.	—Compendium of Philosophy.
D.	—Dīgha Nikāya.
Dh.	—Dhammapada.
Dhs.	—Dhammasangiṇi.
DN.	—Dīgha Nikāya.
Gītā.	—Srīmadbhagavadgītā.
Iti.	—Itivuttaka.
J.	—Jātaka.
JIBS.	—Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies. (in Japanese, Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū) Japanese Association of Indian and Buddhist Studies, Tokyo.
Kv.	—Kathāvattu.
M.	—Majjhima Nikāya.
Md.	—Mahāniddesa.
Milin.	—Milindapanha.
MN.	—Majjhima Nikāya.
MS.	— Mīmāṃsāsutra of Jaimini.
Mv.	— Mahāvattu.
NB.	—Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti.
NBT.	—Nyāyabinduṭikā of Dharmottara.
NS.	—Nyāyasūtra of Gautama.
NBh.	—Nyāyabhāṣya of Vātsyāyana.
Paṭi.	—Paṭisambhidā-magga.
P. ed.	—Pradhan's edition of the Abhidharmakośa.
P. T. S.	—Pali Text Society, London.

S. —Sañyutta Nikāya.
Saddh. —Saddhammapāyana.
S. ed. —Sastri's edition of the Abhidharmakośa.
SK. —Sāṃkhyakārikā of Iśvarakṛṣṇa.
SDS. —Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha of Mādhavâcārya.
Sn. —Suttanipāta.
SN. —Saṃyutta Nikāya.
Sphuṭārthā —Yaśomitra's Commentary on the Abhidharmakośa.
Taisho. —Taisho Edition of the Chinese Translation of the Buddhist Tripitaka.
Triṃśikā. —Triṃśikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi of Vasubandhu.
TV. —Tattvaiṣāradi of Vācaspatimiśra, (in Yogasūtra of Patañjali, Bombay, 1917).
Vbh. —Vibhañga.
Viṃśatikā—Viṃṣatikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi of Vasubandhu.
Vin. —Vinaya.
Vism. —Visuddhimagga.
Vivaraṇa. —Pātañjali-Yogasūtra Bhāṣya Vivarṇa of Sañkara Bhagavata-pāda.
VS. —Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda.
YBh. —Yogasūtrabhāṣya of Vyāsa. (in Yogasūtra of Patañjali, Bombay, 1917.)
YD. —Yuktidīpikā.
YS. —Yogasūtra of Patañjali, Bombay, 1917.
YV. —Yogavārttika of Vijñānabhikṣu. (in Pātañjala Yogadarśanam, Varanasi, 1977).

CONTENTS

Chapter 1

The Pariṇāma Theory in Terms of Puruṣa and Evolution of Prakṛti

The Yoga philosophy as enunciated by Patañjali may be stated to owe its base of ontology to the Sāṃkhya philosophy fundamentally. Strictly speaking, the ontology of the Yoga philosophy is not exactly the same as that of the Sāṃkhya philosophy, systematized by Īśvarakṛṣṇa in the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*. Whether such ontology is different or the same deserves a special study. In this chapter it is proposed to inquire the ontology of the Yoga philosophy in respect to its relationship with the Sāṃkhya philosophy. This study, at the same time, is expected to enlighten us to show some of the points of similarity of thought between the Yoga philosophy and Buddhist thoughts.[1]

The principal point of the Yoga philosophy appears to be contained in the statement of Patañjali defining *yoga* as 'the restraint of the mind-functions'.[2] The reason assigned for the necessity of the control of mental function is that all the worldly objects which are experienced by means of the mind-functions are nothing but pain to the discriminating persons.[3] Whatever is presented to us may ultimately contribute to pain. This may be stated to be the starting point of the Yoga philosophy. But Patañjali is neither the first nor the last to proclaim that the world is painful. That is a leit-motif of all post Upaniṣadic Indian speculation.[4]

Patañjali mentions the cause of pain (duḥkha) for the discriminating person. The causes are *pariṇāma-duḥkha* (pain from change), *tāpa-duḥkha* (pain from misery) and *saṃskāra-duḥkha* (pain from subliminal-impressions).[5] These three look similar to the three kinds of *duḥkha* in Buddhism.[6] But the contents of them are not all the same. Detailed discussion will follow in the third chapter (§ 4, part 5).

By the description of Patañjali, the cause which brings pain is equivalent to the cause by which the world comes to exist. That is due to the conjunction of *draṣṭṛ* (the seer) and *dṛśya* (the seen).[7]

Thus, in the Yoga philosophy, the world including human beings is expounded by means of duality. Generally the self-intelligent principle is named *draṣṭṛ* and the material principle is named *dṛśya*.[8] These two principles are the ontological theoretical base of the dualism designed as the *Sat-kārya-vāda* and the *Pariṇāma vāda*.[9]

Before inquiring into the exact characteristics of both *draṣṭṛ* and *dṛśya*, it is convenient for us to draw rough idea of the two and their conjunction.

The *draṣṭṛ* which is the basis of the subjective side of the phenomenal world is defined by Patañjali in the *Yoga-sūtra* (II.20) thus : The seer is no other than the merely seeing, although pure, the reperceiver of the conception (of the mind).[10]

The *dṛśya* which is the basis of the objective side is *defined* thus in the *Yoga-sūtra* (II . 18) : The seen is of the characteristic of illumination, activity and inertia, and is of the nature of elements and organs, and is intended for enjoyment and emancipation (of the seer).[11]

And in the *Yoga-sūtra* (II.21) : The nature of the seen is to serve as objective fields to the *puruṣa*.[12]

The fundamental characteristics of both principles are almost distinguished thereby. The *draṣṭṛ* is the merely seeing (dṛśimātra), pure (śuddha) and the reperceiver (anupaśya). In contrast, the *dṛśya* is characterised by three *guṇas*,[13] the material elements (bhūta) and the sense organs (indriya) and having purpose of the *draṣṭṛ*.

We should notice here that both characteristics are cognizable under the state of their conjunction only. Patañjali expounds the conjunction (saṃyoga) thus in the *Yoga-sūtra* (II.23) : Conjunction is the means of realising the nature of the powers of the property and the owner.[14]

Vyāsa comments thus: *Puruṣa* as the owner becomes conjuncted with the seen as the property for the purpose of seeing. The apperception of objects that takes place as a result of conjunction is experience (bhoga), while the apperception of the nature of the seer is emancipation (apavarga).[15]

In the state of the conjunction of *draṣṭṛ* and *dṛśya*, all living beings exist. It is in this state that they have worldly experience, which is nothing but pain as we have already seen. But in the same state they may also have an occasion of getting rid of pain, that is, in other words, getting emancipation.

The fundamental standpoint mentioned above is the same as that of the Sāṃkhya philosophy. The conjunction (saṃyoga) of *puruṣa* and *pradhāna* is declared by Īśvarakṛṣṇa, thus: For *puruṣa's* contemplation of *pradhāna* and for its emancipation, as of the lame and blind, the conjunction of both takes place. By that creation is made.[16]

In this context, '*puruṣa*' means the spiritual principle, equivalent to *draṣṭṛ*, and '*pradhāna*' means the material principle, equivalent to *dṛśya*. The conjunction takes place for the purpose that the *puruṣa* sees the *pradhāna* and that the *puruṣa* isolates himself from the *pradhāna*. The former implies experience and the latter implies emancipation or liberation.

Thus the end is twofold. One belongs to the *pradhāna*, and the other to the *puruṣa*. The end of *pradhāna* is fulfilled when it becomes the object of enjoyment of the *puruṣa*. The *puruṣa's* end, on the other hand, is freedom from the clasp of *the pradhāna*. These two ends cannot be achieved unless *pradhāna* manifests itself, and this manifestation in its turn necessiates its conjunction with the *puruṣa*.[17] The fact is expressed in one word 'being the object of *puruṣa*' (puruṣārtha).[18]

Here the teleological reason is presumed against the conjunction. By means of the conjunction, the creation (sarga)

is undertaken. This means that the *pradhāna* begins to evolve and from that the *buddhi* (intellectual entity) occurs, and then the external world and the individuals arise.[19]

Thus both schools similarly interpret the relation between the two principles. Terminologically Īśvarakṛṣṇa employs the words '*pradhāna*', '*avyakta*' and '*prakṛti*' to convey the sense of the primary cause of matter,[20] whereas Patañjali uses the words '*draṣṭṛ*', '*svāmin*' and also '*puruṣa*', and the words '*dṛśya*' and '*sva*' instead of '*pradhāna*' etc. of the Saṃkhya.[21]

In the *Yoga-sūtra*, the terms '*prakṛti*' and '*pradhāna*' are also used but the applications are sometimes different from those of the Sāṃkhya. In this respect we shall observe later (§ 2, part 3 and 4).

It would be our task here to investigate the conception or the characteristics of the *puruṣa* in the Yoga philosophy, but we must acknowledge that the *draṣṭṛ* (i.e., puruṣa) is mentioned always in the context of *citta* (the mind) which is the ground of mental functions. In other words, the characteristics of *draṣṭṛ* is inferred from the state of conjunction with *dṛśya*. Actually that state appears as the *citta*.

Therefore it is not possible to judge the characteristics of the *draṣṭṛ* abstractly independent of the state of conjunction. Whenever we see a concept of the *draṣṭṛ*, simultaneously we cannot but observe that of *dṛśya*, that is the *citta*. Furthermore, we should bear in mind that the *citta*, which itself is the substance of the mental functions, is termed '*buddhi*' from the intellectual point of view and '*manas*' from the emotional point of view.

§ 1. Draṣṭṛ or the Seer

We have already seen the brief ideas of the characteristics of the *draṣṭṛ* and the *dṛśya*, and their conjunction. Now we shall examine a thorough discussion on both in the light of interpretation offered by Patañjali and Vyāsa. In the context of the *draṣṭṛ* we find the following expressions :

1. dṛśi-mātra, dṛśi, dṛśi-rūpa.

2. citi-śakti.
3. citi, prabhū, apariṇāmin, apratisaṃkrama.
4. śuddha, kuśala, amala, svarūpamātra-jyotis.
5. dṛk-śakti.
6. pratyayānupaśya, partisaṃvedana, darśita-viṣaya.
7. svārtha, nirguṇa, cetanā.
8. tad-ātmaka iva, vṛtti-sārūpya.
9. svāmin.
10. bhoktṛ.
11. akartṛ.
12. niṣkriyā, kṣetra-jña, tad-ākārānurodhin.
13. viśeṣa, aṇu, sūkṣma.
14. nityatā.
15. bahu.

We shall observe them one by one and make clear the characteristics of *draṣṭṛ*.

1. Dṛśi-mātra, dṛśi, dṛśi-rūpa.

Dṛśi-mātra (the merely seeing) is, as we have already seen (p. 2), is one of the characteristics of *draṣṭṛ* defined in the *Yoga-sūtra* (II.20).

Next, it is evident that *dṛśi* (seeing) is one of the characteristics of *draṣṭṛ* freed from the conjunction, because the word *'dṛśi'* is used relating to *kaivalya* (isolation or state of the self-in-itself).[22] It is said by Vyāsa that the *dṛśi's* isolation is the unmixed state of *puruṣa* (i.e. draṣṭṛ), that which will not again conjunct with the *gunas* (qualities, i.e., dṛśya).[23] It is further explained that, at the time when the functions of mind are restrained, the *puruṣa* remains in his own nature.[24] Therefore it may be said that the *dṛśi* involves the nature of isolation of the *puruṣa*.

The same characteristic as *dṛśi* is referred to by Vyāsa that the very *dṛśya*…becomes the property of the *puruṣa* who is *dṛśirūpa* (of nature of seeing) and *svāmin* (owner).[25]

Thus, the *dṛśi* (seeing) is one of the fundamental characteristics of *puruṣa*.

2. Citi-śakti.

The word '*citi-śakti*' (power of soul) is used in the context of the isolation. It is said that isolation is realised when the *guṇas* are without any object of the *puruṣa* and disappear into their causal substance, in other words, it is the power of soul remaining in its own nature.[26]

Here 'the power of soul remaining in its own nature'[27] is interpreted as 'it always stand still thus.'[28] So it is understood that the *puruṣa* is *citi-śakti* and that isolation is the condition where *citi-śakti* is identified with its own self.

3. Citi, prabhū, apariṇāmin, apratisaṃkrama.

Some characteristics of the *citi-śakti* are referred by Vyāsa thus : *Citī-śakti* is non-changing (apariṇāmin), non-associating (apratisaṃkrama), seeing the objects (darśita-viṣaya), pure and eternal (anantā).[29]

Naming the *puruṣa* '*prabhū*' (master), Patañjali characterizes it as '*apariṇāmin*', thus : To its master the mind-functions are always known, because the *puruṣa* is non-changing.[30]

In contrast, it may be said that the *puruṣa* observes the mind-functions at any time, while to the mind the objects are known in some case and are not known in other case,[31] because the mind is changing.[32] Vyāsa explains that the *puruṣa's* non-changing is inferred by the fact that the mind is always known.[33]

In the *Yoga-sūtra* (IV. 22) Patañjali calls the *puruṣa* '*citi*' declaring that the soul (citi), although non-associating (apratisaṃkrama) with the other, turning into its (i.e., the mind's) form, apperceives its own intellect (svabuddhi-saṃvedana).[34]

The meaning is that the *puruṣa* i.e., the *citi* is not really associated with the *buddhi*, but through misapprehension it appears as having been associated.[35]

All the above mentioned characteristics of *puruṣa*, that is *citi* or *citi-śakti*, are relating to the state of disjunction.

4. Śuddha, kuśala, amala, svarūpamātra-jyotis.

As we have already seen, '*śuddha*' is said as a characteristic of *puruṣa* (p. 2. n. 10, p. 6. n. 29.) in the state of disjunction with the *dṛśya*.[36] So we understand that the *puruṣa* is pure (śuddha) when conjunction does not exist, that is to say, when the *puruṣa* is not touched by the *guṇas*.

With regard to the pureness of *puruṣa*, we should notice Vyāsa's comment on the devotion to God (Iśvara praṇidhāna).[37] He mentions thus : The observation of his own nature (svarūpa-darśana) appears to him. Just as God is pure (śuddha), blissful (prasanna), isolated (kevala) and unencumbered (anupasarga), so is the *puruṣa* who is the apperceiver of the intellect. Thus he (yogin) understands.[38]

Through this comment, we understand that in the state of *samādhi* (concentration) attained by the devotion to Gad,[39] one realizes the *puruṣa* who is not conjuncted with the *dṛśya*. In this state the *puruṣa* has the same characteristics as God who is the distinguished *puruṣa* (puruṣaviśeṣa)[40], and is pure, blissful, isolated and unencumbered.

According to the other description of Vyāsa, we see that, when a yogin obtains *nirbīja-samādhi*, his mind-functions cease. When they cease the *puruṣa* dwells in his own nature. Therefore it is said that he is pure, isolated and free (mukta).[41] Furthermore, for a yogin who aquired enlightenment, the *puruṣa* is beyond any relation with the *guṇas*, and has brightness by his own nature (svarūpamātra-jyotis), spotless (amala) and becomes an isolater.[42]

In the above explanation, we have seen almost of all characteristics of the isolated *puruṣa*, who has no relation with the *dṛśya*. The *puruṣa* is by nature different (anya)[43] from the other. In the state of isolation, that is disunion or disjunction with the *guṇas*, one can attain the real *puruṣa*, whose characteristics are *śuddha*, *kuśala*, *amala*, *svarūpa-jyotis* and *anupasarga*.

Next we shall proceed with our observation of some of

the characteristics of *puruṣa* in the state of conjunction (saṃyoga).

5. Dṛk-śakti.

Commenting on '*dṛśimātra*', Vyāsa points out '*dṛkśakti*' (power of seer) as a characteristic of *puruṣa*.[44] The word '*dṛk-śakti*' is also employed in the context of explaining *asmitā* (I-sense) which is one of the five *kleśas* (affliction). Thus it is held that *asmitā* is tantamount to the identification of the power of seer (dṛk-śakti) with the power of seeing (darśana-śakti).[45]

According to Vyāsa's commentary, 'the power of seer' means the *puruṣa* and 'the power of seeing' means the *buddhi*.[46] Therefore we get idea that the *draṣṭṛ* or the *puruṣa* is equivalent to *dṛṣ* (the pure seer) and the *dṛśya* is the same as *darśana* (the act of seeing), which is of the nature of determination by the inner organs (antaḥ-karaṇādhyavasāya) which may be equivalent to the *buddhi*.[47]

Here the *dṛśya* stands not for the general worldly objects but for the *buddhi* because the fact that which conjuncts with the *puruṣa* is the act of seeing (darśana), not the external objects of perception.[48] Our act of seeing, i.e., perception, is realized in the state of conjunction. This state is, in the Yoga philosophy, contemplated as '*puruṣa* sees *buddhi*'.

6. Pratyayānupaśya, Pratismavedana, darśita-viṣaya.

In the *Yoga-sūtra* (II.20), as we have seen before (p.2), the *puruṣa* is said to reperceive the conception. According to Vyāsa's commentary, the reperceiver of conception (pratyayānupaśya)[49] means the apperceiver of intellect (buddheḥ pratisaṃvedi).[50] This idea is caused by the way of thinking which divides the fact of perception into the *puruṣa* (draṣṭṛ) and the *buddhi* (dṛśya).

Vyāsa considers the *pratyaya* by identifying it with the *buddhi*. That implies the reflective perception of objeets, which appears in the *buddhi*, i.e., *citta*. For example, there arises the cognition of 'cow' when one sees a cow.[51] He

cognizes 'cow' because the *puruṣa* apperceives the conception (pratyaya) of a cow which appears in the *buddhi*. Therefore the *puraṣa* is termed '*buddhi-pratisaṃvedī*'.[52] The fact that the *puruṣa* cognizes the *buddhi* means the fact the *puruṣa* sees the *buddhi* as object. So it is also said that the *puruśa* sees the object (darśita-viṣaya).[53]

7. Svārtha, nirguṇa, cetanā.

It has already been pointed out that the *puruṣa* is neither similar to the *buddhi* nor is completely different.[54] On the idea of 'not similar'[55], Vyāsa mentions three characteristics which distinguish the *buddhi* from the *puruṣa*.

Firstly, the *buddhi* is changing,[56] while the *puruṣa* is non-changing. Both these characteristics have already been noted. (p. 6.)

Secondly, the *buddhi* is not an end itself (parâtha), because it acts in conjunction with the other (saṃhatya-kāritva), while the *puruṣa* is an end in itself (svārtha).[57] This interpretation is evidently adjusted with the *Yogasūtra* (IV.24)[58].

Thirdly, the *buddhi* is constituted of the three *guṇas*, because of being a determiner of all objects (sarvârthadhyavasāyakatva). It is unconscious, because of being constitued of the three *guṇas*. On the other hand, the *puruṣa* is an onlooker (upadraṣṭṛ) of the three *guṇas*. Therefore the *puruṣa* is noṭ similar to the buddhi.[59] In other words, the *puruṣa* is antithetic to the *buddhi*,[60] is without the three *guṇas* (nirguṇa) and is conscious (cetana).

8. Tad-ātmaka iva, vṛtti-sārūpya.

Vyāsa, after explaining the concept of the *puruṣa* as 'not similar', continues to clarify the other concept, namely 'not completely different'. What he express is that the *puruṣa* is not completely different, because although pure he reperceives the conception belonging to the *buddhi*. By such reperception, he, although not being identical with it, appears to be identical with it (tad-ātmaka iva).[61]

The *puruṣa* is, in reality, completely different from the *buddhi*, while in the state of conjunction he appears to assume the form of the *buddhi*.[62] In other words, the *citta-vṛtti* can not be distinguished from the *puruṣa* in the state of conjunction.[63]

9. Svāmin.

As we have already seen, the fact that the *puruṣa* sees the *buddhi* implies that the *citta-vṛttis* take place in the state of conjunction. The *puruṣa* becomes conjuncted with the *buddhi* for the purpose of seeing. In this state one experiences all worldly objects, and at the same time one can have opportunity of emancipating oneself from the world. In this context, the *puruṣa* is termed '*svāmin*' (owner) and the *buddhi*, i.e., the *dṛśya* is termed as '*sva*' (property).[64]

10. Bhoktṛ.

The *puruṣa*, in the state of conjunction, is also called *bhoktṛ* (experiencer) and the *buddhi* is called *bhogya* (experienced), and the fact of seeing is regarded as *bhoga* (experience).[65]

The fact of experience is expounded in the *Yoga-sūtra* (III.35) thus : Experience is the undistinguished conception between the *sattva* and the *puruṣa*, although both are completely unmixed.[66] Here the experience is regarded as a certain conception (pratyaya).[67] In the context of the conjunction of the seer and the seen, the same fact is said 'seeing' (darśana).[68] So we understand that, when the seer gets conjuncted with the seen, a certain conception raises on the *buddhi*. That is called 'experience'. In this condition, the seer is named experiencer (bhoktṛ)[69] and the seen it named experience (bhogya).

Thus the experience is regarded as seeing. The seeing is twofold nature : the *puruṣa* sees the *buddhi*, and he sees his own self. The former fact is experience, and the latter is emancipation. There is no other seeing (darśana) besides the two.[70]

In continuation, Vyāsa in his commentary explains how this experience and emancipation, being created by the *buddhi* and belonging to the *buddhi* itself, can be attributed to the *puruṣa*. What is stated is that, just as victory or defeat taking place in the soldiers is ascribed to the commander, he being the experiencer of the result of war, similarly bondage (bandha) and release (mokṣa) taking place only in the *buddhi* are ascribed to the *puruṣa*, for he is the experiencer of the result of them.[71]

Thus perception, retention, recollection, elimination and determination, although present in the *buddhi* are assumed to occur in the *puruṣa* because he is the experiencer of them.[72]

11. Akartṛ.

On this characteristic of the *puruṣa* as *bhoktṛ*, Vyāsa quotes a text[73] as testimony, in which the *guṇas* are regarded as agent (kartṛ) and the *puruṣa* as non-agent (akartṛ).

The *puruṣa* is really inactive. All experience and emancipation, although occurs in the *buddhi*, look like to appear in the *puruṣa*. The reason has been mentioned as the *puruṣa* is the experiencer.

12. Niṣkriyā, kṣetra-jña, tad-ākārânurodhin.

Vyāsa, while referring to the normal worldly experience of pain which may be avoided through steps, such as putting on a shoe to avoid pain caused by thorn, explains what happens in spiritual experience. What is stated is that in spiritual experience also the *rajas* (afflictive guṇa) can disturb the *sattva*. Why ? Because disturbance must operate on an entity which is amenable to mutation. The *sattva* being amenable to mutation can be disturbed while the *kṣetra-jña* (self) who is beyond mutation and action (niṣkriyā) cannot be so affected. Since the objects are witnessed by the *puruṣa*. When they are fraught with pain, the *puruṣa* also appears to be aware of their painful nature (tad-ākāranurodhin).[74]

13. Viśeṣa, aṇu, sūkṣma.

As to the form of *puruṣa* it is said that the peculiarities which belong to the subtle elements and the *puruṣa* are perceived only by the wisdom aquired through concentration (samādhi-prajñā).[75] This knowledge is different from that which derived from testimony or through inference, because it relates to particulars (viśeśarthatvāt).[76]

Puruṣa's own peculiarity (pratisvika-viṣeṣa)[77] has been referred to by Vyāsa by quoting an anonymous text, thus : By knowing the self in its pure atomic form (anumātra), one is conscious to the pure knowledge of 'I am' (asmi).[78]

The subcommentaries, with respect to this text, have attempted to explain the two terms referring to the *puruṣa* as *sūkṣma* (subtle) and *aṇu* (atom).[79]

14. Nityatā.

There are two types of eternity (nityatā), namely, the immutable eternity (kūṭastha-nityatā) and the mutable eternity (pariṇāma-nityatā). The former is ascribed to the *puruṣa,* while the latter to the *guṇas.* That of which the essence is not destroyed even when it is changing is called eternal. Since the essence of both the *puruṣa* and the *guṇas* is never destroyed, they are eternal.[80]

15. Bahu

Whether the *puruṣa* is one or many in number is the question that has been discussed in both the schools, Sāṃkhya[81] and Yoga. In the *Yoga-bhāṣya* this question is taken in the context of isolation (kailvalya).[82] Vyāsa describes that there are many (bahu) who have reached isolation and become isolater. Because they, cutting the three bondages, reached the isolation.[83]

Thus, the *puruṣa* is regarded as of two kinds : one whose purpose is accomplished and the other whose purpose has not been accomplished. Though the *dṛśya* is single, it disappears in relation to the former *puruṣa,* on the other hand,

it remains as the object in relation to the latter *puruṣa.*[84] So the plurality of *puruṣa* is referred to, thus : The *puruṣa* is not single in number like the primary cause. Because his plurality is established on account of the existence of the individual birth, death, experience of pleasure or pain, freedom and the circuit of worldly life.[85]

Each man has his own birth, death and so on. That is the reason why the *puruṣa* is plural. To the unimancipated *puruṣa*, the *dṛśya* is still the object. In actuality, the *dṛśya* means the body and organs of the individuals.[86] In this respect, it is obviously understood that the *puruṣa* is plural as many as human beings.

A brief summary : The characteristics of the *puruṣa*, i.e., the *draṣṭṛ* which Patañjali refers to are 'power of seer' (dṛk-śakti, p. 8.), 'merely seeing' (dṛśimātra, p. 5.), 'pure' (śuddha, p. 7.), 'reperceiver of conception' (pratyayānu-paśya, p. 9.), 'master' (prabhū, p. 6.), 'non-changing' (apariṇāmin, p. 6.), 'soul' (citi, p. 6.), 'non-associating' (apratisaṃkrama, p. 6.), 'apperceiver of its own intellect' (svabuddhi-saṃvedana, p. 8.) and 'power of soul' (citi-śakti, p. 6.). To these, Vyāsa adds some, but those are not especially peculiar.

§ 2. Dṛśya or the Seen

By way of analysing the characteristics of the *puruṣa*, the question of the *dṛśya* comes into picture. It will be our task here to investigate in detail the characteristics of the *dṛśya* under the following heads : 1. tad-artha, 2. guṇa, 3. pradhāna, 4. prakṛti.

1. Tad-artha.

As we have seen already (p. 2), in the *Yoga-sūtra* (II. 21), the nature of the *dṛśya* is to serve as objective field to the *puruṣa*, in short, described as '*tad-artha*' (for the purpose of it).

In Vyāsa's commentary, it is said that the *dṛśya* is

endowed with the property of being the experience (karma-svarūpatā) of the *puruṣa* who is of the nature of seeing; that is why being his object is the essence (ātman) or real nature (svarūpa) of the *dṛśya*. The nature of the *dṛśya* is perceived through the other (puruṣa).[87]

And in the *Yoga-sūtra* (II. 18), as we have already seen (p. 2), the *dṛśya* is characterised by the three *guṇas*, i.e., the material elements and the sense-organs.

Therefore we may understand that the *dṛśya*, in the state of conjunction with the *puruṣa*, is the phenomenon of the material world including the human body. The conjunction itself brings experience and may be stated ultimately to lead to emancipation.[88] This is stated from the point of view of the *dṛśya*, which exists for the purpose of experience and emancipation of the *puruṣa*.

In the commentary on the *Yoga-sūtra* (II. 17), Vyāsa explains the *dṛśya* in its relation with the *puruṣa*, thus : The seer is the *puruṣa* who is the perceiver of *buddhi* (buddheḥ pratisaṃvedī). All that are superimposed (uparūḍha) on *buddhi-sattva* are the *dṛśyas* (knowledge). Like a magnet, the *dṛśya* acts on that which is near it by virtue of proximity, and by its character of being seen it becomes the property (sva) of the *puruṣa* who is of nature of seeing and owner (svāmin) : As becoming the object of experience or action, it appears as having other form (anya-svarūpeṇa) and is cognized by a nature different from its own, and though independent (svatantra) in itself it becomes dependent (paratantra) in serving as the object of another (i.e., puruṣa). That beginningless conjunction between the seer and the seeing is the cause of the avoidable, i.e., the cause of pain.[89]

In this concept, the following two points are to be noticed : Firstly, all the objects, say, sound and the like, become *dṛśya* (object of seeing) only when they are superimposed on the *buddhi* (i.e., when they assume the form of *buddhi*) but never by themselves.[90] A rule of Patañjali

indirectly may go to prove the identity between the mind (buddhi) and the external objects (dṛśya).[91]

It is the *buddhi*, in reality, with which the *puruṣa* conjuncts, and when the *buddhi* comes in contact with the sense-organs, the *puruṣa* relates to them through the medium of the *buddhi*. In this way, the *puruṣa* conjuncts with the *dṛśya*.

Secondly, the *dṛśya* or the *buddhi*, though being independent, is dependent being in serving as object of the *puruṣa*. The *dṛśya*, including the *buddhi* and the external objects,[92] exists by itself. It is the material substance. Its existence cannot be denied. So it is independent (svatantra). Yet, the *buddhi* comes forth in conjunction with the *puruṣa*, that is, it exists as objects of the *puruṣa*. So it is also regarded as dependent (paratantra).[93]

2. Guṇa.

As we have seen before (p. 2) in the *Yoga-sūtra* (II. 18), the *dṛśya* is constituted of the three *guṇas*. They are brightness (prakāśa), activity (kriyā) and inertia (sthiti).[94] Patañjali employs the word '*guṇa*' six times in the *Yoga-sūtra*.[95] From his use of the word. we may distinguish the three types of contents of the *guṇas*.

Firstly, the three *guṇas* constitute the *dṛśya*. From the Sāṃkhya view point, the *dṛśya* is classified into the unmanifested (avyakta) and the manifested (vyakta). Both, needless to say, are constituted of the *guṇas*.[96]

Secondly, the three *guṇas* are by nature changing (pariṇāma).[97] We have seen this matter in contrast with the *puruṣa*'s non-changing (p. 6.)

Thirdly, the three *guṇas* have the inconsistent functions. We come to know of it for Patañjali counts 'the inconsistency of the functions of *guṇas*' (guṇa-vṛtti-virodha) as one of the cause of pain.[98]

Three *guṇas* are by name, *sattva, rajas* and *tamas*. Each has the aspect of brightness, activity and inertia. Changing as the *buddhi*, the three *guṇas* produce the conceptions, that

is to say, tranquil, vehement and stupidity in consequence of each characteristic.[99] In this case, they are helpful and dependent to each other. So, it is mentioned that, being dependent on each other, these *guṇas* produce the conception of pleasure, pain and stupidity so that all (conceptions) have all aspects of *guṇas*. But their specific characteristics (viśeṣa) are made by the condition of secondary or preponderance of the three *guṇas*.[100]

From what we have noticed above, we come to know that the *guṇas* are ultimate subtle entities or substances but not mere qualities. But it may be mentioned that there is no separate existence of qualities ; it holds that each and every unit of qualities is but a unit of substance.[101]

We have already seen that the *puruṣa* is immutably eternal, while the *guṇas* are mutably eternal (p. 12). Here it is our task to observe more the eternity of *guṇas*. The three *guṇas* are, by nature, changing (pariṇāmin). But they are eternal (nitya) when they are in the state of non-indicator (aliṅga), i.e., when they are changing as the non-indicator,[102] because changing as the non-indicator is apart from the state of conjunction. The changings of the other three, i.e., the indicator-only (liṅgamātra), the undiversified (aviśeṣa) and the diversified (viśeṣa),[103] are regarded as non-eternal (anitya).[104]

We may regard that the changing of the *guṇas* is non-eternal when they act as the object of the *puruṣa*. In other words, the *guṇas* are conjuncted with the *puruṣa* as the *dṛśya*. In the state of conjunction, the *guṇas* continue repeatedly to appear and disappear as manifestation.

Lastly, we should note summing up of the characteristics of the three *guṇas* by Vyāsa as followings : These *guṇas* 1) are distinct though mutually related, 2) are changing, 3) are unifing and separating, and 4) co-operatingly produce manifest forms. 5) Although organically related, they do not get mixed up their powers. 6) The two non-homogeneous

natures operate as associate cause with another homogeneous nature, 7) and they show themselves in the state of predominance, 8) while when any two are subdued their existence can be inferred as subsidiary to the dominant one. 9) By being the object of the *puruṣa* they are able to produce forms, and 10) they act by proximity as a magnet does. 11) They, in absence of an appropriate cause, follow the activity of the dominant one. 12) They are expressed by the word '*pradhāna*'.[105]

3. Pradhāna.

As we have seen above, Vyāsa mentions that the three *guṇas* are explained by the word '*pradhāna*' (primary cause). In the *Yoga-sūtra* the word '*pradhāna*' is used only once (III. 48). Patañjali declares that by means of subduing the sense-organs one can subdue the *pradhāna*.[106] 'Subduing the *pradhāna*' means, according to Vyāsa, 'overcoming all *prakṛtis* (material cause) and *vikāras* (their modification).' Here the *pradhāna* connotes *prakṛti* and *vikāra*.[107]

Comparing with the Sāṃkhya view, this *pradhāna* can be characterized as including eight *prakṛtis* (mūla-prakṛti, mahat, ahaṃkāra and five tanmātras) and sixteen *vikāras* (five bhūtas and eleven indriyas).[108] Here the *pradhāna* does not mean the *mūla-prakṛti* only, but also indicates the twenty-four principles. This *pradhāna* means all cause and effect which change into the principles (tattva). We may regard this as Patañjali's idea of *pradhāna*. Of course, we may also admit that in the commentaries the word *pradhāna* is used as having the same meaning as the *mūla-prakṛti*.[109]

4. Prakṛti.

In the *Yoga-sūtra*, the word '*prakṛti*' is used three times.[110] It is said that, in the case where the body and the sense-organs mutate into those of another birth,[111] the *prakṛtis* (material cause) of the body and sense-organs assume their own type of modification, through the filling in, depending

upon causes such as pious acts etc.[112] Here the *prakṛti* does not mean the primary cause of material.

The word '*prakṛti*' is also used in the following context: To obtain the *asaṃprajñāta-samādhi* there are two ways. The *yogins* have the *samādhi* caused by method (upāya-pratyaya), while the *videha* (bodiless or god) and the *prakṛti-laya* (the dissolved in the material cause) have the *samādhi* caused by existence (bhava-pratyaya).[113]

What is *prakṛti* in the phrase of '*prakṛti-laya*'? In the Sāṃkhya it is stated that the *mūla-prakṛti* is *avikṛti* and the seven of *mahat* etc. are *prakṛti-vikṛti*.[114] Those eight *tattvas* are expressed by the single word '*prakṛti*' in the Yoga philosophy.[115] So we may conclude that the *prakṛti* means the eight *tattvas* as the cause of the sixteen *vikāras* in the Sāṃkhyaic parlance.

A brief summary: The *dṛśya* (seen) is the principle which is regarded to opposite to the *puruṣa* (seer). Being the substance conjuncted with the *puruṣa*, the *dṛśya* involves the whole phenomenal world in a broad sense, on the other hand, the body and the sense-organs in a narrow sense. Furthermore, the *dṛśya* connotes the mind (citta, buddhi or manas) when only relating to the mental functions.


The *dṛśya* consists of three *guṇas*, to which the characteristics of modifications of the *dṛśya* are attributed. The three *guṇas* play a role to varify the mental as well as worldly phenomena. Thus the three *guṇas* are referred to the qualities of a thing, while the *dṛśya* are referred to the object of the *puruṣa*.

Terminologically in the *Yoga-sūtra*, the word '*pradhāna*' is used as the meaning of the cause of the phenomenal world. In the Sāṃkhyaic parlance, the *pradhāna* involves the twenty-four *tattvas* excepting the *puruṣa*, while the word '*prakṛti*' includes the eight *tattvas*, i.e., *avyakta*, *mahat*, *ahaṃkāra* and the five *tanmātras*. Those are however to be inferred from the later commentaries.

§ 3. **Pariṇāma (Tattvāntara-pariṇāma)**

It has been noticed that the *dṛśya* exists in the state of conjunction with the *puruṣa* and maintains the existential form of change (pariṇāma). Thus, the *dṛśya* is explained by the concept of *pariṇāma* ontologically. That is the so-called *pariṇāma-vāda*. With respect to its metaphysics and ontology, the Yoga philosophy may be regarded as the same as the Sāṃkhya philosophy.[116] On this similarity, we shall investigate more.

In the contemplation of the Sāṃkhya philosophy, two principles are set up. The one is *puruṣa* which is purely spiritual entity and the other is *prakṛti* which is non-spiritual material entity. The *prakṛti* is the material cause of the world and is also called '*pradhāna*' or '*mūla-prakṛti*'. When the *prakṛti* is in the state of conjunction with the *puruṣa*, the twenty-three *tattvas* evolve in series: from the *prakṛti* the *mahat*, from it the *ahaṃkāra*, from it eleven *indriyas* and five *tanmātras*, and from the latter five *bhūtas*.[117] For a bird's eye view, we may draw this table.



This generation of the twenty-three *tattvas* is called by Īśvarakṛṣṇa as '*sarga*' or creation.[118] And the generation of the subtle body (sūkṣma-śarīra or liṅga) and the eight state of being (bhāva) are also called '*sarga*'.[119] Especially the latter is called '*pratyayasarga*' or creation by intellect.[120] And the three worlds, i.e., gods, animals and mankinds, are called '*bhautikasarga*' or creation belonging to the elements.[121] In short, Īśvarakṛṣṇa calls the generation of world from the primal cause as '*sarga*.'

Besides the above said creation Īśvarakṛṣṇa regards the mutation of *avyakta* (i.e., prakṛti) as *pariṇāma*,[122] and also he mentions that various entities and worldly things come forth from *ahaṃkāra* according to differentiation of the *pariṇāma* of the three *guṇas*.[123]


In this sense, the *pariṇāma*, including *sarga* in the Sāṃkhya philosophy, means that the effect comes forth from the cause. That is to say, everything of the phenomenal world comes out of the unmanifested, *avyakta*.

From what has been stated, we may understand that the *pariṇāma* in the Sāṃkhya philosophy means the fact that the entity of *mahat* etc. comes forth from the primary cause of matter, while, in the Yoga philosophy the same fact has not been so analytically described.

That which seems to systematized the entities is expounded by Patañjali, thus: Diversified (viśeṣa), undiversified (aviśeṣa), indicator-only (liṅgamātra) and that which is without any indicator (aliṅga) are the states of the *guṇas* (guṇa-parvan).[124]

Through Vyāsa's commentary, we understand that each state of the *guṇas* is put in accordance with the Sāṃkhyaic entities. It is to be noticed also that Vyāsa calls each state as '*pariṇāma*', such as '*viśeṣa-pariṇāma*' etc.[125]

According to Vyāsa, the following series of evolution may be tabulated.



Comparing this with that of the Sāṃkhya, we notice that the five *tanmātras* and the *asmitāmātra* (ahaṃkāra in the Sāṃkhya) are generated from the *mahat* in the Yoga philosophy. That is a different point from the Sāṃkhya's series of evolution. Another difference is this : In the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā,* although being used the term *liṅga, viśeṣa* and *aviśeṣa,* the term *liṅga* means the subtle body (sūkṣma-śarīra), *viśeṣa* means the five *bhūtas,* and *aviśeṣa* means the five *tanmātras.*[126] So it is not apparent in the Sāṃkhya whether the *ahaṃkāra* and the eleven *indriyas* belong to the *aviśeṣa* or the *viśeṣa.*

In the Yoga philosophy, the change from the *aliṅga* to the *viśeṣa* is called 'to generate' (saṃsṛj-) and the antithesis direction is called 'to inverse generate' (pratisaṃsṛj-) like as '*sarga*' and '*pratisarga*' in the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā.*

At the same time, as we have seen before, the same fact is also called '*pariṇāma*', which is of two kinds : One is *tattvântara-pariṇāma* (change into another entity) and the other is *dharma-pariṇāma* (change of attributes). The former denotes the *guṇa*'s change from the *aliṅga* to the *viśeṣa.* The latter is the change of the *viśeṣa,* that is the fact that the *bhūtas* and *indriyas* change with various forms.[127]

In this respect, Vyāsa explains thus : This *dṛśya* is of elements (bhūta) and sense-organs (indriya) as essence. As the state of elements, it changes into earth etc. in subtle or gross. Similarly as the state of sense organ, it changes into ear etc. in subtle or in gross.[128]

The *tanmātras* generate the *bhūtas.*[129] In other words, the *tanmātras* are the cause of the *bhūtas.* On this point, Vyāsa explains that the subtle state of the *bhūta* is *tanmātra,* that is, the cause of the *bhūta,* and *paramāṇu* is one part of the *tanmātra.*[130]

From the *bhūtas* worldly things are produced. But, in reality, the *bhūtas* do not generate any new entities. The change from the state of *pradhāna* to *bhūta,* that is, the

aliṅga to the *viśeṣa* is called *tattvântara-pariṇāma* (change into another entities). It is not a mere change of qualities but a change of existence or state of being.[131]

With the *bhūtas* the evolution of the *guṇas* come to the last state. The course of evolution, however, does not cease here but continues, although by its process no new stage of existence is generated. This is what is called *dharma-pariṇāma* (change of attributes or qualities), distinguished from the *tattvântara-pariṇāma*.[132]

The manifested thing, in the Yoga philosophy, is brought about by the different collection of atoms (anupracaya-viśeṣātma).[133] The manifested things (vyakta) or the phenomena (dharma) are, in other words, explained as the particular configuration (saṃniveśa-viśeṣamātra) of the *guṇas*,[134] and the arrangement (saṃsthāna) of the *guṇas*.[135]

To explain the change of phenomena, we find that the appearance of bodies and things change with the change of the relative position of the atoms amongst themselves. The change of appearance of bodies and things only shows the change of collection of the atoms, there being always a change of appearance in the bodies consequent on every change of the position of the atoms.[136]

Thus, in the Yoga philosophy, the phenomenal change of the world is described as *dharma-pariṇāma*. The definition of the *dharma-pariṇāma* is given by Vyāsa, thus : Change (pariṇāma) is the appearance of another attribute (dharma) on the disappearance of the previous attribute of a substance (dravya) which remains constant.[137]

The underlying substance that remains uneffected is called *dharmin*, while its varying aspects are called *dharma*. The *dharmin* is an abiding principle manifesting itself in and through the *dharma*.[138] The change of appearance is therefore called *dharma-pariṇāma*.[139]

Summary : The Yoga philosophy is ontologically based on the dualism like the Sāṃkhya philosophy. The spiritual principle is called *draṣṭṛ* and the principle of matter is called

dṛśya by Patañjali. The characteristics of both the principles have been observed elaborately in §1 and §2, and brief summaries are given there.

Another fundamental theory of the ontology of the Yoga philosophy is the *pariṇāma-vāda.* In the Sāṃkhya philosophy, *pariṇāma* means that the effect comes forth from the cause, that is to say, everything of the world comes out from the primary cause of matter. This *pariṇāma,* that is the evolution from *prakṛti* to *bhūta,* is also accepted by the Yoga philosophy and is called *tattvântara-pariṇāma* or the evolution of principles. The course of evolution does not cease but continue, although no new principle (tattva) is produced. The alteration of condition of the phenomenal world is described as *dharma-pariṇāma* in the Yoga philosophy.

So long in this chapter we have observed the characteristics of both the *draṣṭṛ* and the *dṛśya,* and the *pariṇāma* theory on the aforesaid points. In the next chapter an attempt will be made to analyse further the *pariṇāma* theory in terms of mental phenomena.

NOTES

1. For further elaboration, see Chapter 11.
2. Yogaś citta-vṛtti-nirodhaḥ.—YS. I. 2. Vyāsa comments: yogaḥ samādhiḥ. In this respect, we shall observe in Chapter V. §1.
3. See YS. II. 15.—pariṇāma-tāpa-saṃskāra-duḥkhair guṇavṛtti-virodhāc ca duḥkham eva sarvaṃ vivekinaḥ.
4. M. Eliade, *Yoga*, p. 11.

   S. N. Dasgupta says "The practical motive of all systematic philosophic speculation in India was deliverence from suffering." (*Yoga Philosophy*, p. 87.)

   Radhakrishnan says "Insistance on suffering is not peculiar to Buddhism, though Buddha emphasised it overmuch." (*Indian Philosophy*, vol. I, p. 362f.)

   Cf. SDS. 2. 143ff.—sarvasya saṃsārasya duḥkhātmakatvaṃ sarvatīrthakara-saṃmatam. anyathā tan-nivṛtsūnāṃ teṣāṃ tan-nivṛtty-upāye pravṛtty-anupapatteḥ. tasmāt sarvaṃ duḥkhaṃ duḥkham iti bhāvanīyam. (p. 28.)

NS. I. 1. 2.—duḥkha-janma-pravṛtti-doṣa-mithyājñānānām uttarottarâpāye tad-anantarâbhāvād apavargaḥ.

NBh. I. 1. 2.—tasmin (janmani) sati duḥkham, tat punaḥ pratikūla-vedanīyaṃ bādhanā pīḍā tāpa iti. (p. 51)

NS. I. 1. 21.—bādhanā-lakṣaṇaṃ duḥkham.

NBh. I. 1. 21.—bādhanā pīḍā tāpa iti. tayânubaddham anuṣaktam avinirbhāgena vartamānaṃ duḥkha-yogād duḥkham iti. So 'yaṃ sarvaṃ duḥkhenânubaddham iti paśyan duḥkaṃ jihāsur janmani duḥkha-darśī nirvidyate nirvinno virajyate virakto vimucyate. (p. 450.)

Gītā V. 22.—ye hi saṃsparśajā bhogā duḥkha-yonaya eva te, ādy-antavantaḥ kaunteya na teṣu ramate buddheḥ.

Īśvarakṛṣṇa, the author of the *Sāmkhya-kārikā*, declares that the foundation stone of Sāṃkha is man's desire to escape from the torture of the suffering.

See Sk. 1ab.—duḥkha-trayâbhighātāj jijñāsā tadabhighātake hetau.

P. Chakravarti mentions, "Sāṃkhya is a speculative science; it aims at liberating man from his worldly existence. In no other system (except Buddhism, does the pessimistic view of the universe find such a distinct expression as in Sāṃkhya." (*Origin and....*, p. 318.)

5. See YS. II. 15; quoted p. 1, n. 3.

All commentaries on SK. 1 mention the following three kinds of *duḥkha*: *ādhyātmika* (internal), *ādhibhautika* (external) and *ādhidaivika* (heavenly).

But cf. SK. 55—tatra jarā-maraṇa-kṛtaṃ duḥkhaṃ prāpnoti cetaḥ puruṣaḥ, liṅgasyâvinivṛttes tasmād duḥkhaṃ svabhāvena:

In YD. ad. SK. 1 (p. 10), the very SK. 55 is quoted as 'tatra janma-jarā-maraṇa-kṛtaṃ duḥkham'. In this respect, see M. Honda, *A Study on the Sāṃkhya Philosophy*, vol. I, pp. 366 and 579, S. Murakami, *A Study of the Sāṃkhya-Philosophy*, p. 720; H. Ui, "On Sāṃkhya-yoga", pp. 183 and 194.

6. In Pāli, *vipariṇāma-dukkhatā*, *dukkha-dukkhatā* and *saṃkāra-dukkhatā*; see DN. III, p. 216, SN. IV, p. 259, V. p. 56. And see E. Kanakura, 'Human Existence in the Yoga School,' pp. 299-309; K. Fujita, "Tradional Interpretation on Duḥkha.'

7. See YS. II. 17—draṣṭṛ-dṛśyayoḥ saṃyogo heya-hetuḥ. YBh. II. 17—tayor dṛg-darśana-śaktyor anādir arthakṛtaḥ saṃyogo heya-hetur duḥkhasya kāraṇam ity arthaḥ. (p. 80, l. 4—p. 81, l. 1)

With this respect, see pp. 3 and 13-15 of this chapter.

8. The word '*draṣṭṛ*' is seen in YS. I. 3; II. 17, 20; IV. 23, and '*dṛśya*' in YS. II. 17, 18, 21; IV. (19), 23.

9. See SK. 9—asad-karaṇād upādāna-grahaṇāt sarva-saṃ-bhavâbhāvāt, śaktasya śakya-karaṇāt-kāraṇa-bhāvāc ca sat-kāryam.

About the *Sat-kārya-vāda*, see S. N. Dasgupta, *Yoga Philosophy*, pp. 113-115 ; *History of...*, vol. I, p. 257f ; M. Eliade, *Yoga*, p. 22 ; E. Frauwallner, *History of...*, vol. I, p. 303ff ; Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, vol. 2, p. 256 ; P. Chakravarti, *Origin and...*, pp. 196-199 ; L. Chattopadhyaya, *Self in...*, p. 15.

10. Draṣṭā dṛśimātraḥ śuddho' pi pratyayânupaśyaḥ—YS. II.20. For elaboration, see p. 5 on *dṛśi*, p. 7 on *śuddha*, p. 9 on *pratyayânupaśya*.

11. prakāśa-kriyā-sthiti-śilaṃ-bhūtêndriyâtmakaṃ bhogâpavargârthaṃ dṛśyam.—YS.II.18.

12. tad-artha eva dṛśyasyâtmā – YS. II. 21. As to Vyāsa's commentary, see p. 14. n. 87.

13. *prakāśa, kriyā* and *sthiti* are the characteristics of the *guṇas*. See YBh. I. 2.—cittaṃ hi prakhyā-pravṛtti-sthiti-śilatvāt tri-guṇam. (p. 4. l. 7f) ; and see § 2, part 2 of this chapter.

14. sva-svāmi-śaktyoḥ svarūpôpalabdhi-hetuḥ saṃyogaḥ—YS. II. 23.

15. puruṣaḥ svāmī dṛśyena svena darśanârthaṃ saṃyuktaḥ. tasmāt saṃyogād dṛśyasyôpalabdhir yā sa bhogaḥ. yā tu draṣṭuḥ svarūpôpalabdhiḥ so' pavargaḥ,—YBh. II. 23. (p. 92, l. 5f.)

See J. Kashio, "On the Relation between the Seer and the Seen in Yoga Philosophy."

16. puruṣasya darśanârthaṃ kaivalyârthaṃ tathā pradhānasya, paṅgv-andhavad ubhayor api saṃyogas tat-kṛtaḥ sargaḥ—SK. 21.

17. P. Chakravarti, *Origin and...*, p. 230f.—

18. The word '*puruṣârtha*' is seen in SK. 31, 42, 63. The fact is explained in SK. 56 to 61.

19. See SK. 22—prakṛter mahāṃs tato' haṃkāras tasmād ganaś ca ṣoḍaśakaḥ, tasmād api ṣoḍaśakāt pañcabhyaḥ pañcabhūtāni.

On detailed discussion, see P. Chakravarti, ibid., pp. 215-254 ; Dasgupta, *History of...*vol. I, pp. 245-251 ; Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, vol. 2, pp. 266-277 ; Frauwallner, *History of...*, vol. I, pp. 278-282.

20. The word '*prakṛti*' is seen in SK. 8, 22, 42, 45, 50, 56, 59, 62, 63, 65 ; '*pradhāna*' in SK. 11, 21, 37, 57, 68 ; '*avyakta*' in SK. 2, 10, 14, 16. 58 ; '*mūla-prakṛti*' in SK. 3.

21. Cf. YBh. IV. 21—Sāṃkhya-yogâdayas tu pravādāḥ svaśabdena puruṣam eva svāminaṃ cittasya bhoktāram upayanti. (p. 204, l. 15f.)

22. See YS. II. 25—tad (i. e., avidyā)—abhāvāt saṃyogâbhāvo hānaṃ tad dṛśeḥ kaivalyam. (The absence of it, that is the avoidance of conjunction and the isolation of the seeing.)

    Here *dṛśi* is the subjective genitive of *kaivalya*.

23. See YBh. II. 25—tad dṛśeḥ kaivalyaṃ puruṣasyâmiśrībhāvaḥ punar asaṃyogo guṇair ity arthaḥ. (p. 97, 1. 7f.)

24. Ibid.—tadā svarūpa-pratiṣṭhaḥ puruṣa ity uktam. (p. 97, 1. 8f.) Here Vyāsa refers to YS. I. 3—tadā draṣṭuḥ svarūpe' vasthānam. (At that time the seer remains in his own nature.)

25. tad etad dṛśyam...syaṃ bhavati puruṣasya dṛśirūpasya svāminaḥ.—YBh. II. 17. (p. 79, 1. 11-p. 80, 1. 1.)

26. puruṣârtha-śūnyāṃ guṇānāṃ pratiprasavaḥ kaivalyaṃ svarūpa-pratiṣṭhā vā citi-śaktir iti.—YS. IV. 34.

27. See also YBh. I. 3—svarūpa-pratiṣṭhā tadānīṃ citiśaktir yathā kaivalyam. (p. 7, 1. 8.) and YBh. III. 50—tadā svarūpa-pratiṣṭhā citi-śaktir eva puruṣa iti. (p. 173, 1. 12f.)

28. tasyā sadā tathaivâvasthānaṃ kaivalyam iti.—YBh. IV. 34. (p. 217, 1. 1f.)

29. citi-śaktir apariṇāminy apratisaṃkramā darśita-viṣyayā śuddhā câanantā ca.—YBh. I. 2. (p. 6, 1.3.)

    See also YBh. III. 35—tasmād ca sattvāt pariṇāmino 'tyanta-vidharmā viśuddho' nyaś citimātra-rūpaḥ puruṣaḥ. (p. 159, 1. 1f.)

30. sadā jñātāś citta-vṛttayas tat-prabhoḥ puruṣasyâpariṇāmitvāt.—YS. IV. 18.

31. See YS. IV. 17—tad-uparāgâpekṣitāc cittasya vastu jñātâjñātam.

32. See YBh. IV. 17—vastuno jñātâjñāta-svarūpatvāt pariṇāmi cittam. (p. 201, 1. 3.)

33. See YBh. IV. 18—sadā-jñātatvaṃ tu manasas tat-prabhoḥ puruṣasyâpariṇāmitvam anumāpayati. (p. 202, 1. 2f.)

    See also YBh. II. 20—sadā jñāta-viṣayatvaṃ tu puruṣasya-apariṇāmitvaṃ paridīpayati. kasmāt. na hi buddhiś ca nāma puruṣa-viṣayaś ca syād agṛhītā cêti siddhaṃ puruṣasya sadā jñāta-viṣayatvaṃ tataś câpariṇāmitvam iti. (p. 88, 1. 10. p. 89, 1. 2.)

34. citer apratisaṃkramāyās tad-ākārâpattau svabuddhi-saṃvedanam.—YS. IV. 22.

35. See Swāmi H. Āraṇya, *Yoga Philosophy*, p. 388 ; and see p. 10. of this chapter.

36. The *puruṣa*, i. e., the *draṣṭṛ* is by nature different from the *citta*, i. e., the *dṛśya*. On this point. Vyāsa explains a characteristic of *puruṣa* in YBh. IV. 25—cittasyaivaiṣa vicitraḥ pariṇāmaḥ puruṣas.

tu asatyām avidyāyām śuddhaś citta-dharmair aparāmṛṣṭa iti. (p. 210, l. 1f: The *citta* has such various changes, while, the *puruṣa* is pure and is not touched by the attributes of *citta* when nescience does not exist.)

Here instead of the phrese 'when nescience does not exist', we can read 'when the conjunction does not exist' by Patañjali's explication that the nescience is the cause of conjunction : YS. II. 24—tasya (saṃyogasya) hetur avidyā.

37. Patañjali declares that one attains the inner-consciousness (pratyak-cetanā) by means of devotion to God : YS. I. 29—tataḥ (īśvara-praṇidhānāt) pratyak-cetanādhigamo 'py antarāyābhāvaś ca.

Vyāsa seems to regard 'pratyak-cetanā' as the isolated *puruṣa*. See the following n. 38 ; and TV. I. 29—pratīpam viparītam añcati vijānātīti pratyak sa câsau cetanaś cêti pratyak-cetano' vidyāvān puruṣaḥ. (p. 34, ll. 15-17.) ; Ibid. II. 24—pratīpam añcati prāpnotīti pratyak. (p. 95, l. 21.) ; Vivaraṇa I. 29—pratyak svabuddhiṃ cetayata iti pratyak-cetanā ātmā. (p. 80.)

38. svarūpa-darśanam apy asya bhavati. yathaivêśvaraḥ puruṣaḥ śuddhaḥ prasannaḥ kevalo'nupasargas tathāyam api buddheḥ pratisaṃvedī puruṣa ity evam adhigacchati.—YBh. I. 29. (p. 34, ll. 9-11.)

39. See YS. I. 23—īsvara-praṇidhānād vā ; YS. II. 45—samādhi-siddhir īsvara-praṇidhānāt.

About '*īśvara praṇidhāna*' see Chapter V, §2.

40. See YS. I. 24—puruṣa-viśeṣaḥ īśvaraḥ.

Speciality of *īśvara* is explained to be always free and supreme: YBh. I. 24—sadaiva īśvaraḥ sadaiva muktaḥ. (p. 27, l. 9f, p. 29, l. 3.)

41. tasmin vivṛtte puruṣaḥ svarūpamātra-pratiṣṭho'taḥ śuddhaḥ kevalo mukta ity ucyata iti.—YBh. I. 51. (p. 56, l. 4f.)

About *nirbīja-samādhi*, see Chapter V, § 5.

42. See YBh. II. 27—etasyām avasthāyām guṇa-sambandhâtītaḥ svarūpamātra-jyotir amalaḥ kevalī puruṣa iti. (p. 99, l. 7f.)—etām sapta-vidhām prânta-bhūmi-prajñām anupaśyan puruṣaḥ kuśala ity ākhyāyate. pratiprasave'pi cittasya muktaḥ kuśala ity eva bhavati guṇâtītatvād iti. (p. 99, ll. 8-10.)

Similar passage in YBh. III. 55—caritâdhikārāś caitasyām avasthāyām guṇā na puruṣasya dṛśyatvena punar upatiṣṭhante. tat puruṣasya kaivalyam. tadā puruṣaḥ svarūpamātra-jyotir amalaḥ kevalī bhavati. (p. 181, ll. 7-10.)

43. See YBh. III, 35. (quoted on p. 6, n. 29) ; and YBh. III. 50—puruṣaś câpariṇāmī śuddho'nyaḥ sattvād iti. (p. 173, l. 7.)

44. See YBh. II. 20—dṛśimātra iti dṛk-śaktir eva viśeṣaṇâparāmṛṣṭêty arthaḥ. sa puruṣo buddheḥ pratisaṃvedī. sa buddher na sarūpo nâtyantaṃ virūpa iti. (p. 88, 1. 6f : The merely seeing means only the power of seer untouched by any qualifications. It is the *puruṣa* who is an apperceiver of *buddhi*. He is not similar to the *buddh i* and is not completely different.)

The word 'viśeṣaṇâparāmṛṣṭa' conveys the sense 'untouched by any attributes.' See TV. II. 20—viśeṣaṇāni dharmās tair aparāmṛṣṭā. (p. 88, 1. 16f.) ; and Vivaraṇa II. 20—viśeṣaṇāni kena cid icchâdinā guṇair guṇa-dharmaiś câparāmṛṣṭaḥ. (p. 189, 1. 21.)

45. dṛg-darśana-śaktyor ekâtmatêva asmitā.—YS. II. 6.

46. puruṣo dṛk-śaktir buddhir darśana-śaktir iti.—YBh. II. 6 (p, 64, 1. 5.)

47. See Vivaraṇa II.6—dṛk darśanam upalabdhiḥ puruṣaḥ sa eva śaktiḥ. dṛśyante 'nenêti darśanam saiva śaktiḥ antaḥ-karaṇâdhyavasāya-svarūpā. (p. 137. 1. 29f.)

YV. II.6—dṛg draṣṭā, dṛśyante 'nenêti darśanaṃ karaṇam buddhiḥ, pralayâdau phalôpadhānaṃ nâstîti śakti-grahanam, tayor ekâtmêva svarūpato dharmataś câtyantam ekâkāro viparyayo' 'smitā' haṃkāra ity arthaḥ. (p. 152.)

48. Therefore *dṛśya* has two meaning, wide and narrow. With this respect we shall observe it again (§ 2, part 1.)

49. This word is discussed by S. N. Dasgupta, *Yoga as...*, p. 18.

50. See YBh. II. 20—sa puruṣo buddheḥ pratisaṃvedī.....yataḥ pratyayaḥ bauddham anupaśyati. tam anupaśyann atadātmâpi tadātmakaiva pratyavabhāsate. (p. 88, 1. 6-p. 89, 1. 8.)

51. See YBh. III. 17—evam ete śabdârtha-pratyayā itaretarâdhyāsāt saṃkīrṇā gaur iti śabdo gaur ity artho gaur iti jñānam. (p. 145, i. 1f.)

52. This word is discussed by S. N. Dasgupta, *Yoga as.....*, p. 19 : See the word 'buddhi-pratisaṃvedi' (YBh. I. 29 ; II. 17, 20 ; IV. 21), 'svabuddhi-pracāra-pratisaṃvedana' (YBh. IV. 19) and 'pratisaṃvedī' (YBh. I. 7).

The term seems to be named after 'svabuddhi-saṃvedana' in YS. IV. 22. See p. 7, n. 34.

53. This word is seen in YBh. I. 2(see p. 6, n. 29), 4 ; 11. 17 ; III. 35.

See Vivaraṇa I. 2—darśito'ntaḥ-karaṇena viṣayo'syā iti. (p. 12, 1. 13.)

54. YBh. II. 20 (see p. 8, n. 44.) Cf. SK. 10 and 11.

55. Also YBh. I. 2—sattva-guṇātmikā cêyam ato viparītā viveka-khyātir iti (p. 7. 1. 1.) and 'atyanta-vidharma' in YBh. III. 35. (see pp. 6, n. 29.) Cf. 'anya' (pp. 8, n. 43.)

56. See YBh. II. 20—na tāvat sarūpaḥ. kasmāt. jñātâjñāta-viṣayatvāt pariṇāmī hi buddhiḥ. tasyāś ca viṣayo gavâdir ghaṭâdiś ca jñātaś câjñātaś cêti pariṇāmitvaṃ darśayati. (p. 88, 11. 7-9) This portion is followed by the passage quoted on p. 6, n. 33.

    The *buddhi's* 'jñātâjñāta-viṣayatva' seems to come from YS. IV. 17 quoted on p. 6, n. 31.

57. kiṃ ca parârthā buddhiḥ saṃhatya-kāritvāt svârthaḥ puruṣaḥ.—YBh. II. 20. (p. 89, 1. 2f.)

    Also see YS. III. 35—sattva-puruṣayor atyantâsaṃkīrṇayoḥ pratyayâviśeṣo bhogaḥ parârthāt svârtha-saṃyamāt puruṣa-jñānam.

    About *bhoga* see part 10 of this section.

58. YS. IV. 24—tad asaṃkhyeya-vāsanābhiś citram api parârthaṃ saṃhatya-kāritvāt.

59. tathā sarvârthâdhyavasāyakatvāt tri-guṇā buddhis triguṇatvād acetanêti. guṇānāṃ tûpadraṣṭā puruṣa iti. ato na sarūpaḥ.—YBh. II. 20. (p. 89, 11. 3-5.)

60. See SK. 10 and 11.

61. See YBh. II, 20—sa tu tarhi virūpa iti. nâtyantaṃ virūpaḥ. kasmāt. śuddho'py asau pratyayânupaśyaḥ. yataḥ pratyayaṃ bauddham anupaśyati. tam anupaśyann atadātmakâpi tad-ātmaka iva pratyavabhāsate. (p. 89, 11. 6-8.)

62. See YS. 1.3—tadā draṣṭuḥ svarūpe'vasthānam. (At that time the seer remains in his own nature.)

    And YS. 1. 4—vṛtti-sārūpyam itaretara. (At other times the seer appears to have the same form as the functions.)

63. See YBh. I. 4—vyutthāne yāś citta-vṛttayas tad-aviśiṣṭavṛttiḥ puruṣaḥ. (p. 8, 1. 4 : *Puruṣa* is not distinguished from the functions of mind that take place in the emprical state.)

64. See YS. II. 23 and YBh. II. 23 quoted on p. 3, n. 14 and 15.
    Also see YBh. II. 17 quoted on p. 6 n. 25.

    We can find the same idea in YBh. I. 4—cittam ayaskānta-maṇikalpaṃ saṃnidhimātrôpakāri dṛśyatvena svaṃ bhavati puruṣasya svāminaḥ. tasmāc citta-vṛtti-bodhe puruṣasyânādiḥ saṃbandho hetuḥ. (p. 8, 1. 5-p. 9, 1. 2 : The *citta*, like a magnet, serves only by being close to. By being the seen, it is the property of the owner, i. e., the *puruṣa*. Therefore in the case that

the *puruṣa* cognizes the mind-functions, the cause of it is the beginningless combination.)

The phrase 'the *puruṣa* cognizes the mind-functions' is equivalent to the phrase 'recognizes the seen', and that means experience, i. e., 'dṛśyôpalabdhiḥ' in YBh. II. 23.

65. In Vyāsa's comment on *asmitā*, the *puruṣa* is named *dṛk-śakti* and the *buddhi* is named *darśana-śakti* (p. 16.) Using the words *bhoktṛ-śakti* and *bhogya-śakti*, he proceeds to explain the *bhoga* in YBh. II. 6—bhoktṛ-bhogya-śaktyor atyanta-vibhaktayor atyantâsaṃkīrṇayor avibhāga-prāptav iva satyāṃ bhoga kalpate. svarūpa-pratilambhe tu tayoḥ kaivalyam eva bhavati, kuto bhoga iti. (p. 64, 11. 6-8 : Although the power of experiencer and the power of experienced are completely unmixed, when both look like undivided, the experience happens. But when both attain their own nature, the isolation get reflected. Then wherefrom is the experience ?)

L. Chattopadhyaya mentions that '*Bhoga* or experience, which includes different froms of perception and emotional and other feelings, can only be conceived of in terms of something related to consciousness i. e. it can never be achieved by an unconscious object. Experience therefore is not possible unless in relation to a conscious principle and consciousness in its unadulterated form, makes the self or *puruṣa* in Sāṃkhya terminology.' (*Self in*....., p. 32.)

66. sattva-puruṣayor atyantâsaṃkīrṇayoḥ pratyayâviśeṣo bhogaḥ—YS. III. 35 first half.

Here '*sattva*' means '*buddhi-sattva*'.

See YBh. III. 35—tayor atyntâsaṃkīrṇayor pratyayâviśeṣo bhoghaḥ. puruṣasya darśita-viṣaytvāt. sa bhoga-pratyaya sattvasya parârthatvāt dṛśyaḥ. (p. 159, 11.2-4 : The experience is the undistinguished conception between the two being completely unmixed, because the *puruṣa* is the seer of the object. The conception of experience is the seen because the *sattva* is for the purpose of the other.)

67. About *pratyaya*, see p. 9.

68. See p. 8 and p. 10 n. 65.

69. Cf. SK. 17b—puruṣo' sti bhoktṛ-bhāvāt.

70. See YBh. II.18—tat tu nâprayojanam api tu prayojanam urarīkṛtya pravartate iti bhogâpavargârtham hi tad dṛśyaṃ puruṣasyêti. tatrêṣṭâniṣṭa-guṇa-svarūpâvadhāraṇam avibhāgāpannam bhogo, bhoktuḥ svarūpâvadhāraṇam apavarga iti. dvayor atiriktam anyad-darśanaṃ nâsti. (p. 84, 11. 1-4 : It, i. e., the *dṛśya* acts

not only having no motivation but accepting motivation, so that, indeed the *dṛśya* is for the purpose of experience and emancipation of the *puruṣa*. Of these, the experience is the realisation of the wished or unwished *guṇas* and is the unattainment of division, while the emancipation is the realisation of the experiencer's own nature. There is no other seeing apart from the two.)

This explanation is parallel to YBh. II. 23 quoted on p. 3 and YBh. II. 6 quoted on p. 10. n. 65.

71. yathā ca jayaḥ parā-jayo vā yoddhṛṣu vartamānaḥ svāmini vyapadiśyate, sa hi tat-phalasya bhoktêti. evaṃ bandha-mokṣau buddhav eva vartamānau puruṣe vyapadiśyate. sa hi tat-phalasya bhoktêti—YBh. II. 18. (p. 84, 11. 8-10.)

The example of the soldier and commander is said also in YBh. I. 24. (p. 27, 11. 1-3) Cf. SK. 21 and 59.

72. etena grahaṇa-dhāraṇôhâpoha-tattvajñâbhiniveśā buddhau vartamānāḥ puruṣe'dhyāropita-sad-bhāvāh. sa hi tat-phalasya bhoktêti.—Ibid. (p. 84, 11. 11-13.)

About "adhyāropita", see Vivaraṇa 11.18—puruṣo gṛhṇāti puruṣa dhārayatīty evam eva puruṣe adhyāropayante. (p. 181, 1. 23f.)

73. tathā côktaṁ. ayam tu khalu triṣu guṇeṣu kartṛṣv akartari ca puruṣe tulyâtulya-jātīye caturthe tatkriyā-sākṣiṇy upanīyamānān sarva-bhāvān upapannān anupaśyan na darśanam anyac chaṅkata iti.—YBh. II, 18. (p. 84, 11. 4-6.)

Vācaspatimiśra in his TV attributes this text to Pañcaśikha, About Pañcaśikha, see P. Chakravarti, *Origin and.....*, pp. 113-127.

74. atrâpi tāpakasya rajasaḥ sattvam eva tapyaṁ. kasmāt. tapikriyāyāḥ karmasthatvāt. sattve karmaṇi tapikriyā nâpariṇāmini niṣkriye kṣetrā-jñe. darśita-viṣayatvāt sattve tu tapyamāne tadākārânurodhi puruṣo'nutapyata iti.—YBh. II. 17. (p. 81. 11. 6-9.)

75. YBh. I. 49.—samādhi-prajñā-nirgrāhya eva sa viśeṣo bhavati, bhūta-sūkṣma-gato vā puruṣa-gato vā. (p. 53, 1. 5f.)

76. See YS. I. 49—śrutânumānā-prajñābhyām anya-viṣayā viśeṣârthatvāt.

77. This word is used in TV. I. 49. (p. 53, 11. 19-21.)

78. yatrêdam uktam, tam aṇumātram ātmānam anuvidya asmîty evaṃ tāvat saṃprajānīta iti.—YBh. I. 36. (p. 41, 1. 11-p. 42, 1. 1)
We shall refer to this passage later on Chap. III, n. 108

79. Vācaspatimiśra speaks of 'atom' not telling its form but only that

'because of not understandable'. see TV. I. 36—yatrêdam uktaṃ Pañcaśikhena 'tam aṇum' *duradhigamatvād* 'ātmānam' ahaṃkārâspandam 'anuvidya' anucintayâsmîty evaṃ tāvaj jānîta iti. (p. 41, l. 30—p. 42, l. 12.)

Śaṅkara-Bhagavatpāda explains that 'atom' means 'subtle' (sūkṣma) and 'atomic form' means the same size of the own form of the object. See Vivaraṇa I. 36—'tam' etaṃ prakṣtam asmitātmānam ahaṃkāram 'anu' sūkṣmam 'ātmānam anuvidya' prāpya 'asmîty evaṃ tāvat' saṃjānîta iti. yādṛśam ālambana-svarūpaṃ tāvat mātraṃ saṃjānîte. ahaṃkāra-svarūpenaiva tad-anurūpyād avacchidyate. (p. 95, ll. 17-19.)

Vijñānabhikṣu regards 'atomic form' as the subtlest. See YV. I.36—'anumātram' sūkṣmatamam anuvidya sravaṇamananâbhyām avadhāryâsmîty etāvan mātrâkāreṇa sākṣātkarotîty arthaḥ. (p. 104, l. 4f.)

80. davyī cêyaṃ nityatā kūṭastha-nityatā pariṇāminityatā ca. tatra kūṭastha-nityatā puruṣasya. pariṇāmanityatā guṇānām. yasmin pariṇamyamāne tattvaṃ na vihanyate tan nityam. ubhayasya ca tattvânabhighātān nityatvam.– YBh. IV. 33. (p. 214, ll. 2-5.)
   As to the eternity of *guṇsa*, see p. 16.
81. The Sāṃkhya view of the plurality of *puruṣa* is recorded in SK. 18 ; see P. Chakravarti, *Origin* and…, pp. 53 and 317f.
82. See S. N. Dasgupta, *Yoga As*…, pp. 26-30.
83. Kaivalyaṃ prāptās tarhi santi ca bahuvaḥ kevalinaḥ. te hi trīṇi bandhāni cchitvā kaivalyaṃ prāptāḥ.—YBh. I. 24. (p. 27, l. 5f.)
84. See YS. II. 22—kṛtârthaṃ prati naṣṭam apy anaṣṭaṃ tad-anya-sādhāraṇatvāt. (Although ceasing to exist in relation to the *puruṣa* whose purpose is fulfilled, the *dṛśya* does not cease to exist to others on account of being of use to others.)
85. na ca pradhānavad eka eva puruṣaḥ. tan-nānātvasya janma-maraṇa-sukha-duḥkhâpabhoga-mukti-saṃsāra-vyavasthayā siddheḥ. —TV. II. 22. (p. 91, l. 21f.)
86. About the standpoint of this matter of the Yoga Philosophy, see S. N. Dasgupta, *Yoga As*…, p. 30 ; S. Murakami, *A Study of the Sāṃkhya-Philosophy*, pp. 334-336.
87. dṛśi-rūpasya puruṣasya karma-rūpatām āpannaṃ dṛśyam iti tad-artha eva dṛśyasyatmā svarūpaṃ bhavatîty arthaḥ. tat-svarūpaṃ tu para-rūpeṇa pratilabdhâtmakam.—YBh. II. 21. (p. 90, ll. 3-5.)
88. See p. 10, n. 70 ; YBh. II. 18.
89. draṣṭā buddheḥ pratisaṃvedī puruṣaḥ, dṛśyā buddhisattvôparūḍhāḥ sarve dharmāḥ. tad etad dṛśyam ayaskāntamaṇi-kalpaṃ saṃniddhi-

mātrôpakāri dṛśyatvena svaṃ bhavati puruṣasya dṛśi-rūpasya svāminaḥ. anubhava-karma-viṣayatām āpannaṃ yataḥ. anya-svarūpeṇa pratipannam anya-svarūpeṇa pratilabdhâtmakaṃ svatantram api parârthatvāt paratantram. tayor dṛg-darśana-śaktiyor anādir artha-kṛtaḥ saṃyogo heya-hetur duḥkhasya kāraṇam ity arthaḥ.—YBh. II. 17. (p. 79, l. 11-p. 80, l. 11 The text of Vivaraṇa lacks 'anya-svarūpeṇa pratipannam'.)

The simile of the magnet relating to the *puruṣa* is mentioned also in YBh. I. 4. (see fn. 64 and fn. 1.); II. 18). (see p. 36.), while in YBh. IV. 17, a magnet is the object relating to the *citta*. (see fn. 1.)

90. Vācaspatimiśra, Śaṅkara-Bhagavatapāda too, introduces the sentence 'dṛśyā buddhi-sattvôparūḍhāḥ sarve dharmāḥ' as the answer to the question that 'the sense objects, i. e., sound etc. are the seen, aren't they ?'

See TV. II. 17—nanu etāvatâpi buddher evânena dṛśyate na dṛśyerañ śabdādayo 'tyanta-vyavahitā ity ata āha, dṛśyā buddhi sattva iti. indriya-praṇālikayā buddhau śabdâdy-ākāreṇa pariṇatāyāṃ bhavati śabdâdayo'pi dṛśyā ity arthaḥ. (p. 79, ll. 24-26.)

Vivaraṇa II. 17—nanu ca śabdâdayo'pi viṣayā dṛśyā evêty ata āha, sattvôparuḍhāḥ sarve dharmāḥ śabdâdayo buddhi-sattvam uparūḍhā buddhi-pratyayākārā eva dṛśyā na svataḥ. (p. 172, l. 25f.)

91. See YS. IV. 19—na tat svâbhāsaṃ dṛśyatvāt. (It, i. e., the mind is not self-illuminating being an object of seeing.)

92. The *buddhi*, i.e., *citta* and the external objects are *svatantra*. See YBh. IV. 16—tasmāt svatantro'rthaḥ sarva-puruṣa-sādhāraṇaḥ svatantrī ca cittāni pratipuruṣaṃ pravartante. tayoḥ sambandhād upalabdhiḥ puruṣasya bhoga iti. (p. 200, ll. 4-6.)

93. Cf. SK. 10—hetumad anityam avyāpi sakriyam anekam āśritaṃ liṅgam, sâvayavaṃ paratantraṃ vyaktaṃ viparītam avyaktam; SK. 11d—tad-viparītaś ca tathā pumān.

Here *vyakta* (buddhi etc.) is *paratantra*, while *avyakta* and *puruṣa* are *svatantra*. We should notice that the *buddhi* is not *svatantra*.

94. See YBh. II. 18—prakāśa-śīlaṃ sattvam. kriyā-śīlaṃ rajaḥ. sthiti-śīlaṃ tama iti ete guṇāḥ. (p. 82, l. 4f.)

95. YS. I. 16; II. 15, 19; IV. 13, 32, 34.

96. Cf. YS. II. 19—viśeṣâviśeṣa-liṅgamātrâliṅgāni guṇa-parvāṇi. In this *sūtra*, *aliṅga* is *avyakta* and the other three are *vyakta*.

YS. I. 16—tat-paraṃ puruṣa-khyāter guṇa-vaitṛṣṇyam.

YBh. I. 16—guṇebhyo vyaktāvyakta-dharmakebhyo... (p. 20, l. 4.)

97. The fact that the *guṇas* change is mentioned in YS. IV. 32—'tataḥ kṛthārthārāṃ pariṇāma-krama-samāptir guṇānām ; In YS. IV. 34, 'guṇānāṃ pratiprasavaḥ' is mentioned. That is the reverse of *parināma*.

98. See YS. II. 15, fn. 3 of this chapter.

99. See YBh. II. 15—prakhyā-pravṛtti-sthiti-rūpā buddhi-guṇāḥ parasparânugraha-tantrībhūtvā śāntaṃ ghoraṃ mūḍhaṃ vā pratyayaṃ triguṇam evârabhante. (p. 77, ll. 7-9 ; The *guṇas* as *buddhi*, which are by nature brightness, activity and inertia, being helpful and dependent each other, give rise to the three qualified conceptions, i.e., tranquil, vehement and stupidity.) ; Cf. SK. 38.

100. YBh. II. 15—evam ete guṇā itaretarâśrayenôpārjita-sukha-duḥkha-moha-pratyayāḥ sarve sarva-rūpā bhavantîti. guṇa pradhāna-bhāva-kṛtas tv eṣāṃ viśeṣa iti. (p. 77, l. 11– p. 78, l. 2.)

101. This is discussed by S. N. Dasgupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. I, p. 243f.

102. See YBh- II. 19—aliṅgâvasthāyāṃ na puruṣârtho hetuḥ. nâliṅgâvasthāyām ādau puruṣârthatā kāraṇaṃ bhavatîti. na tasyāḥ puruṣârthatā kāraṇaṃ bhavatîti. nâsau puruṣârtha-kṛtti nityâkhyāyate. (p. 86, l. 5—p. 87, l. 2 ; The state of the non-indicator has not any object of *puruṣa* as its cause, because being as an object of *puruṣa* it can not be the beginning cause of the state of the non-indicator nor has it been caused for serving the end of *puruṣa*. It is moreover regarded as eternal.)

103. See YS. II. 19, fn. 124 in this chapter.

104. See YBh. II. 19—trayāṇāṃ tu avasthā-viśeṣāṇām ādau puruṣârthatā kāraṇaṃ bhavati. sa cârtho hetur nimittaṃ kāraṇaṃ bhavatîty anityâkhyāyate. (p. 87, ll. 2-4 ; Serving as objects of the *puruṣa* is the cause of the three distinguished states. Serving as objects of the *puruṣa* being the cause, those three states are regarded as non-eternal.

105. ete guṇāḥ (1) parasparôparakta-pravibhāgâḥ, (2) pariṇāminaḥ, (3) saṃyoga-viyoga-dharmāḥ, (4) itaretarôpāśrayeṇôpārjitamūrtayâḥ, (5) parasparâṅgâṅgitve'py asaṃbhinna-śakti-pravibhāgās, (6) tulya-jātīyâtulya-jātīya-śakti-bhedânupātinaḥ, (7) pradhāna-velāyām upadarśita-saṃnidhārā, (8) guṇatve'pi ca vyāpāra-mātreṇa pradhānântarītâ numitâstitāḥ, (9) puruṣârtha-kartavyatayā prayukta sāmarthyāḥ, (10) saṃnidhimātrôpakāriṇo 'yaskāntamaṇi-kalpāḥ, (11) pratyayam antareṇaikâtmasya vṛttim anuvartamānāḥ, (12) pradhāna-śabda-vācyā bhavanti.. YBh. II. 18. (p. 82, l. 5—p. 83, l. 4.)

106. See YS. III. 48—tato mano-javitvaṃ vikaraṇa-bhāvaḥ pradhāna-jayaś ca. (Thence come power of rapidity as of the mind, independent actions of organs and subduing the *pradhāna*.)

Here 'tato' follows the previous YS. III. 47—grahaṇa-svarūpāsmitānvayārthavattva-saṃyamād indriya-jayaḥ. (By *saṃyama* on the receptivity, essential character, I-sense, inherent quality and objectivity subduing the sense-organs can be obtained.)

107. sarva-prakṛti-vikāra-vaśitvaṃ pradhāna-jaya iti—YBh. III. 48. (p. 172, l. 3f.)

108. In this context, see Vivaraṇa III. 48—aṣṭānāṃ prakṛtīnāṃ tad-vikārāṇām ca vaśitvam. (p. 305, l.20.)

SK. 3 terms 'avikṛti' as *mūla-prakṛti*, 'prakṛti-vikṛti' as *mahat* etc. and 'vikāra' as the sixteen.

109. See Vivaraṇa II. 18—naiva triguṇa-vyatirekeṇānyat pradhānaṃ nāmāsti, ta eva guṇāḥ sāmyāvasthāḥ pradhānaika-śabdābhi-dhānīyakaṃ pratipadyante. vaiṣmyaṃ bhajanto vikāra-śabdābhidheyā vṛtti-manto bhavati. (p. 179, ll. 15-17; The so-called *pradhāna* does not exist aparting from the three *guṇas*. When they are equilibrated the expression *pradhana*, as one word, is taken. When they get to be unequilibrated, they are expressed by the word *vyakta* and obtain action.)

Cf. TV. II. 18—pradhīyata ādhīyate viśvaṃ kāryam ebhir iti vyutpattyā. (p. 83, l. 25.)

See also S. N. Dasgupta, *Yoga As*...p. 10.

110. YS. I. 19—bhava-pratyayo videha-prakṛti-layānām.
YS. IV. 2—jāty-antara-pariṇāmaḥ prakṛty-āpūrāt.
YS. IV. 3—nimittam aprayojakaṃ prakṛtīnāṃ varṇa-bhedas tu tataḥ kṣetrivat.

111. tatra kāyêndriyāṇām anya-jāti-pariṇatānām—YBh. IV. intro. (p. 183, l. 1.)

112. kāyêndriya-prakṛtayaś ca svaṃ vikāram anugṛhnanty āpūreṇa dharmâdi-minittam apekṣamāṇā iti—YBh. IV. 2. (p. 183, l.4.f.)

Cf. TV. IV. 2—kāyasya hi prakṛtiḥ pṛthivy-ādīni bhūtāni. indriyāṇāṃ ca prakṛtir asmitā. (p. 183, l. 14f.)

Following Vācaspatimiśra, the *prakṛti* of body is the five *bhutas* of *pṛthivī* etc. and the *prakṛti* of sense-organs is *asmitā*. If so, speaking like the Sāṃkya, the word 'prakṛti' indicates the thirteen *tattvas*, i. e., *pradhāna*, *mahat*, five *tanmātras* and five *bhūtas*. But the *bhūtas* must be *vikāra*. Here the *prakṛti* cannot imply the *bhūta* but *tanmātra*.

113. See YS. I. 19, fn. 110; YBh. I. 19 intro—sa khalv ayaṃ dvi-vidhaḥ, upāya-pratyayo bhava-pratyayaś ca. tatra upāya-pratyayo yogināṃ bhavati. (p. 23, l. 4f.)

114. See SK. 3—mūla-prakṛtir avikṛtir mahat-ādyāḥ prakṛti-vikṛtayaḥ sapta, ṣoḍaśakas tu vikāro na prakṛtir na vikṛtiḥ puruṣaḥ.

115. Vācaspatimiśra here correctly considers this *prakṛti* as *avyakta*, *mahat*, *ahaṃkāra* and the five *tanmātras*.

See TV. I. 19—tathā prakṛti-layāś cāvyakta-mahad-ahaṃkāra-pañca-tānmātreṣv anyatamam ātmatvena prati-pannās…(p. 24, l. 7f.)

116. For example, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, dealing with the *pariṇāma-vāda* in his *Pradhāna-bheda*, summs up; only the *pradhāna*, having the *guṇa*, i. e., *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* as its essence, changes (pariṇamate) into the shape of the world in the sequence of the *mahat*, the *ahaṃkāra* and so on. Effects, before appearance existing with the subtle shape, come forth by the activity of the cause. That is the second assertion (viz. pariṇāma-vāda), i. e., that of the Sāṃkhya, the Yoga-Patañjali and the Pāśpata. (ĀnSS. No. 51, Appendix.) This is quoted by S. Murakami, *A Study of*…p. 54f.

And also in the *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha*, the author Mādhava regards the Yoga philosophy as the theistic Sāṃkhya and the *Yoga-sūtra* as the *Sāṃkhya-pravacana*: sāṃpratam seśvara-sāṃkhya-pravartaka-patañjali-prabhṛti-muni-matam anuvartamānānāṃ matam upanyasyate. tatra sāṃkhya-pravacanāpara-nāma-dheyaṃ yoga-śāstraṃ Patañjali-praṇitaṃ pāda-catuṣṭayātmakam. (p. 331; Cowel's tr. p. 231.)

117. See SK. 22—prakṛter mahāṃs toto'haṃkāras tasmād gaṇaś ca ṣoḍaśakaḥ, tasmād api ṣoḍaśakāt pañcabhyāḥ pañca-bhūtāni; and SK. 24—abhimāno'haṃkāras tasmād dvividhaḥ pravartate sargaḥ, ekādaśakaś ca gaṇas tanmātraḥ pañcaś caiva.

118. See SK. 21 cd—paṅgv-andhavad ubhayor api saṃyogas tat-kṛtaḥ sargaḥ; and SK. 24, also cf. SK. 66.

119. See Sk. 52cd—liṅgākhyo bhāvākhyas tasmād bhavati dvidhā sargaḥ.

The eight *bhāvas* are *dharma*, *adharma*, *jñāna*, *ajñāna*, *vairāgya*, *rāga*, *aiśvarya* and *anaiśvarya*: See SK. 44, 45.

120. See SK. 46a—eṣa pratyaya-sargo.

121. See SK. 53d—samāsato bhautikaḥ sargaḥ.

122. See SK. 16.

123. See SK. 27cd—guṇa-pariṇāma-viśeṣān nānātvaṃ bāhya-bhedaś ca. The older three commentaries, i.e., the *Suvarna-saptati* (Chinese version), the *Gaudapāda-bhāsya* and the *Māṭhara-vṛtti*, comment

in the same manner that the phenomenal world comes forth by the *pradhāna's* change. For instance, the *Māṭhara-vṛtti* ad SK. 16—evam evâvyaktam ādhyātmikena buddhy-ahaṃkāra-tanmātrêndriya-bhūta-bhāvena pariṇamati, ādhidaivikena śitôṣṇa-vāta-varṣâdi-bhāvena pariṇamati. (Just as water changes variously so the unmanifested changes as relating to the soul in the condition of *buddhi, ahaṃkāra, tanmātra, indriya* and *bhūta*, and as relating to the atmosphere changes in the condition of cold, heat, wind and rain etc.)

124. Viśeṣâviśeṣa-liṅgamātrâliṅgāni guṇa-parvāni—YS. II. 19.

125. Diversified (viśeṣa) means the five bhūtas, the five *buddhīndriyas*, the five *karmêndriyas* and *manas*. Vyāsa calls these sixteen as 'viśeṣa-pariṇāma' (diversified mutation) of the *guṇas*.

See YBh. II. 19—guṇānām eṣa ṣoḍaśako viśeṣa-pariṇāmaḥ, (p. 85, 1, 7f.)

Undiversified (aviśeṣa) means the five *tanmātras*, and the *asmitāmātra*. They are called 'aviśeṣa-pariṇāma' (undiversified mutation).

See YBh. II. 19—ete sattāmātrasyâtmano mahataḥ ṣaḍaviśeṣapariṇāmāḥ. (p. 85, 1. 11f.)

Indicator-only (liṅgamātra) is called 'mahat-tattva' (great entity), 'sattāmātra' (mere existence), 'mahat' (great) and 'ātman' (self).

See YBh. II. 19—yat tat param aviśeṣebhyo liṅgamātraṃ mahattattvaṃ tasminn ete sattāmātre mahaty avasthāya vivṛddhikāṣṭhām anubhavanti. (p. 85, 1. 12-p. 86, 1. 1.)

Non-indicator (aliṅga) means the primal cause (pradhāna), which is without existence-non-existence (niḥsattâsat), without real-nonreal (niḥsad-asad), apart from non-real (nirasat), and unmanifested (avyakta).

See YBh. II. 19—parisaṃsṛjyamānaś ca tasminn eva sattāmātre mahaty avasthāya yat tan niḥsattâsattaṃ niḥsad-asan nirasada vyaktam aliṅgaṃ pradhānaṃ tat pratyanti. (p. 86, 1. 2f.) The last two are called *parināma*. See YBh. II. 19—eṣa teṣāṃ liṅgamātraḥ pariṇāmo niḥsattâsattaṃ câlinga-pariṇāma iti. (p. 86, 1. 4.)

In this respect, see S. Takagi, "The Relation Between the Yogabhāṣya and Sāṃkhya." and "Sāṃkhya View in the Yogabhāṣya."

126. See SK. 38—tanmātrāṇy aviśeṣās tebhyo bhūtāni pañca, pañcabhyaḥ, ete smṛtā viśeṣāḥ śāntā ghorāś ca mūḍhāś ca.

127. See S. N. Dasgupta, *Yoga As......*, p. 69, and YBh. II. 19—na viśeṣebhyaḥ paraṃ tattvântaram astîti viśeṣāṇāṃ nâsti tattvântara-pariṇāmaḥ, teṣām tu dharma-lakṣaṇa-avasthā-pariṇāmā vyākhyāyi ṣyante. (p. 88, 11. 1—3.)

128. tad etad bhūtêndriyâtmakaṃ bhūta-bhāvena pṛthivy-ādinā sūkṣma-sthūlena pariṇamate. tathêndriya-bhāvena śrotrâdinā sūkṣma-sthūlena pariṇamata iti.—YBh. II. 18. (p. 86, 1. 5f.)

About the same thing in other words, YBh. IV. 14—prakhyā-kriyāsthiti-śīlānāṃ guṇānāṃ grahaṇâtmakānāṃ karana-bhāvenaikaḥ pariṇāmaḥ śrotram indriyam. grāhya-ātmakānāṃ *śabda-tanmātra*-bhāvenaikaḥ pariṇāmaḥ śabdo viṣaya iti. (p. 195, 11.6-8. The words in Italics part must be read *śabda* according to Vivarana.)

Cf. TV. IV. 14—śabda iti śabda-tanmātram. viṣaya iti jaḍatvam āha, na tu tanmātrasya śrotra-viṣaya-saṃbhava iti. (p.195, 1.24f.)

129. S. N. Dasgupta explains in detail in his *History of*...vol I : The five classes of atomsphere generated from the tanmātras as follows: the sound-potential, with assertion of radiant matter from *bhūtādi* generates the ākāśa-atom. The touch-potentials combine with the vibratory particles (sound-potential) to generate the vāyu-atom. The light-and-heat potentials combine with touch-potentials and sound-potentials to produce the tejas-atom, and so on (p. 252f)

We read the same explanation in TV. I. 44—nimittaṃ pārthivasya paramāṇor gandha-tanmātra-pradhānebhya utpattiḥ, evam āpyasya paramāṇor gandha-tanmātra-varjitebhyo rasa-tanmātra-pradhānebhyaś caturbhyaḥ...(p. 41, 11. 12-16.) But the sequence of explanation between the *History of*......and TV is inversely.

130. See YBh. III. 44—atha kim eṣāṃ sūkṣma-rūpam. tanmātraṃ bhūta-kāraṇam, tasyaiko' vayavaḥ paramāṇuḥ. (p. 162, 1. 6f.)

The *bhūtas* have their *sāmānya* (generic property) and *viśeṣa* (specific property). As the *sāmānya*, earth is characterised by form, water is by smoothness, fire is by heat, wind is by movability and air is by motion in all directions. On this point, see YBh. III. 44—dvitīyam rūpaṃ svasāmānyam. mūrtir bhūmiḥ, sneho jalaṃ, vahnir uṣṇatā, vāyuḥ praṇāmī, sarvato-gatir ākāśa ity etat svarūpa-śabdenôcyate. (p. 166, 1. 2f.)

In the case of generation of the *bhūtas* or *paramānus* from the *tanmātra*, it may be said that *pṛthivī-paramānu* is one *parināma* which is characterised by the *mūrti* as *sāmānya* with predominance of *gandha-tanmātra*. In this connection, see YBh. IV. 14—śabdâdīnāṃ mūrti-samāna-jātīyānām ekaḥ pariṇāmaḥ pṛthivī-paramāṇus tanmātrâvayavaḥ. (p. 195, 1. 8f.)

As the *viśesa*, earth and the others are characterised by smell, taste, form, touch and sound. See YBh. III.44—asya sāmānyasya-śabdâdayo viśeṣāḥ (p. 166, 1. 3f.) But each one is not corresponding with each *viśeṣa*. Pṛthivī has five viśeṣas. *āp* has four

excepting *gandha*, and the like. Lastly *ākāśa* has only *śabda*. In this connection, see TV. III. 44—eteṣām pañca pṛthivyām, gandha varjaṃ catvāropsu, gandha-rasa-varjaṃ trayas tejasi. gandha-rasa-rūpa-varjaṃ dvau nabhasvati, śabda evākāśe. (p. 165, l. 23f.)

These five *viśesas*, i.e., *gandha* etc. with attributes of *ākāra* etc. change into the worldly things. Those are said by the word '*sthūla*' or gross. See YBh. III. 44—tatra pārthivādyāḥ śabdâdayo viśeṣāḥ sahākārâdibhir dharmaiḥ sthūla-śabdena paribhāṣitāḥ (p. 165, l. 9—p. 166, l. 1.)

The *dharmas* of *pṛthivī* etc. are fully numerated in TV. III. 44 (p. 166.) and S. N. Dasgupta, *Yoga As*....., p. 167.
In other words, for example, one change (eka parināma) of *pṛthivī-paramāṇu* is the land, cow and the like. See YBh. IV. 14—pṛthivī-paramāṇus tanmātrâvayavaḥ, teṣāṃ caikāḥ pariṇāmaḥ pṛthivī gaur vṛksaḥ parvataḥ ity evaṃ ādiḥ. (p. 195, l. 9f.)

However F. V. Catalina metions : The five mahābhutas are referred to as atoms by Dasgupta, but it would be better to consider them as sub-atomic particles. These five factors are basic constitutions from which the 'atoms' of the elements are produced. (*A Study of the Self-concept of Sāṃkhya Yoga Philosophy*, p. 53.)

131. S. N. Dasgupta, *Yoga As*....., p. 41.
132. S. N. Dasgupta, *Yoga As* ....., p. 69. And also Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, vol. 2, p. 272.
133. See YBh. I. 43—tasyā eka-buddhy-upakrano hy arthâtmā aṇu-pracaya-viśeṣâtmā gavâdir ghaṭâdir vā lokaḥ. (p. 46, l. 12—p. 47, l. 1.)
134. See YBh. IV. 13—te khalv amī try-adhvāno dharma....sarvam idam guṇānāṃ saṃniveśa-viśeṣamātram iti. (p. 194, l. 9—p. 195, l.1.) Cf. YD. p. 48, ll. 8-11. S. Murakami, *A Study of*....., p. 142.
135. The word '*samsthāna*' appears in the YBh. I. 43 (p. 47, l. 1), III. 13(p. 132, l. 8) and III. 26 (p. 153, l. 15).
136. S. N. Dasgupta, *Yoga Philosophy*, p. 115.
137. avasthitasya dravyasya pūrva-dharma-nivṛttau dharmantarôt-pattiḥ pariṇāma iti.—YBh. III. 13. (p. 133, l. 10f.)
See P. Chakravarti, *Origin and*....., p. 258.
138. P. Chakravarti, ibid., p. 260.
139. S. N. Dasgupta, *Yoga As*....., p. 71.

Chapter II

The Pariṇāma Theory in Terms of Mental Phenomena

In the philosophical treaties of both the schools of Yoga and Sāṃkhya, the ontological problems are dealt with through the concept of *pariṇāma*. As we have already noticed (Chap. 1, § 3), *pariṇāma* is to be understood both in the sense of the *tattvântara-pariṇāma* and the *dharma-pariṇāma*.

In this chapter it will be our task to enquire further into the change of phenomenal world in concept of *citta* or mind which is the principal subject matter of the Yoga philosophy.

§ 1. Citta-pariṇāma

In the Yoga philosophy, all investigations are made from the aspect of *citta*. It is the mind that is to be restrained, and the restraint of the mind-functions (citta-vṛtti-nirodha) is what is meant by *samādhi* or concentration.[1]

The restraint of the mind-functions is accomplished through the practice of the eight *yogâṅgas*.[2] In that condition of *samādhi*, the state of mind is explained through the concept of the *citta-pariṇāma*.

In the Sāṃkhya philosophy, *parinām̄a* is the concept to explain the manifestation of twenty-three principles from the primary cause of matter. In the Yoga philosophy, *pariṇāma* implies the mental phenomena also, relating to the restraint of the mind-functions.

Generally speaking, *citta* combining with *puruṣa* is reflected by external objects and recognizes them. That state of *citta* is regarded to be changing.[3] By the *citta-pariṇāma* is meant the fact that we have consciousness or mental functionings.[4]

Patañjali classifies the restrained state of *citta* into three kinds : (1) *nirodha-pariṇāma* or the change of the state of restraint, (2) *samādhi-pariṇāma* or the change of the state of concentration, and (3) *ekâgratā-pariṇāma* or the change of the state of one-pointedness.

(1) The *nirodha-pariṇāma* is that suppression of the fluctuated latencies (vyutthāna-saṃskāra) and appearance of the restrained latencies (nirodha-saṃskāra) take place at every moment of the restraint in the same mind.[5]

(2) The *samādhi-pariṇāma* stands for the extirpation of attention to all worldly objects and the development of one-pointedness in the mind.[6]

(3) The *ekâgratā-pariṇāma* of the mind consists in the equal visualisation of both the quisent and the uprisen concepts.[7]

In the *Yoga-bhāṣya*, the nature of the three *pariṇāmas* is delineated in the following way : The *saṃskāra* (latent impression) is the characteristic of mind (cittadharma). It is of two kinds. One is *vyutthāna* (fluctuated) and the other is *nirodha* (restrained). In the state of *nirodha-pariṇāma*, the former becomes disappear yielding place to the latter. Then this change of *saṃskāra*, from *vyutthāna* to *nirodha*, takes place in the mind at each moment. This is called *nirodha-pariṇāma*.[8]

In the *samādhi-pariṇāma*, the attending to all objects (sarvārthatā) disappears (tirobhāva) and the one-pointedness (ekāgratā) is generated, and the mind becomes concentrated (samādhīyate).[9]

The *ekâgratā-pariṇāma* is related to the concentrated mind (samāhita-citta). At each moment in the state of *samādhi*, the same modification (pratyaya) happens and disappears one after another. Then the similar sequence of the same modification goes on until the *samādhi* is disturbed.[10]

These three *citta-pariṇāmas* are, in other words, the

pariṇāma of *citta-dharma*. The *dharmas* are modifications of *citta*. The *citta* is the substance, from which mental characteristics come out, and as such is technically called *dharmin*. The *dharmin* is the substratum while the *dharma* forms its different aspects.[11] Vyāsa explains that a *dharma* is exclusively of the nature of the *dharmin* and it is the changes of the *dharmin* that are made explicit by the *dharmas*.[12]

After explaining the three kinds of *citta-pariṇāma*, Patañjali refers to the other three kinds of *pariṇāma*, namely, *dharma-pariṇāma* (change of essential attributes), *lakṣaṇa-pariṇāma* (that of temporal characters) and *avasthā-pariṇāma* (that of states).[13]

The *citta-pariṇāmas* are with reference to the practice of yoga to attain liberation.[14] Those three *pariṇāmas* are not parallel in space but are at the stage of mind progressing towards *kaivalya* (the state of the self-in-itself).

In the concept of the *citta-pariṇāma*, there is an idea of differentiation (anyathātva) of *dharma*. The idea is that the previous *dharma* disappears and then the new *dharma* appears,[15] even though in the *ekâgratā-pariṇāma* the *dharmas* before and after are similar.

Therefore, at each state of the three *citta-pariṇāmas*, these three *pariṇāmas*, viz. *dharma*, *lakṣaṇa* and *avasthā* should be accepted. In his commentary on the *Yoga-sūtra* (III. 13), Vyāsa explains these three *pariṇāmas* one by one in accordance with the *nirodha-pariṇāma* of mind. According to Vyāsa, we see the fundamental ideas of the three *pariṇāmas* as following :

(1) *Dharma-pariṇāma* : It stands for the suppression (abhibhava) of fluctuating state and development (prādurbhāva) of the restrained state of mind.[16]

(2) *Lakṣaṇa-pariṇāma* : The change of *dharma* in a time series ; when the *nirodha-dharma* enters into its present stage from the future one, the *vyutthāna-dharma* which has been at the present stage goes into its past stage. In this

case at the present stage the *nirodha-pariṇāma* only becomes prominent (abhivyakti) while it is not altogether dissociated (viyukta) from its past and future stage.[17] Thus the change is undertaken. Each *dharma* is connected (yukta) to the future, present and past being not apart from characteristics (dharmatva) of *citta.*[18]

(3) *Avasthā-pariṇāma* : At the moment of *nirodha,* the *nirodha-saṃskāra* becomes stronger and the *vyutthāna-saṃskāra* becomes weaker.[19] So this is the change of condition or state in every succeeding moment in any of its particular stage in a time series. The *dharma* when exists in its present stage is generally held to be new. But even its newness begins to diminish in every succeeding moment.[20] Thus, this *pariṇāma* does not materially differ from the *lakṣaṇa-pariṇāma* and thus can be held to be a mode of it. It is on account of this that a substance is called new or old, grown or decayed.[21]

In fact these three *citta-pariṇāmas* are to be treated as one viewed from the three aspects. Vyāsa gives an explanation that the *dharmin* has a change relating to the *dharmas,* the *dharmas* have a change relating to the three *lakṣaṇas* and the *lakṣaṇas* have a change also relating to the *avasthā.*[22] Fundamentally, however, there is only one kind of *pariṇāma.* For a *dharma* is essentially the same as the *dharmin,* and any change in the *dharmin* are detailed by the description of the changes of *dharmas.*[23]

To summarize, when the quality of a thing changes, we have a case of *dharma-pariṇāma* ; when the potential becomes actual and the change is only external, we have a case of *lakṣaṇa-pariṇāma.* The change of state due to mere lapse of time is *avasthā-pariṇāma.*[24]

§ 2. The Pariṇāma of the Bhūta and Indriya

As we have already observed in the previous section, in the series of evolution, the *bhūtas* and the *indriyas* come in the last stage. There is no other *tattvântara-pariṇāma* from

them. The things and the bodies in the world consist of the *bhūtas* and the *indriyas*. The change of appearance of the things and the bodies shows the change of collection of atoms. This change is explained by the three *citta-pariṇāmas*, viz., *dharma*, *lakṣaṇa* and *avasthā*, being described in the *Yoga-sūtra* (III. 13).

According to Vyāsa's commentary on this *sūtra*, we understand those three *pariṇāmas* of the *bhūtas* and the *indriyas* briefly, thus : *Dharmin*, take for example earth, has the power of existing in the form of particles of dust, a lump or a jug. Earth here is the commom quality which remains unchanged in all these stages. This earth therefore is regarded as the *dharmin*, and its stages as the *dharma*. When this *dharmin* undergoes a change from a stage of lump to a stage of jug, it undergoes what is called *dharma-pariṇāma*. This *dharma* as the shape of the jug may be thought to have itself undergone inasmuch as it has now come into being from a stage of relative non-being or a stage of future. This is called *lakṣaṇa-pariṇāma* of *dharma* as constituting a jug. This jug is again suffering another change as new or old as it is just produced or is gradually running towards its dissolution. This is called *avasthā-pariṇāma*.[25]

Vyāsa makes a summary, thus : A different characteristic (dharmāntara) is a change of condition (avasthā) of an object (dharmin), and a different time-element (lakṣaṇāntara) is also a change of condition. Thus single change of substance (dravya) is shown in three different categories. This rule is applicable to other objects also. These changes, i.e., *dharma*, *lakṣaṇa* and *avasthā*, do not transcend the original nature of *dharmin*. For this reason it is held that there is in reality only one kind of *pariṇāma* which includes all the other varieties.[26]

Thus in the Yoga-philosophy, the *pariṇāma* means the fact that the *dharma* as an effect comes to be visible from the *dharmin* as a cause.

This point will be more clear when in the next section we observe the nature of the *dharmin* and the *dharma.*

§ 3. Dharmin and Dharma

We have already observed the theory of change, the *pariṇāma-vāda*, of the Yoga philosophy. There is an idea that the *dharma* becomes visible from the *dharmin.* With respect to the both, Vyāsa explains thus : *Dharma* is nothing but the power which is modified by the capability of the *dharmin* for giving rise to effect. Its existence is inferred from the different results arising out of its actions, and an object is seen to possess various characteristics.[27] The *dharmin* (substratum) thus has many *dharmas* (characteristics).[28] And the *dharmas* are all only the special configuration of the *guṇas.* So they have, fundamantally, the *guṇas* as their essence.[29] On the other hand, the *guṇas,* which remain common to all *dharma,* neither cease to be nor come into being. They appear as the manifested things (vyakti), which is past, yet-to-come, going and coming, and is inseparably connected with the *guṇas* ; they appear as if they had the properties of growing and decaying.[30]

Again the *dharmin* is explained by Vyāsa thus : That which remains common to the *dharmas* manifested and unmanifested, and which has the generic and the particular form as its essence ; it is the *dharmin* inseparably connected with the *dharmas.*[31]

Therefore we understand that the *dharmin* and the *guṇas* are the same thing from the ontological point of view. Both mean the substance from which the phenomenal things of the world come forth. From the view-point of the *guṇa* theory, we have the *tattvântara-pariṇāma*, and from the view-point of the change of the phenomenal world we have the *dharma-pariṇāma.*

As we have already seen (chap. I, p. 22), Vyāsa defines the *dharma-pariṇāma* in general terms, thus : *Pariṇāma* is appearance of another *dharma* on the disappearance of the

previous *dharma* of a substance (dravya) which remains constant.

The *dharma* (phenomenal thing) comes forth from the *dharmin* (substance). That is the theory of change of the Yoga philosophy. The source of this may however be traced in a fragment which may be of Pañcaśikha.[32] That is : For *dharmins* having beginningless conjunction, *dharmas* in general have also beginningless conjunction.[33] The meaning of this is that since the association of the primary cause (dharmin) of the phenomenal world with *puruṣa* has been beginningless, phenomena (dharma) too have been associated with *puruṣa* from time without beginning.[34]

§ 4. Pariṇāma-vāda and Buddhism

It is assumed that the Sāṃkhya school, included the Yoga school, got criticized by Buddhists.[35] In this section, we shall observe some sources in the Buddhist texts.

The *Mahāvibhāṣā* of the *Sarvâsti-vāda* refers to the four *Śāśvata-vādas* among the sixty-two thoughts of the other schools. Of the four, the *pariṇāma-vāda* and the *tirobhāvâvirbhāva-vāda* are pointed out as having the same idea.

According to the text, the *pariṇāma-vāda*, the theory of change, is of the following idea : Milk changes into butter... All is mutation of milk. This does not mean that one *dharma* ceases to exist and the other *dharma* begins to exist. The original nature of all *dharmas* is eternal.[36]

This *pariṇāma-vāda* is regarded as the theory that only the phenomena are changing, the substance is not changable but eternal.

The *tirobhāvâvirbhāva-vāda* or the theory of appearance and disappearance is of the following idea : The original nature of *dharma* sometimes appears and disappears. At intervals, the nature of which is not visible does not become vanished. When a *dharma* seems to be vanished, its nature becomes only latent. When it is to be uprisen, it again becomes visible.[37]

The idea of this theory is that although the characteristics of a thing are sometimes visible and not visible, their essence is not destroyed.

In this connection, we can read another passage, thus : An entity (dharma) is always existent. A non-entity is always void. A non-entity can never come into existence. An entity can never be annihilated. The cause and effect is the fact that, from beginningless time, the essence is the only one and neither destroyed nor produced.[38]

The first half of this passage is quoted in the *Yoga-sūtra-bhāṣya* as a common phrase.[39] With respect to the above-quoted passage, the *Abhidharma-kośa* is to be looked into. The author, Vasubandhu, refers to the view of Vārṣagaṇya,[40] thus : The view of Vārṣagaṇya is like this ; what exists is always exclusively existent, what does not exist is not always existent. A non-entity can never come into existence and an entity can never be annihilated.[41]

Next, in the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*, the *hetu-phala-sadbhāva-vāda* (i.e. satkārya-vāda) and the *abhivyakti-vāda* (theory of manifestation) are referred to. They are mentioned separately but are regarded as the same [42]

In the Buddhist literature picked up above, the *pariṇāma vāda* is variously explained using the words '*tirobhāva-āvirbhāva*' and '*abhivyakti*'. But there is no difference in the concept. In the Yoga philosophy, as we have already seen, the *samādhi-pariṇāma* is explained by using the words '*tirobhāva*' and '*āvirbhāva*', and the *lakṣaṇa-pariṇāma* is explained by '*abhivyakti*'.[43] Accordingly we can recognize that the original ideas such as *pariṇāma* are stored up in the Buddhist literature and both schools criticized each other.

In this connection, we shall observe a typical controversy between both schools, relating to the concept of *pariṇāma*. Vasubandhu,[44] in his auto-commentary on the *Abhidharma-kośa*, presents the idea as to how the world (bhājanaloka) is produced, for which he uses the expression of *pariṇāma*.[45]

According to him, by the concept of *pariṇāma* we are to understand the production of the particular object which in nature is of different type than the cause. That is not the same as the *pariṇāma* of Sāṃkhya.[46]

In the context, Vasubandhu quite relevantly introduces the Sāṃkhya theory of *pariṇāma*, which stands for the appearance of the object in another form (dharmântara) while the original form (dravya) remains.[47]

We find that the phrase quoted by Vasubandhu is the same as the definition of the *dharma-pariṇāma* in the *Yoga-sūtra bhāsya*, which we have already seen.[48]

With respect to this idea of *pariṇāma*, Vasubandhu critically points out that it is not thoughtful that *dharmin* which remains with its *dharma* may have its *pariṇāma*.[49] He continues that the Sāṃkhyas may refute saying that *dharmin* is not different from *dharma*, and *pariṇāma* is nothing but the different state of *dravya* (*substance*).[50] Then, he argues that the point does not stand. It is indeed a wordly device to say that *dharmin and dharma* are the same.[51]

In Vasubandhu's criticism, we find the premised idea that such *dharmin* as the same as *dharma* can not exist. The *Sarvâsti-vāda* admits only *dharma* as *dravya* (substance). When one *dharma* as an effect rises, the other *dharma* as a cause does not exist.[52] On the other hand, for the Yoga philosophy, the *dharmin* is not fundamentally different from the *dharma*. The *dharmin* is the substance and the *dharma* is the phenomenal thing which springs up from the *dharmin*.[53] Here we acknowledge that the idea of *pariṇāma* of the Yoga philosophy is the same as the theory of *pariṇāma* of Sāṃkhya which Vasubandhu takes up to criticize.[54]

In the next section we shall investigate Vyāsa's refutation to the criticism of Vasubandhu.

§ 5. The Yoga-sūtra-bhāṣya and Sarvâsti-vādins

In the theory of *pariṇāma* of the *Yoga-sūtra-bhāṣya*, we have found some connections with the Buddhist school of the

Sarvâsti-vādins.[55] In this section, we shall investigate the relationship along with the context of the *Yoga-sūtra-bhāṣya.* Our view-point is first on the Buddhist's criticism to the Sāṃkhya and next on the Yoga's (or Sāṃkhya's) response to it. Then as a result we can make clear how the Yoga school accepts the Buddhist thoughts. The controversy between both schools is relating to the three *pariṇāmas* of the *bhūta* and *indriya,* viz., *dharma, lakṣaṇa* and *avasthā pariṇāma.* A reference to the same has been made (in §. 2). It is proposed to attempt here a detailed study.

The Sarvâsti-vāda is the theory which declares that all *dharmas* exist in reality throughout future, present and past.[56] In this theory, it is a problem as to how the three time-series (adhvan) are distinguished.[57] In this connection, four prominent teachers are represented from the age of the *Mahāvibhāṣā.*

The view of the four teachers are : Dharmatrāta's *bhāvânyathika* or the difference of existence, Ghoṣaka's *lakṣaṇânyathika* or the difference of time-series, Vasumitra's *avasthânyathika* or the difference of condition, and Buddhadeva's *anyathānyathika* or the difference of one-another.[58]

Vasubandhu, in his *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya,* criticizes these four views from the stand-point of the Sautrāntikas. As we shall observe soon after, by taking that criticism into consideration, Vyāsa discusses the three kinds of *pariṇāma* of the *bhūta* and *indriya* after finishing the explanation of the three kinds of *citta-pariṇāma,* which as we have observed (in § 1.) are *dharma, lakṣaṇa* and *avasthā pariṇāma* of the mind. By Vyāsa, those three *pariṇāmas* are to be treated as one, *the dharma-pariṇāma.* The variety of phenomenal things is regarded as the various *dharmas* being developed from the *dharmin.* (§ 1,)

After thus summarizing the *citta-pariṇāma* of *dharma* and so on, Vyāsa begins to explain the *dharma-pariṇāma* of the *bhūta* and *indriya,* thus : In this case, there is the differentia-

tion of existence (bhāvānyathātva) of the present *dharma* with regard to time-series (adhvan) of past, future and present, but there is no differentiation of matter (dravyānyathātva). Just as, even though a plate of gold is divided and made into another, there is the differentiation of existence, but there is no differentiation of gold.[59]

This explanation has relation to the view of Dharmatrāta. He, not using the term *dharmin*, explains how the difference of the three time-series occurs, thus : The *dharma*, when it gives up the future-time and comes to the present-time, leaves the existence of its future stage, but does not leave the existence of matter.[60]

In his view, the difference of *dharma* in future, present and past depends on the aspect of existence. As matter (dravya) *dharmas* exist in reality through three time-series. We may regard that he accepts the Sāṃkhyaic *pariṇāma* to the *dharmas* in the three time-series.[61] Therefore Vasubandhu does not accept Dharmatrāta's view, saying that his view should be put in the side of Sāṃkhya for it is the theory of *pariṇāma*.[62]

Vasubandhu refutes the theory of *pariṇāma* as we have observed. (§ 4,) His point of criticism is that the eternal *dharmin* changes into *dharmas*, and that *dharmin* and *dharma* are not different.

Taking such criticism into consideration, next, Vyāsa refers to a view of opponent, according to which the *dharmin* is nothing more than its attributes (dharma) since the former never gives up its essential nature (tattva). If the *dharmin* persists through all its attributes, then because of its sameness in all conditions it would be changeless.[63]

This is the criticism from a view-point that *dharmin* is not different from *dharma*, so it is contradictory to set out *dharma* from *dharmin*.[64]

Vyāsa replies to the above noted criticism, saying that the view-point is not wrong, because it has nowhere

been mentioned that an object is immutably eternal. On the other hand it has been mentioned thal all things in this world disappear from their manifest condition because it is not admitted that these are immutably eternal. Again since their complete annihilation is denied, these appear. When they merge into their cause, they stay in a subtle form which is not noticeable on account of its subtlety.[65]

Vyāsa's point of view appears to be that all things disappear and merge into the cause. In this case they stay in a subtle form which is not noticeable, so it is neither admitted that they are immutably eternal nor that they are completely annihilated.

After finishing the explanation of the *dharma-pariṇāma*, Vyāsa explains the *lakṣaṇa-pariṇāma*, thus : *Dharma* in the *lakṣaṇa-pariṇāma* exists in all the three time series. The past *dharma* is combined with the past time-series, not being severed from the future and the present time-series. Similarly the future *dharma* is combined with the future time-series, not being severed from the present and the past time-series. Similarly the present *dharma* is combined with the present time-series, not being severed from the past and the past time-series. The point is like that of a man who, though at present attached to a particular woman, is not absolutely detached from other women.[66]

We find that this view is attributed to Ghoṣaka in the Buddhist literature. The view of Ghoṣaka quoted in the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*[67] and the view referred to in the *Yogasūtra-bhāṣya*, both are almost the same with minor variation in expression.[68]

The view of Ghoṣaka is also refuted by Vasubandhu. Vasubandhu's view-point of criticism is that, according to Ghoṣaka because all *dharmas* are connected with all time-series there results the confusion of time-series (adhva-saṅkara). As to the example of a man's attachment (rāga), the attachment felt with a particular woman is relating to

the very woman only. That is not the case of common feeling to all the other woman.[69]

Receiving that refutation as a criticism to his own school, Vyāsa quotes the first half of the foresaid Vasubandhu's refutation and observes, thus: With respect to the *lakṣaṇa-pariṇāma*, some critics point out that if the all *dharmas* are connected with all the three time-series then there would be the confusion of the time-series.[70]

Then Vyāsa refutes this criticism. His point of view is this: *Dharmatva* (general attribute) is not supposed in all *dharmas*. The particular *dharma* which is connected with a particular time-series appears on the individual manifestation.[71]

Then again he refutes Vasubandhu's criticism to the example of a man's attachment. The purport of his refutation is this: His attachment to another woman exists as generality but it is not unreal.[72] The fact is that his passion towards the particular woman becomes prominent at that time while it becomes latent towards other women for the time being.[73]

Then, next, Vyāsa explains the *avasthā-pariṇāma* of the *bhūta* and *indriya*: *Dharmins* (objects) do not have three time-series but *dharmas* (characteristics) have, viz., manifested as present and unmanifested as past or future. The *dharmas* are regarded as different as they get into different states (avasthā), a distinction of states, but not of the being itself (dravya). This is illustrated by a line, which means unity when placed in the first column, ten in the second column, hundred in the third column. It is also illustrated by the case of a woman, who is called mother, daughter or sister in reference to the relationships borne by her.[74]

This explanation is almost the same as the view of Vasumitra.[75] Buddhadeva's view[76] is not counted separately in the *Yogasūtra-bhāṣa*. Probably his view is included in the *avasthā-pariṇāma* of Vasumitra; for the illustration of

the case of a woman quoted by Vyāsa is seen in the view of Buddhadeva.[77]

Of the four views, only that of Vasumitra is accepted to the Sarvāsti-vādins,[78] while the rest are rejected. Vasubandhu explains the view of Vasumitra, thus: He maintained the differentiation of condition. His opinion is that the time-series is distinguished by action (kāritra). When the *dharma* has not yet done its action it is regarded as future. When it is acting it is regarded as present. When it ceases to function after having acted it is regarded as past.[79]

To the idea that the three time-series is divided by action, Vasubandhu refutes to say that the action does, after all, bring forth the confusion of time-series (lakṣaṇa-saṅkara).[80]

Receiving the aforesaid refutation of Vasubandhu Vyāsa speaks of a criticism from other school, thus: With respect to the *avasthā-pariṇāma,* some persons have pointed out a fault resulting permanency (kauṭasthya). The reason is "because time-series is divided by operation (vyāpāra), when the *dharma* has not yet done its operation it is regarded as future, when it is operating it is regarded as present, and when it ceases to function after having operated it is regarded as past." If you say that, then there follows the permanency of *dharma* and *dharmin, lakṣaṇa* and *avasthā.* Such a fault is pointed out by some persons.[81]

Here we notice that Vyāsa quotes the view of Vasumitra in the criticism and regards it as his own which is refuted by Vasubandhu. Thus, taking what Vasubandhu refutes, as if it were pointing to his own school, like in the case of the *bhāvânyathika* of Dharmatrāta, Vyāsa responds with the view of Sāṃkhya that, although the substance (guṇin) is permanent, the modifications (guṇa) can not be regarded as permanent on account of the conflicting mutations that take place.[82]

Summary

Yoga philosophy explains the mental phenomena of the

mind and the material phenomena of the world by means of the theory of *pariṇāma*, namely, *dharma-pariṇāma*. Patañjali classifies the restrained state of the mind into three kinds, viz., *nirodha-pariṇāma*, *samādhi-pariṇāma* and ekāgratā pariṇāma and then, he divids the general mental phenomena of the mind into three, viz., *dharma-pariṇāma*, *lakṣaṇa-pariṇāma* and *avasthā-pariṇāma*. According to Vyāsa, the latter three *pariṇāmas* are dealt with in accordance with the *nirodha-pariṇāma*, and are to be treated as a single *pariṇāma* viewed from three aspects, because, in the strict sense, there is but a single *pariṇāma* of *dharmin* as *dharma*. (§ 1.)

The concept of the three *pariṇāmas* of the general material phenomena of the mind is fully applied to the material phenomena of the world. (§ 2.)

In the theory of *pariṇāma*, *dharmin* and *guṇa* are the same thing, from which the phenomenal things of the world and the mind come forth. From the view-point of the *guṇa* theory, we have the *tattvântara-pariṇāma*, and from the view-point of the change of the phenomenal things, we have the *dharma-pariṇāma*. (§ 3.)

In the Buddhist literature, the *pariṇāma* theory is often criticized. In this connection, we have investigated a controversy between the Buddhist school of Sarvāsti-vādins, especially Vasubandhu himself, and the Sāṃkhya Yoga, Vyāsa. The theory of *pariṇāma*, manifestation from *dharmin* to *dharma*, was brought into both schools perhaps at the age of Pañcaśikha. (§ 4 and 5.)

In the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, the four eminent teachers of the Sarvāsti-vāda advocated their theories, may be, through the influence of the Sāṃkhya. Then Vasubandhu criticized all the four views of the Sarvāsti-vāda from the view point of the Sautrāntikas in his *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*. He regards those four views as the same as the Sāṃkhyas. Vyāsa, in his *Yogasūtra-bhāṣya*, made use of the thoughts of the

Sarvsāti-vāda for elaborating on the theory of the *dharma-pariṇāma.* It is presumed that, in those ages, there was keen inter-relationship between the Buddhists and the Sāṃkhya (Yoga) school.[83]

References

1. Yogaḥ samādhiḥ—YBh. I. 1 (p. 2, l. 1), On this point, we shall observe later in Chap. V, §1.
2. The eight *yogâṅgas* are described in YS. II. 28-III. 8. See S. N. Dasgupta, *Yoga As*···, p. 136.

   For detailed treatise of the *yogâṅgas,* we shall observe later in Chap. V, § 2 and 3.
3. In this respect, see YBh. IV. 17 and 23 (quoted in Chap. III, §3 p. 96 and 98).
4. Swāmi H. Āraṇya comments on YBh. IV. 17 : Objects cognised by the mind exist independently of it. Under suitable conditions they influence or shape the mind. Then the knowledge of the object appears in the mind ; otherwise the mere existence of the thing does not bring about its cognition by the mind. Thus a separate object is sometimes known by the mind and sometimes it remains unknown. From this is established that a mind suffer mutation in the shape of change in perception. (*Yoga Philosophy*, p. 379.)
5. Vyutthāna-nirodha-saṃskārayor abhibhava-prādurbhāvau nirodhakṣaṇa-cittânvayo nirodha-pariṇāmaḥ.—YS, III. 9.
6. Sarvârthataikâgratayoḥ kṣayôdayau cittasya samādhipariṇāmaḥ. —YS. III. 12.
7. tataḥ punaḥ śāntôditau tulya-pratyayau cittasyaikâgratā-pariṇāmaḥ.—YS. III. 12.
8. YBh. III. 9 (p. 124, ll. 1—5.) summarized.
9. YBh. III, 11 (p. 125, ll. 3—5) summarized.
10. YBh. III. 12 (p. 125, ll. 9—11) summarized.
11. See P. Chakravarti, *Origin and*······, p. 198.
12. Dharmi-svarūpa-mātro hi dharmo dharmi-vikriyaiṣā dharma-dvārā prapañcyata iti.—YBh. III. 13. (p. 128, l. 2f.)

    Vide S. N. Dasgupta, *Yoga As*·····, p. 71.
13. etena bhūtêndriyeṣu dharma-lakṣaṇâvasthā-pariṇāmā vyākhyātāḥ. —YS. III. 13.

    In this *sûtra,* the word 'by that' (etena) does not indicate the above three *sûtras* which mention the three kinds of *citta-pariṇāmas.* That is to say, the *nirodha-pariṇāma* of the mind is

not related directly to the *dharma-pariņāma* of the elements and the organs.

That is noticed by Swāmi H. Āraņya, *Yoga Philosophy*, p. 270, fn (1).

Cf. J. H. Woods, *The Yoga System*, *p.* 210, fn. He regards. YS. III. 9. 11, 1 2 each is the instance of *dharma*, *lakşaņa* and *avasthā pariņāma in* YS. III. 13 one by one.

14. Swāmi H. Āraņya, ibid., p. 262, fn (1).
15. To indicate 'disappear' and 'appear' the following expressions are used : *abhibhava* and *prādurbhava* (YS. III. 9), *hiyante* and *ădhīyante* (YBh. III. 9), *kşaya* and *udaya* (YS. III. 11), *tirobhăva* and *āvirbhăva* (YBh. III. 11), and *śănta* and *udita* (YS. III. 12).
16. tatra vyutthāna-nirodhayor dharmayor abhibhava-prādurbhāvau dharmiņi dharma-pariņāmaḥ.—YBh. III. 13 (p. 126, 1. 5).
17. lakşaņa-pariņāmaś ca nirodhas tri-lakşaņas tribhir adhvabhir yuktaḥ. sa khalv anāgata-lakşaņam adhvānaṃ prathamaṃ hitvā dharmatvam anatikrānto vartamāna-lakşaņam pratipannaḥ. yatrâsya svarūpeņâbhivyaktiḥ. eşo'sya dvitīyo'dhvā. na câtītânāgatābhyāṃ lakşaņābhyāṃ viyuktaḥ.—YBh. III, 13 (p.126, 11. 6-9).

    See P. Chakravarti, *Origin and...*, p. 261.
18. YBh. III. 13 (p. 127, 11. 1-7) summarized.
19. tatra nirodha-kşaņesu nirodha-saṃskārā balavanto bhavanti durbalā vyutthāna-saṃskārā iti esa dharmāņām avasthā-pariņāmaḥ.—YBh. III. 13 (p. 127, 11. 8-10).

    See S. N. Dasgupta, *Yoga As*..., p. 73.
20. P. Chakravarti, *Origin and*..., p. 261.
21. S. N. Dasgupta, *Yoga As*..., p. 73.
22. tatra dharmino dharmaiḥ pariņāmo dharmāņāṃ try-lakşaņaiḥ pariņāmo lakşaņānām apy avasthāobiḥ pariņāma iti.—YBh. III. 13. (p. 127, 1. 10f.)
23. paramârthatas tv eka eva pariņāmaḥ. dharmi-svarūpamātro hi dharmo dharmi-vikriyaivaişā dharma-dvārā prapañcyate.—ibi. (p. 128, 1. 2f.)
24. S. Radhakrichnan, *Indian Philosophy*, vol. 2, p. 258.

    And see S. Takagi, "A Comparative Study of 'Time' found in the Yogabhāşya and Abhidharma Buddhism."
25. For exposition of the same, see S. N. Dasgupta, *Yoga As*..., pp. 73-74.

    About *dharma-pariņāma* in YBh. III. 13, p. 128, 1. 3-p. 129, 1. 5 ; *lakşaņa-pariņāma*, p. 130, 1. 1-p. 131, 1. 5 ; *avasthā-pariņāma*, p. 131, 1. 6-p. 133, 1. 2.

    About an example of earth and jug, p. 133, 11. 3-6.

26. Dharmino' pi dharmântaram avasthā, dharmasyâpi lakṣaṇa-antaram avasthêty eka eva dravya-pariṇāmo bhedenôpadarśita iti. evaṃ padârthântareṣv api yojyam iti. ta ete dharma-lakṣaṇâvasthā-pariṇāmā dharmi-svarūpam anatikrāntā ity eka eva pariṇāmaḥ sarvān amūn viśeṣān abhiplavate.—YBh. lll. 13 (p. 133, 11. 6-10.)
27. yogyatâvacchinnā dharminaḥ śaktir eva dharmaḥ. sa ca phala-prasava-bhedânumita-sadbhāva ekasyânyo'nyasyânyaś ca pari-dṛṣṭaḥ.—YBh. lll. 14. (p. 133, l. 14-p. 134, l. 1.)

    On the interpretation of the first sentense quoted here, see P. Chakravarti, *Origin and...*, p. 199f.
28. dharmī câneka-dharma-svabhāvaḥ.—YBh. IV. 12. (p. 194, l. i.)
29. sarvam idaṃ (dharmaḥ) guṇānāṃ saṃniveśa-viśeṣamātram iti paramârthato guṇâtmānaḥ.—YBh. IV. 13. (p. 194, 1. 10-p. 195, 1. 1.)
30. guṇās tu sarva-dharmânupātino na pratyastamayante nôpajāyante. vyaktibhir evâtītânāgata-vyayâgamavatībhir guṇânvayibhir upajananâpāya-dharmakā iva pratyavabhāsante.—YBh. ll. 19. (p. 87, 11, 4-6.)
31. ya eteṣv abhivyaktânabhivyakteṣu dharmeṣv anupātī sāmānya-viśeṣâtmā so' nvayī dharmī.—YBh. lll. 14. (p. 136, l. 2f.)
32. By Vijñānabhikṣu. Vācaspatimiśra calls 'āgamin'.

    About Pañcaśikha see P. Chakravarti, *Origin and...*, pp. 113-127.
33. tathā côktam. dharmiṇām anādi-saṃyogād dharma-mātrāṇām apy anādiḥ saṃyoga iti.—YBh. ll. 22. (p. 92, l. 2f.)

    The term *dharmin* and *dharma* may be influenced by logics. With this respect, see J. Imanishi, "Indian Philosophy and the Discussion on Causality." p. 456.

    Patañjali employs some terms of logics, such as *aliṅga* and *liṅgamātra* in YS. II. 19.

    Dharmin is supported by *sādhana* of syllogism in YD. p. 53, 11. 22-26. With this respect, see S. Murakami, *A Study of the Sāṃkhya-Philosophy*, p. 145.
34. See Swāmi H. Āraṇya, *Yoga Philosophy*, p. 188.
35. On some points, see P. Chakravarti, ibid., pp. 77-79.
36. Mahāvibhāṣā, vol. 199. (Taisho, vol. 27, p. 996c.)
37. op. cit.
38. Mahāvibhāṣā, voi. 199 (Taisho, 27, 997a).
39. nāsty asataḥ saṃbhavaḥ, na câsti sato vināśa iti—YBh. IV. 12. intro. (p. 193, l. 6.)
40. As to Vārṣagaṇya a full discussion is done by P. Chakravarti, *origin and...*, pp. 135-141 ; S. Takagi, "On Vārṣagaṇyāḥ (I)" p. 139f.

41. Vārṣagaṇya—vādas caivaṃ dyotito bhavati. yad asty asty eva tat, yan nâsti násty eva tat. asato nâsti saṃbhavaḥ, sato nâsti vināśaḥ.—AKBh. V. 27. (p. ed. p. 31, l. 1f; S. ed, p. 817, ll. 6-8.)

Cf. Gītā II. 16—násato vidyate bhāvo, nábhāvo vidyate sataḥ. ubhayor api dṛṣṭo'ntas tv, anayos tattva-darśibhiḥ.

The first half of this verse is quoted in Vivaraṇa III. 13, p. 250.

In detail see J. Imanishi, "On Pariṇāma.' p. 169; "Indian Philosophy and the Discussion on Causality." p. 453.

42. *Yogācāra-bhūmi*, vol. 6 (Taisho, 30, 303f); *Yogācāra-bhūmi*, Part I, p. 118f.

J. Imanishi, "Indian Philosophy and..." refers to the following: M. Hiriyanna, *Outline of Indian Philosophy*, p. 273; E. Frauwallner, *C. d. ind. Ph.* Ed. I, s.352f; R. Garbe, *Sāṃkhya Philosophie*, s. 293-7; B. Keith, *Sāṃkhya System*, p. 89f; K. Saksena, *Essays in Indian Philosophy*, p. 10; on 'abhivyakti' *Madhyamaka-vṛtti*, p. 21, ll. 4-6, 9-12 and p. 210.

To be added, A. Wezler, "A Note on Vārṣagaṇya and the Yogācārabhūmi.' p. 10f.

43. See §1, and fn. 15.

44. As to a good argument on the biography of Vasubandhu, see S. Anacker, *Seven Works of Vasubandhu*, pp. 7-28.

45. According to the Buddhist view of the universe, the world, on which beings exist, is supported by three *mandalas* (universal discs). They are, from bottom, *Vāyu-Jala* and *Kañcana-maṇḍala*. (Akkā. III. 45-48a.) On the *Kañcana-maṇḍala*, there are nine great mountains, eight great oceans and four great continents. (Ibid. 48b-56.) Among the nine great mountains, the *Meru* consists of four kinds of jewels. (Ibid. 50a. catūratnamayo meruḥ.)

Here rises a question from what these jewels are produced. To this, Vasubandhu uses the expression of *pariṇāma*: Akbh. III. 50a.—atha kathāṃ teṣaṃ saṃbhavaḥ...tāṃ jātiṃ pariṇamayanti. (P. ed. p. 159, ll. 15-17; S. ed. p. 508, ll. 15-17.)

46. See AKbh. III. 50a.—evaṃ ca punaḥ pariṇamayanti yad bhinnajātīyasya kārya-viśeṣôtpattav asamavadhānena pratyayībhavanti. na tu khalu yathā sāṃkhyānāṃ pariṇāmaḥ. (P. ed. p. 159, l. 17f; S. ed. p. 508, l. 17-p. 509, l. 2. His reading 'asamādhānena' appears to be correct.)

47. See AKbh. III. 50a.—kathaṃ ca sāṃkhyānāṃ pariṇāmaḥ. avasthitasya dravyasya dharmântara-nivṛttau dharmântara-prādurbhāva iti. (P. ed. p. 159, l. 18f; S. ed. p. 509, l. 3f. His reading 'na hy avasthitasya' appears to be erroneous.)

See S. Tamura, "The Sāṃkhya Doctorine known to Vasubandhu..."

48. See Chap. 1, p. 22. Excepting only a few words underlined are different : avasthitasya dravyasya *pūrva-dharma*-nivṛttau dharmântara-*utpattih* dariṇāma iti.—YBh. III. 13 (p. 133, 1. 10f.)

49. See AKbh. III. 50a.—kaś câtra doṣaḥ. sa eva hi dharmī na saṃvidyate yasyâvasthitasya dharmāṇāṃ pariṇāmaḥ kalpyeta. (P. ed. p. 159, 1. 19f ; S. ed. p. 509, I. 4f.)

50. See Ibid.—Kaś caivam āha dharmebhyo' nyo dharmîti. tasyaiva tu dravyasyânyathī bhāvāmātraṃ pariṇāmaḥ. (P. ed. p. 159, I. 20f ; S. ed. p. 509, 1. 5f.)

51. See Ibid.—evam apy ayuktam. kim atrâyuktam. tad eva cêdaṃ na cêdaṃ tathêti apūrvaiṣā *vāyo yuktiḥ*. (P. ed. p. 159, 1. 21f ; S. ed. p. 509, 1. 6f. reading correctly 'vācoyuktiḥ. So corrected by A. Hirakawa, *Index to*—p. 430.

52. See sphutārthā 'ad' AKbh. III. 50a.—*asamādhānenêti* ayugapad bhāvenêti arthaḥ. na hi yadā kāryaṃ tadā kāraṇaṃ tiṣṭhati. (p. 508, I. 27)

53. See P. Chakravarti, *origin and*..., p. 93.

54. other sources of such *pariṇāma* theory are found in some other texts. J. Imanishi, "Indian philosophy and..." (p. 468, fn. 39) shows the following :

pariṇāmo hi nāmâvasthitasya dravyasya dharmamātranivṛttih dharmântara pravṛttiś ca.—YD. p. 49, 1. 6f.

Jahad dharmântaraṃ pūrvam upādatte yadā param tattvād apracyuto dharmī pariṇāmaḥ sa ucyate—YD. p. 49 and p. 75.

yadā śakty—antarânugahāt pūrva-dharmān tirobhāvya svarūpād apracyuto dharmī dharmântarevâṇirbhavati. tadavasthānam asmākaṃ pariṇāma iti ucyate.—YD. p. 75, 11. 8-9.

upayann apayan dharmo vikaroti hi dharmiṇam—SDS. xv. 1. 181.

dravyaṃ tāvat sad eva guṇo'pi san kevalamanubhūta āsīt. ekaś côdbhūto guṇaḥ tatra ya udbhūtas tirobhavati pūrva—guṇasya nivṛttau tirobhūtau guṇântaram utpadyate tad bhavatîti arthaḥ,—Nyāyavārtika-tātpariyatīkā, (p. 563, ad. NS. 111. 2. 15.)

dharma-bheda-pariṇati,—Dvādaśāranacakra, vol. I, p. 322, 1. 8. cf. YD. p. 118f.

sāṃakhyas tv avasthitasya dharminaḥ svâtma bhūtasya dharmamātrasya utsargaḥ svâtma-bhūtasya (dharmamātrasya) côtpādaḥ pariṇāma iti.—Abhidharma-dīpa, p. 116, 11. 10-12.

atrâpi syād vyavasthitasya dharmiṇo dharmântara-nivṛttyā dharmântara-prādurbhāvaḥ pariṇāmo varṇyate na tu svabhāvasyânyathātvād iti.—Tattvasaṃgraha, p. 23, 11. 22-23.

Also see K. Yamashita, "The Sāṃkhya Thought in the Abhidharmadīpa," and M. Honda, "The Sāṃkhya system as it appears in the Tattvasaṃgraha."

55. The followings are the first works concerning the relation : Th. Stcherbatsky, *The Central Conception of Buddhism* ; H. Jacobi, *Uber das ursprüngliche Yoga system* ; T. Kimura, *The Study on the Theory of Abhidharma.*

56. For instance AKbh. V. 25—ye hi sarvâstīti vadanti atītam anāgatam pratyutpannaṃ ca te sarvāsti-vādāḥ. (P. ed. p. 296. l. 4 ; S. ed. p. 805, l. 9.)

57. The term *adhvan* means a transitional period as apposed to *kāla* or duration-time. P. Chakravarti, *Origin and...*p. 95.

    On the problem in detail, see K. Yamashita, "Time and Change in Yoga Philosophy."

58. On the four teachers and the theory of the Sarvâstivāda, Th. Stcherbatsky and so on have already referred to. The latest and detailed work is M. Akimoto & Y. Honjo, "Abhidharmakośa : Sarvâstivāda,"

59. tatra dharmasya dharmiṇi vartamānasyaivâdhvasv atita-anāgata-vartamāneṣu bhāvânyathātvaṃ bhavati na tu dravya-anyathātvam. yathā suvarṇa-bhājanasya bhittvânyathā kriyamānasya bhāvâny-athātvaṃ bhavati na suvarṇânyathātvam iti.—YBh. III. 13. (p. 128, ll. 3-6.)

60. See AKbh. V. 26—bhāvânyathiko Bhadanta-Dharmatrātaḥ. sa kilâha. dharmasyâdhvasu pravartamānasya bhāvânyathātvaṃ bhavati na dravyânyathātvam. yathā suvarṇa-bhājanasya bhittvā' nyathā kriyamānasya saṃsthānânyathātvaṃ bhavati na varṇâny-athātvam. yathā ca kṣiraṃ dadhitvena pariṇamad rasa-vīrya-vipākān parityajati na varṇam. evaṃ dharmo'py anāgatād adhvanaḥ pratyutpannam adhvānam āgacchann anāgata-bhāvaṃ jahāti na dravya-bhāvam. evaṃ pratyutpannād atītam adhvānaṃ gacchan pratyutpanna-bhāvam jahāti na dravya-bhāvam iti. (P. ed. p. 296, ll. 9-14 ; S. ed. P. 805, l, 15-p. 806, l. 3.)

    The term *dharmin* is not used but the first half of this passage upto the example of a gold plate is almost the same as that of Vyāsa. Dharmatrāta speaks one more example of milk and curd using the verb *parlnam-*

    See P. Chakravarti, *Origin and...*, p. 95f.

61. See J. Imanishi, "Indian Philosophy and..." p. 495f ; S. Murakami, *A Study of the Sāṃkhya Philosophy*, p. 122.

62. eṣāṃ tu prathamaḥ pariṇāma-vāditvāt sāṃkya-pakṣe nikṣep-tavyaḥ.—AKbh. V. 26. (P. ed. p. 297, l. 4 ; S. ed. p. 807, l. 5.)

63. apara āha, dharmânabhyadhiko dharmī pūrva-tattva-anatikramāt. pūrvâparâvasthā-bhedam anupatitaḥ kauṭa-sthyenaiva parivar-teta yady anvayī syād iti,—YBh. III. 13. (p. 128, l. 7-p. 129, l. 2.)

64. Another passage of the criticism that taking out a contradiction in the case of regarding *dharmin* and *dharma* as the same : YD. ad. SK. 16—āha, dharma-dharmiṇor ananyatvâbhyupagamād dharmôtpatti-vināśe dharmy-utpatti-vināśa-prasaṅgaḥ. na hi vo dharmebhyo'nyo dharmī. tatra yadi dharmasya nivṛttir abhyu-pagamyate dharmiṇo'pi nivṛttir ananyatvāt prāptā. dharmôt-pattau tad-utpattiḥ. tatra yad uktaṃ dharmôtpatti-virodhe dharmi-svarūpâva-sthānam iti. (p. 75, 11. 15-17.)
See S. Murakami, *A Study of*..., p. 129f.

65. ayam adoṣaḥ. kasmāt. ekântatânabhyupagamāt. tad etat trailokyaṃ vyakter apaiti. nityatva-pratiṣedhāt. apetam apy asti vināśa-pratisedhāt. saṃsargāc câsya saukṣmyam. saukṣmyāc cânupalabdhir iti.—YBh, III. 13. (p. 129, 11. 3-5.)
With respect to this, P. Chakravarti mentions that it is curious to notice that the aforesaid lines are attributed to the followers of Vārṣagaṇya in the *Yuktidīpikā*. The *Nyāya-Bhāṣya* ad. NS. 1. 2. 6. as well as the *Vārttika* also refer to these lines, but do not mention the source. (*Origin and*..., p. 139.)
See YD. ad SK. 10—tathā ca Vārṣagaṇyāḥ paṭhati. tat etat trailokyaṃ vyakter apaiti, na sattvād apetam apy asati. vināśa-pratiṣedhāt. asaṃsargāc câsya saukṣmyam, saukṣmyāc cânu-palabdhis tasmād vyakty-apagamo vināśaḥ, sa tu dvi-vidhaḥ. āsarga-pralayāt tattvānām-kiṃcit kāla-antarâvasthād itareṣam iti. (p. 57, 11. 6-9.)

66. lakṣaṇa-pariṇāmo dharmo' dhvasu vartamāno'tīto'tīta-lakṣaṇa-yukto'nāgata-vartamānābhyāṃ lakṣaṇabhyām avi-yuktaḥ. tathâ-nāgato'nāgata-lakṣṇa-yukto vartamānâtītā-bhyāṃ lakṣaṇābhyām aviyuktaḥ. tathā vartamāno vartamāna-lakṣaṇa-yukto' tītânā-gatābhyāṃ lakṣaṇābhyām aviyukta iti. yathā puruṣa ekasyāṃ striyaṃ rakto na śeṣāsu virakto, bhavatīti.—YBh. III. 13. (p. 130, 11. 1-5.)
See P. Chakravarti, *Origin and*..., p. 261.

67. See AKbh. V. 26—lakṣaṇânyathiko Bhadanta-Ghoṣakaḥ. sa kilâha. dharmo'dhvasu pravarttamāno'tīto'tīta-lakṣaṇa-yukto' nāgata-pratyutyutpannābhyaṃ lakṣauābhyām aviyuktaḥ. anāgato' nāgata-lakṣaṇa-yukto'tīta-pratyutpannābhyām aviyuktah, evem pratyutpanno'py atītânāgatābhyām avi-yuktaḥ. tad yathā puruṣa ekasyāṃ striyāṃ raktaḥ śeṣāsv avirakta iti. (P. ed. p. 296, 11. 15-18 ; S. ed. p. 806, 11. 4-6.)

As to the summary of the view, see P. Chakravarti, ibid. p. 96.

68. Ghoṣaka uses a term '*pratyutpanna*' in place of '*vartamāna*' of YBh, and shortens the lines.

69. See Akbh. V. 26—dvitīyasy*âdhva-saṅkaraḥ prāpnoti. sarvasya sarva-lakṣaṇa-yogāt.* puruṣasya tu *kasyāmcit* striyāṃ *rāgaḥ samudācarati* kasyāmcit *kevalaṃ samanvāga* iti kim atra sāmyam. (P. ed. p. 297, l. 4f ; S. ed. p. 807, ll. 5-7.)

This criticism is also preserved in *Mahāvibhāṣā* vol. 77. (Taisho, 27, 396a.)

The underlined parts are utilized by Vyāsa in his response to Vasubandhu's criticism : see following fn. 73 and fn. 72

70. atra lakṣaṇa-pariṇāme sarvasya sarva-lakṣaṇa-yogād adhva-saṅkaraḥ prāpnotîti parair doṣaś codyata iti—YBh: III. 13. (p. 130, l. 6f.)

71. Summarized YBh. III. 13—tasya parihāraḥ···pravartate. (p. 130, l.7p. 131, l. 2.)

72. See YBh. III. 13.—tasmād asaṅkaraḥ. yathā rāgasyaiva kvacit samudācāra iti na tadānīm anyatrâbhāvaḥ. kiṃ tu kevalaṃ sāmānyena samanvāgata ity asti tadā tatra tasya bhāvaḥ. tathā lakṣaṇasyêti. (p. 131, ll. 3-5.)

73. P. Chakravarti, *Origin and*···, p. 261.

74. See YBh. III. 13.—na dharmī try-adhvā. dharmās tu try-adhvānaḥ. te lakṣitā alakṣitā. tatra laksitās tāṃ tāṃ avasthāṃ prāpnuvanto'nyatvena pratinirdiśyante'vasthântarato na dravântarataḥ. yathaikā rekhā śata-sthāne śataṃ daśa-sthāne daśaikā caikā-sthāne. yathā caikatve'pi strī mātā côcyate duhitā ca svasā cêti. (p. 131, l. 6-p. 132, l. 1.)

See P. Chakravarti, ibid., p. 261f.

75. See AKbh. V. 26.—avasthā'nyathiko Bhadanta-Vasumitraḥ. sa kilâha. dharmo'dhvasu pravartamāno'vasthāṃ avasthāṃ prāpyânyo'nyo nirdiśyate avasthântarato na dravyântarataḥ. yathaikā vartikā ekâṅke niksiptā ekam ity ucyate śatâṅke śataṃ sahasrâṅke sahasram iti. (P. ed. p. 296, ll. 19-21 ; S. ed. p. 806, ll. 7-9.)

And see P. Chakravarti, *Origin and...*, p. 96.

76. See AKbh. V, 26.—anyathânyathiko Bhadanta-Buddhadevaḥ. sa kilâha. dharmo'dhvasu pravartamānaḥ pūrvâparam apekṣa anyo'nya ucyate avasthântarato na dravyantarataḥ. yathaikā strī mātā vôcyate duhitā vêti. (P. ed. p. 297, ll. 1-3 ; S. ed. p. 807, ll. 1-3.) And see P. Chakravarti, op. cit.

Vasubandhu's criticism to the view of Buddhadeva is: caturthasyâpy ekasminn evâdhvani trayo'dhvānaḥ prāpnuvanti. atīte'dhvani pūrva-paścimau kṣaṇāv atītânāgatau madhyamaḥ kṣaṇaḥ pratyutpanna iti. evam anāgate'pi. (P. ed. p. 297, 11. 6-8 ; S. ed. p. 807, 11. 7-9.)

This criticism is not taken in YBh.

77. P. Chakravarti, ibid., p. 97f.

78. See AKkā. V. 26c.—tritīyaḥ śobhanaḥ.

79. yo'yam avasthā'nyathikaḥ tasya kila adhvānaḥ *kāritrena vyavasthitāḥ* (kā. V. 26cd.) yadā sa dharmaḥ kāritram na karoti tadā'nāgatah. yadā karoti tadā pratyutpannaḥ. yadā kṛtvā tadā'tīta iti.—AKbh. V. 26. (P. ed. p. 297, 11. 10-13 : S. ed. p. 808, 11. 3-6.)

80. See AKbh. V. 26.—atītānam api tarhi sadbhāga-hetvādīnām phala-dānāt kāritra-prasaṅgo'rdha-kāritrasya vêti lakṣaṇa-saṅkaraḥ. (P. ed. p. 179, 1. 16f ; S. ed. p. 808, 1. 10f.)

Following this passage, Vasubandhu again criticizes the Sarvâsti-vāda (in AKbh. V. 27abc.) from the side of the Sautrāntikas, saying : How can it happen that at a certain time *dharma* has action or not ? In the action how can be there the distinction of past, present and future ? If *dharma* is not different from action, the division of three time-series is not reasonable. If the past and future are real existence, the not yet-come-to-existence and the already-come-to-existence are impossible.

His view-point of criticism is : Firstly, the three time-series can not distinguished by action, secondly, *dharma* is not a real existence in the three time-series, but not existing previously exists now.

Moreover Vasubandhu interprets Vasumitra's view making it close to the Sāṃkhya thought. With this respect, see J. Imanishi, "Indian Philosophy and..." p. 461 ; S. Murakami, *A Study of...*, pp. 131-133.

81. Avasthā-pariṇāme kauṭasthya-prasaṅga-doṣaḥ kaścid uktaḥ. katham. "adhvano vyāpāreṇa vyavasthitatvāt. yadā dharmaḥ svavyāpāram na karoti tadânāgato yadā karoti tadā vartamāno yadā kṛtvā nivṛttas tadâtīta" ity evaṃ dharma-dharmiṇor lakṣaṇānām avasthānāṃ ca kauṭasthyaṃ prāpnotīti parair doṣa ucyate.—YBh. III, 13. (p. 132, 11. 2-6.)

The quoted part is Vasumitra's view. (fn. 79.) Instead of the term '*kāritra*' Vyāsa uses '*vyāpāra*'.

82. nāsau doṣaḥ, kasmāt. guṇi-nityatve'pi guṇānām vimarda-vaicitryāt.—YBh. III. 13. (p. 132, l. 7.)
About the eternity of *puruṣa* and *guṇa*, see Chap. 1.

83. P. Chakravarti argues the question whether the idea of these different manifestations were received by the Sarva-asti-vādins from the Sāṃkhya or it was the Sāṃkhya who received them from the Buddhists is not easy to ascertain. His conclusion appears that the Vaibhāṣikas were, more or less, influenced by Sāṃkhya in establishing their special theories, and that Vyāsa is influenced by the Buddhists, and that the Vaibhāṣikas is also charged by the Sautrāntikas as advocating ultimately nothing but the theory of the following of Vārṣagaṇya. (*Origin and*..., p. 98f.)

Chapter III

The Constitution of the Mind

Feelings or sensations in our mind arise through contact with external objects. We have an epistemological and psychological base in our body. The Yoga philosophy as well as the Buddhist philosophy call it '*citta*' or mind. *Citta* is the base in which occur mental and apperceptive functions. The Sāṃkhya philosophy divides the function into three, as *buddhi, ahaṃkāra* and *manas*. The functions of these internal organs are all unified and can be only modifications or different aspects of a single *antaḥ-karaṇa*.[1]

We know that, before Īśvarakṛṣṇa, there were some Sāṃkhya teachers. Among them we find Vārṣagaṇya and his follower Vindyavāsin, whose view is that everything is experienced in the *manas* and not in the *buddhi* as other teachers of Sāṃkhya hold.[2]

The Yoga philosophy has the same tendency as we find in the view of Vindhyavāsin. The Buddhist thinkers, since its early period, emphasize the concept of *citta*. We presume that the Yoga philosophy has some sort of relationship both with the Buddhist thought and with that of Vindhyavāsin.[3]

In this chapter, we propose to dedicate ourselves to the study of *citta* and its constitution as we notice in the Buddhist texts, and the approach will be comparative in the sense that we will attempt to show the points in which the Buddhist concept has similarity or otherwise with that of the Yoga philosophy.

§ 1. Citta and Caitta in the Buddhist Thoughts

In the Buddhist concept, *citta* has been accorded a very important position.[4]

Herbert V. Guenther observes : The importance of *citta* ...attitude...whether it tends to become involved in Saṃsāra

or whether it tends to find its fulfilment and expression in Nirvāna, is the key to Buddhist philosophy and psychology. Although the various schools of thought in Buddhism wrangled about the logical nature of the substantive *citta*, whether it is existent or subsistent, none of them ever challenged the primacy of *citta*. This fact may be taken as an indication, that *citta* as something which can and must be experienced is of primary importance, and of secondary importance with respect to its formulation.[5]

Thus, in the Buddhist thoughts, the basis of the mental functions is generally called *citta*,[6] although the words, *manas* and *vijñāna*, are also used as synonyms.[7]

According to the Buddhist thoughts, *citta* comprises six classes of *vijñāna*: *cakṣus*, *srotra*, *ghrāṇa*, *jihvā*, *kāya* and *mano vijñāna*. They are the fundamental functions of the mind and called *citta* as one kind.[8] Buddhism, denying the existence of Self (ātman), ascribes the sense of ego (ahaṃkāra) to *citta*.[9]

We perceive external objects (viṣaya) through sense-organs (indriya). This active perception is what is meant by *vijñāna*. Of those six perceptions, the five sense perceptions have each field and object fixed upon. Only *manas* perceives its own object, receives the sense stimuli, and experiences the field and object of the five senses.[10]

The total apperception of those *vijñānas* is *citta*. Thus, *citta* is fundamental and ultimate factor which predominates over sense-organs, their objects and all mental states.

According to Vasubandhu, *citta* and *caitta* (mental states) are interdependent. Without *citta*, any *caitta* can not arise.[11] In the *Abhidharma-kośa* the forty-six *caittas* are enumerated into six groups,[12] thus :

(1) *Mahā-bhūmikas* : ten general mental states.[13]

(2) *Kuśala-mahābhūmikas* : ten meritorious mental states.[14]

(3) *Kleśa-mahābhūmikas* : six defiled mental states.[15]

(4) *Akuśala-mahābhūmikas* : two evil mental states.[16]

(5) *Paritta-kuśala-bhūmikas* : ten subsidiary defiled *mental* states.[17]

(6) *Aniyata* : eight indeterminate mental states.[18]

Of these six groups of *caittas*, only the *mahābhūmikas* always arise together in cach *citta* of each moment.[19]

Generally speaking the mind and its functions are inseparable. Such idea of *citta* and *caitta* may be observed in the Yoga philosophy as we will have occasion to see.

§ 2. Citta in the Yoga Philosophy

In the *Yoga-sūtra*, the term *citta* is used about twenty times, but no clear definition is given by Patañjali. The word '*citta*' is used as a term which is well known and therefore does not require any explanation. Usually *citta* is conceived of in relation to its modification, i. e., *vṛtti* (function). *Citta* does not exist apart from *vṛtti*.[20]

The general characteristics of *citta* and its *vṛttis* are explained by Patañjali as following : Objects are sometimes known and sometimes unknown by *citta*,[21] but the *citta* as an object of *puruṣa* is always known because the *citta* is changing but the *puruṣa* is not changing.[22] The *citta* is not self-luminous because it is knowable.[23] It is coloured (or influenced, uparakta) by the seen, the thing thought of, and it is also coloured by the seer, *puruṣa*, then the *citta* is all-comprehensive.[24] The *citta*, though diversified with countless *vāsanās* or latent impressions, works for the sake of the other, i.e., for the experience and emancipation of *puruṣa*.[25]

The *citta* is regarded as the *dṛśya* (seen) like *buddhi*.[26] Since the *citta* is the *dṛśya*, it consists of the three *guṇas*. In this connection, Vyāsa explains, thus : Since the *citta* has as essence illumination (prakhyā), activity (pravṛtti) and inertia (sthiti), it is made up of the three *guṇas*. The *citta-sattva* has illumination as its form. When it is commingled with *rajas* and *tamas*, it becomes inclined towards supremacy and external objects. When it is dominated by *tamas*, it inclines on non-merit, non-knowledge, non-detach-

ment and non-supremacy. When it removes its veil of delusion and it becomes completely illuminous and it is dominated only by *rajas*, it inclines on merit, knowledge, detachment and supremacy.[27]

The eight matters enumerated here as non-merit (*adharma*) and so on are also taken up in the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* as the eightfold dispositions (bhāva) of *buddhi*. Evidently Vyāsa interprets the *citta* including the eightfold dispositions of *buddhi* represented by Īśvarakṛṣṇa.

Now we shall inquire whether the *citta* is different from the *buddhi* or not. So long as we see the use of the word '*buddhi*' in the *Yoga-sūtra*, we cannot define whether it is the same as that of Sāṃkhya. In the Sāṃkhya philosophy, it is the *buddhi* that discriminates the difference between *puruṣa* and *prakrti*, and accomplishes the fruition of all that is to be experienced by *puruṣa*.[28]

In the *Yoga-sūtra*, the word '*sattva*' is used to describe one particular characteristic of the *dṛśya* which is concerned with the isolation of *puruṣa*.[29] The word '*sattva*' is also used, in contrast with *puruṣa*, being compounded with the word '*buddhi*'[30] and only once compounded with the word '*citta*'.[31] As we have already seen, the word '*buddhi*' has been thought of in the context that *puruṣa* is an appercepter of intellect (buddhi-pratisaṃvedī).[32]

In the *Yogasūtra-bhāṣya*, the word '*buddhi*' is used in the place of '*citta*', and yet Vyāsa sometimes does not strictly distinguish the two words. It is presumed that the two words, *citta* and *buddhi*, in some cases, are interchangeable.[33] Taking these points into consideration, we see that '*buddhi*' or '*buddhi-sattva*' expresses a certain phase of the *citta-vṛtti*. Because of using the word '*sattva*', we regard these *citta-vṛttis* as intellectual phase.

In the Sāṃkhya philosophy, *manas* is one of the eleven organs evolved from *ahaṃkāra*. The *manas* has two characteristics : one is cognition and other is a sense-organ like other five sense-organs.[34]

In the *Yoga-sūtra*, the word '*manas*' is used three times.[35] As far as we read the *Yoga-sūtra*, we cannot define whether this *manas* means an entity as in the Sāṃkhya or not. Then what is *manas* in the Yoga philosophy ?

In the Yoga philosophy, the word '*manas*' is also interchangeable with '*citta-vṛtti*'.[36] But yet '*manas*' is used in a particular context in the *Yogasūtra-bhāṣya*. Vyāsa interprets : Although *manas* is restless and unstable, it is bounded in the body by means of *karmâśaya* (latencies of deed).[37] That is resting place of *vāsanā* (subconscious-impressions).[38] In other words, *manas* is the place of *kleśas*, *karmas* and their *āśaya* (latency).[39] They come to end with *manas* when the seeds of *kleśa* are burnt out.[40]

From such descriptions of the *manas*, it may be said that the *manas* stands for an emotional phase of the *citta-vṛtti*.

In the sequence of the *pariṇāma* of the Sāṃkhya, the *mahat* (great cosmic principle) evolves from the *prakṛti*. The *mahat* is also called *buddhi* as it is held to be the cosmic matter of experience. From the *mahat* evolves *ahaṃkāra*, which consists of the notion of self or I-sense in every form of cognition.[41]

In the *Yoga-sūtra*, the word '*ahaṃkāra*' is not used. It is *asmitā* that corresponds to the Sāṃkhya's *ahaṃkāra*. Patañjali describes that *asmitā* (I-sense) is tantamount to the identification of the power of seer with the power of seeing.[42] By Vyāsa's explanation we understand that the power of seer means *puruṣa* and the power of seeing means *buddhi*. Looking upon these two as the same is *Kleśa* known as *asmitā*.[43]

The *asmitā* is one of the five *kleśas* enumerated by Patañjali.[44] Also the *asmitā* consists of the *samprajñāta-samādhi*.[45] Vyāsa explains that the *asmitā* is I-sense or awareness of individual personality.[46] That is the feeling of identity of the *buddhi* with the self, the perceiver.[47] We will have an occasion of mentioning this later on.

Now we understand that the *asmitā* is a particular state of the *citta-vṛttis* relating to the conception of *puruṣa* or self.

Thus, the internal organs, i.e., *buddhi*, *ahaṃkāra* and *manas* as contemplated in the Sāṃkhya, are all included in the *citta-vṛttis* in the Yoga philosophy. In this context, S. N. Dasgupta observes: It is important to remember in this connection that citta must be distinguished from buddhi, the faculty of niścaya, co-ordination and ahaṃkāra, the ego, the faculty which actively relates all things with the self as its experiences are as identifying itself with them. According to Yoga these two are to be regarded as the separate vṛttis of the citta in the process of cognition which first discerns a thing as such, and then identifies the thing or its experiences with the experiencer shining forth as the ego; looked at from another point of view these may be regarded as the working of the same *vṛtti*, excited either by the senses of presentation or by the representative element of memory, etc.[48]

§ 3. The Role of Citta

We have observed that *citta* is the base for all mental functions. All human intellectual and emotional activities are based on the *citta*. We experience everything in the *citta* as the base of perception. Now we shall further investigate into the ontological role of the *citta*.

In this connection, Patañjali maintains that *citta*, being affected by the seer and the seen, is all-comprehensive.[49]

Vyāsa comments that *citta* is affected by the thing thought of; and it, being itself a knowable, comes into relationship through its own functions with *puruṣa*, the subject.[50]

Here we find that the *citta* has double phases. On one side it comes in contact with external objects, and on the other side it is connected with *puruṣa*. The external objects are like magnets. By coming in contact with the *citta*, they affect it as though it were a piece of iron.[51]

In other words, just as a crystal is tinged with various colours by the various adjacent things and appears as having the form of colours of the adjacent things, similarly the *citta*, affected by the preceivable objects and concentrated on the objects, appears as having the form of the objects.[52] In this case the *citta* gets affected through the sense-organs,[53] which have the act of receiving (grahaṇa) the external objects.[54] And then, being affected by the external objects and the sense-organs, the *citta* makes *pratyaya* (conception) in it.[55]

As we have observed before, *puruṣa* apperceives its own *buddhi*, or in other words, *puruṣa* reperceives the conception (pratyaya).[56] As the *citta* is regarded as *dṛśya*, it is also said that *citta-vṛttis* are always known to *puruṣa*.[57]

Based on this relation between *puruṣa* and *dṛśya* (i.e., citta or buddhi), the *puruṣa* appears like as being identical with the *buddhi* or having the same form of the *citta-vṛttis*.[58]

In support of this interpretation, Vyāsa quotes from the supposed fragment of *Pañcaśikha*. In the fragment[59], the *puruṣa* is said to have the function of knowledge (jñānavṛtti) which is not distinguished from the function of the *buddhi*, because the *Puruṣa* resembles the function of the *buddhi* which receives the influence of consciousness (caitanya).

Therefore it is said that, when the *citta-vṛttis* take place, the *puruṣa* is not distinguished from them.[60] Viewed from the side of *citta*, the same fact is described that the *citta* exists for the purpose of *puruṣa*, the seer.[61]

As to this teleological existence of the *citta* Vyāsa explains thus: The *citta*. like a magnet, serves only by being close to. Being the seen, it is the property of the owner, *puruṣa*.[62] In this case, the *citta* seems to have the same characteristics as the *puruṣa*. So it appears as if not an object although it really is an object; it appears to be intelligent (cetana) although it really is unintelligent.[63]

Therefore we usually perceive objects and have intellectual or emotional activities in our mind.

This very fact is generally called 'experience' (bhoga) in the Yoga philosophy. When the subject and the object of experience are merged, the experience happens. But it ceases when the *citta-vṛtti* is restrained.[64]

As mentioned above, in the Yoga philosophy, it is a premise that the *citta* can function as having consciousness being intimately related with *puruṣa*. Such consciousness is the fundamental empirical principle of human beings.

Buddhists do not admit any ultimate spiritual entity (anātman).[65] Nevertheless, even in early Buddhism, we can find a concept which regards consciousness (vijñāna) as an ultimate reality. For instance, in the *Dīgha Nikāya*. The Buddha expounds :

> There is it that earth, water, fire, and wind,
> And long and short, and fine and coarse,
> Pure and impure, no footing find.
> There is it that both name and form
> die out, leaving no trace behind.
> When intellection ceases they all also cease.[66]

We find in the *Suttanipāta* :

> All grows of Ill from Consciousness arises :
> no Ill can grow, if Consciousness be stilled. (73 !)[67]

To this sūtra, H. Nakamura explains : It is difficult to understand for the people of modern age what 'consciousness be stilled' means. Perhaps that means the state of meditation, wherein the functions of mind stop and, therefore, consciousness does not exist...What is described as 'consciousness' seems the state of *śūnya*. It is the fundamental idea of the later philosophy of the Vijñāna-vāda that the state of *śūnya* is consciousness (vijñāna). We may acknowledge that here was already provided the idealistic view which leads to the Vijñānavāda.[68]

The Vijñāna-vādins preach that all that belonging to the world is representation of consciousness.[69] Vasubandhu,

as a Vijñāna-vādin, declares in his *Vimśatikā* : It is all mere representation of consciousness, because there is the appearance of non-existent objects ; just as a man with a cataract sees hair, moons etc., which do not exist in reality.[70]

Thus, for the Vijñāna-vādins, it is established that the perception-only is the only reality, which is to be apprehended and by apprehending which everything will be apprehended automatically.[71]

§ 4. Phases of the Citta-Vṛttis

As well known, Buddhists classify the phases of *citta* i.e., the functions of mind in various ways.[72] In this section we shall observe how the Yoga philosophy considers the phases of mind.

1. Citta-dharma

In the course of yoga training, the *citta-vṛttis* gradually become restrained, and the *citta* shows various appearances. The *citta* in each state has its modifications (vṛtti). The Yoga philosophy analyzes the *citta-vṛttis* and classifies into certain kinds of phases.

All functions of *citta* are regarded as *dharmas* (attributes) of *citta*. The *dharmas* are classified into two kinds by Vyāsa : They are those which are perceived (paridṛṣṭa) and those which are unperceived (aparidṛṣṭa). The former have conceptions as its essence (pratyayātmaka). The latter have real-things as its essence (vastumātra-ātmaka) and just seven in number. The existence of the real-things is reached by *anumāna* (inference). In this connection Vyāsa quotes a verse : *nirodha* (restraint), *dharma* (meritous deed), *saṃskāra* (subliminal-impression), *pariṇāma* (change), *Jīvana* (life), *ceṣṭā* (movement) and *śakti* (power) are the *dharmas* of *citta* excluded from sight.[73]

Of these two kinds of *dharmas* of *citta*, the former are the modifications of *citta* as functions as *buddhi* and *manas*. They are the *citta-vṛttis* which have *pratyaya* (conception).

They are experienced as knowledge and as feeling in the mind. They include the fivefold *citta-vṛttis*, and the five stages of *citta*. We shall have an occassion to discuss them later.

The latter are not directly experienced, as they represent the characteristics of *citta* in its own nature. Thus first of all it has to be admitted that it is possible for the *citta* to remain in itself without transforming itself into its states. This is called *nirodha*, the first one of the unperceived *citta-dharma*. The second one, *dharma*, is in accordance with *karma* as virtue and vice, merit and demerit. The third one, *saṃskāra*, is the latent impression in the *citta* as the ground of memory. The fourth one, *pariṇāma*, is another plasticity of the *citta*, by virtue of which the *citta* is always transforming itself, and there is not a moment when it is at rest. The fifth one, *Jīvana*, is almost like bye-product of the *citta* transformation. The sixth one, *ceṣṭā*, is the volitional activity or willing by which the conative and cognative senses are brought in relation to their objects. The last one, *śakti*, is the reserve potent power by which the *citta* can retain itself or change its course and directions. These characteristics are involved in the very essence of *citta* and consist in the substrata of *citta*, by which the *citta* transforms itself and has its function.[74]

Thus we see the *citta* has two degrees. One form of states is that the *citta* functions, wherein our mental phenomena, emotional or intellectual, appear. That is, so to say, *vyutthāna* state. The other state is in the form in which all those states are suppressed. This is the *nirodha* state.[75] Between the two stages, i. e., the *vyutthāna* state and the *nirodha* state, there are thousands of infinite variety, through which a man's experiences have to pass, from the *vyutthāna* to the *nirodha*, and again from the *nirodha* to the *vyutthāna*.[76]

2. Kliṣṭa and Akliṣṭa

The *vyutthāna* state is divided into two kinds : the *kliṣṭa-vṛtti* (afflicted state) and the *akliṣṭa vṛtti* (unafflicted state).[77]

The *klistas* are those which are caused by *kleśa* (affliction) and are the field of the accumulation of the latencies of *karma*. The *aklistas* have descernment as their object and obstruct the task of *guṇas*.[78]

In this connection Vyāsa describes that the river of *citta* flows in both direction ; flows towards good (kalyāṇa) and flows towards evil (pāpa). That which flows onwards to isolation (kaivalya) and downwards to discrimination (viveka) is good. That which flows onwards to migration (saṃsāra) and downwards to non-discrimination is evil. Among these, the stream towards objects is dammed by detachment (vairāgya), and the stream towards discrimination is opened by practice of discriminating sight (viveka-darśanābhyāsa).[79]

Such classification that depends on ethical virtue and vice is also common to Buddhists. For instance, Vasubandhu classifies all *dharmas* into two *sāsrava* (impure) and *anāsrava* (pure). The *sāsrava dharmas* are those which are conditioned, excepting the Eightfold Path (marga-satya). Those are so called for the vices are attached to them. The *anāsrava dharmas* are the Eightfold Path and the three *asaṃskṛtas*.[80]

3. Five Citta-vṛttis

Those *kliṣṭa* and *akliṣṭa* modifications are of five varieties as stated in the *Yoga-sūtra* : namely, *pramāna*, *viparyaya*, *vikalpa*, *nidrā* and *smṛti*.[81]

(1) *Pramāna* (valid knowledge) includes *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *āgama*.[82] In detail, we shall discuss in the next Chapter.

(2) *Viparyaya* (misconception) is an erroneous knowledge (mithyā-jñāna) based upon unreal thing.[83] Vyāsa exemplifies the evil nature of *viparyaya* as *avidyā* (nescience), *asmitā* (I-sense). *rāga* (attachment), *dveṣa* (aversion) and *abhiniveśa* (clinging to life).[84] These are acknowledged as the fivefold *kleśas*. We shall observe them in the next part.

(3) *Vikalpa* (imagination) follows knowledge by means of words, and is without real thing.[85] This is the result of

verbal expression of knowledge. This is neither a *pramāṇa* nor a *viparyaya*, but abstract imagination based on language. Because the *vikalpa* is devoid of objective substratum, it cannot be a *pramāna*, and it is not a *viparyaya* for it is not proved by further knowledge. It is purely abstract thought. If the *vikalpa* is not accepted, no abstract thinking would be possible.[86]

(4) *Nidrā* (sleep) is the function which is caused by the conception of non-existence.[87] It is a particular conception (pratyaya-viśeṣa), for it is called back on awakening.[88]

(5) *Smṛti* (memory) is that which retains the experienced objects.[89] The *smṛti* is deeply relating to *saṃskāra* (subliminal impression). It is said that a *pratyaya* (conception), in the mind, appears in the form of both the perceived thing and the act of perceiving. The *pratyaya* produces the *saṃskāra* of the same kind. This *saṃskāra* brings forth the *smṛti* of the very same form which consists of the perceived thing and the act of perceiving.[90] So in memory the object is always that of a former knowledge or something less than the object given in a former knowledge.[91] *Smṛti* is therefore of perceptions already aquired by all *citta-vṛttis*, i. e., *pramāna* and so on.[92]

The *saṃskāras* of the same kind are made by the *citta-vṛttis* which are either *kliṣta* or *akliṣṭa*, again the same kind of *citta-vṛttis* are made by the *saṃskāras*. Thus, the wheel of *vṛttis* and *saṃskāras* ceaselessly rolls on.[93]

Here we find that those five kinds of *citta-vṛttis* are in the sphere of intellectual activity. But they can not be treated separately from the emotional feelings like *sukha* (pleasure), *duhkha* (pain) and *moha* (delusion).[94] The intellectual activities and the emotional feelings are but two different aspects of the modifications of *citta*.[95] The emotional is explained in the sphere of *kleśa*, which needs elaboration.

4. Fivefold Kleśas

Kleśa is defined by Patañjali, thus : *Kleśa* (affliction) is

avidyā (nescience), *asmitā* (I-sense), *rāga* (attachment), *dveṣa* (aversion) and *abhiniveśa* (clinging to life).[96]

The general characteristics are explained by Vyāsa : The *kleśas* are meant to be the five *viparyayas*. When they become active, they strengthen the task (adhikāra) of the *guṇas*, make *pariṇāma* stable, raise the stream of cause and effect, and becoming interdependent upon each other for help, bring forth fruitions (vipaka) of *karma*.[97]

The feeling of *kleśas* is perceived when the conception is mistaken.[98] Therefore, as we have seen, Vyāsa regards the *viparyaya* among the five *citta-vṛttis* as the *kleśa*. The *kleśas*[99] are the roots of *karmâśaya* (residua of deeds) and cause the *karmâśaya* to bring forth its fruitions, which are birth (jāti), life (āyus) and experience (bhoga).[100]

A man is made to perform actions good or bad by the *kleśas* which are rooted in him, and these actions, as a result of their fructification, produce another life and its experience, in which life again new actions are earned by virtue of the *kleśas*, and thus the cycle is continued.[101]

Now we shall observe each one of the five *kleśas*.

(1) *Avidyā* is bestowed with the main position of all the *kleśas*. Patañjali remarks : *Avidyā* is the field for the others whether they are dormant, attenuated, interrupted or expanded.[102] Vyāsa comments that all *kleśas* are varieties of *avidyā* since the *avidyā* pervades all the other *kleśas*.[103] So the *avidyā* is like the substratum of the *kleśas* and is regarded as the root of continuity of the *kleśas* and of the *karmâśaya* together with its fruition.[104]

Here we see that as long as the *avidyā* exists, the *kleśa*, the *karmâśaya* and its fruition are alive. In other words, the *avidyā* is the main cause of human existence.

In the *Yoga-sūtra*, the *avidyā* is defined to be recognition of permanent, pure, pleasure and self in what is impermanent, impure, pain and non-self.[105] We shall observe some ideas of *avidyā* later comparing with the Buddhist concept of *avidyā*.

(2) *Asmitā* is that which is tantamount to the identification (ekātmatā) of the power of seer with the power of seeing.[106] On this definition of *asmitā*, Vyāsa comments that *puruṣa* has the power of seer and *buddhi* has the power of seeing. Those which are likely come into a single nature (eka-svarūpa) is *asmitā*, which is called *kleśa*.[107]

In other part of his commentary, Vyāsa refers to the *asmitā*, thus : *Citta* which is concentrated in the state of *asmitā*, like the waveless great ocean, becomes the peaceful and infinite ego-universal (asmitāmātra).[108]

Again he regards *asmitā* as the awareness of individual personality (ekātmikā saṃvid).[109] This is the feeling of identity of the *buddhi* with the *puruṣa*.[110]

Thus we know that the *asmitā* is the particular consciousness of 'I am', which is the base of the ego-sense (ahaṃkāra) and the self-sense (mamakāra).

(3) *Rāga* is that which follows *sukha*,[111] to which the feelings of *gardha* (greed), *tṛṣṇā* (thirst) and *lobha* (desire) belong.[112]

(4) *Dveṣa* is that which follows *duḥkha*,[113] to which the feelings of *pratigha* (repulsion), *manyu* (wrath), *jighāṃsā* (desire to hurt) and *krodh* (anger) belong.[114]

(5) *Abhiniveśa* is the bearer of the essence of life, which springs up as such even in the wise.[115] The bearer of the essence of life (svarasa-vāhin) means the craving for one's self (ātma-rāśī), that is craving 'let me never be non-existent ; let me be alive'.[116] This is due to the painful experience of death in some previous existence, which abides in us as a residual potency (vāsanā) and causes the instinct of self-preservation, fear of death and love of life.[117]

5. Some Ideas of Avidyā

As we have seen before, in the Yoga philosophy, the *avidyā* is the root of the other *kleśas*. All the *kleśas* are the modifications of the *avidyā* and appear to be the source of the *kliṣṭa vṛttis* of *citta*. In order to obtain the deeper

understanding about the *avidyā*, we shall observe some ideas of *avidyā*.

We find that the definition of *avidyā* in the *Yoga-sūtra* is similar to that of '*viparyaya*' in the *Abhidharmakośa*.[118] In the Yoga philosophy, *avidyā* is cause for conjunction of *draṣṭr* and *dṛśya*.[119] Vyāsa explains the *avidyā* as residue from misconceived knowledge (viparyaya-jñānavāsana).[120] Again he explicitly states the *viparyaya* as the cause of worldly existence and regards it as *kleśa*.[121] Furthermore he states that it is *adarśana* (non-discrimination) that brings out the conjunction of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*.[122] Here we understand that the *avidyā* is synonymous with *viparyaya* and *adarśana* in the Yoga philosophy.

He further illustrates the nature of existence of the *avidyā*. *Avidyā* should be regarded as real existence (vastusattvaṃ vijñeyam). Just as the word '*amitra*' (non-friend) implies an enemy and the word '*agoṣpada*' (place not visited by cows) implies a trackless forest, so *avidyā* is not the *pramāna* nor the negation of *pramāna*, but another knowledge (jñānântara) which is opposed to the true knowledge.[123]

In this connection, we find a similar illustration in the *Abhidharma-kośa*. It is said that *avidyā* is opposed to *prajñā*.[124] In both schools, the concept of *avidyā* is not negative but is a positive entity. However, the Sāṃkhya's concept of *avidyā* is different. They think that all error (avidyā or bhrama) is due to the non-distinction between the true and the untrue. Thus the non-distinction between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* is the cause of all our miserable mundane existence. Avidyā and *Aviveka* are, thus, synonymous with the conception of the Sāṃkhya philosophy.[125]

Relating to the third of the four false recognitions, which is stated as to the definition of *avidyā*,[126] Patañjali mentions that all are nothing but pain to the discriminating persons (vivekin) in the cause of *pariṇāma-duḥkha*, *tāpa-duḥkha* and *saṃskāra duḥkha*, and by reason of contrary of the functions of *guṇas* (guṇa-vṛtti-virodha).[127]

Vyāsa explains about the cause of pain, thus : The *avidyā* is the seed out of which this huge aggregate of pain grows forth.[129] He continues to explain the way to destroy the *avidyā*, that is *saṃyag-darśana* (right-discrimination). Just like the medical science comprising of the fourfold doctrines, that is, disease, cause of disease, healing and medicine, so also our science comprises of the fourfold doctorines, that is, transmigration (saṃsāra), cause of transmigration (saṃsāra-hetu), liberation (mokṣa) and means to attain liberation (mokṣôpāya). Of these, transmigration filled with pain is to be destroyed (heya), the conjunction of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* is the cause of that which is to be destroyed (heya-hetu), the final ceasation of the conjunction is the destruction (hāna) and the means of destruction (hānôpāya) is the *saṃyag-darśana* (right discrimination).[129]

An identical approach has been made by the Buddhists to ascertain the nature of the Four Noble Truth (catur-ārya-satya).[130] Those are *duḥkha-satya* in which pain is observed, *samudaya-satya* in which its cause is observed, *nirodha-satya* in which its restraint is observed and *mārga-satya* in which the way of restraint is observed.[131]

On reading the *Yoga-sūtra* in that context, we see that Patañjali teaches that which is to be destroyed (heya), the cause of that which is to be destroyed (heya-hetu), destruction (hāna) and the means of destruction (hāna-upāya). That which is to be destroyed is the pain in future.[132]

The cause that which is to be destroyed is the conjunction of the seer and the seen.[133] The destruction is absence of *avidyā*, and is the state of liberation of the seer.[134] The means of destruction is clear and distinct discriminative knowledge.[135]

6. Five Citta-bhūmis

There is another kind of classification of *citta* in the *Yogasūtra-bhāṣya*. With regrad to the concept of *yoga*, Vyāsa describes thus : *Yoga* is *samādhi* (concentration).

This (samādhi) is the *dharma* of *citta* which belongs to all stages (bhūmi). The stages of *citta* are *kṣipta* (restless), *mūḍha* (stupified), *vikṣipta* (distructed), *ekâgra* (one-pointed) and *niruddha* (restrained).[136]

Even in the first three stages, the *citta* can at times be in a state of *samādhi,* but that is not to be said *Yogic samādhi.*[137] The *Yogic samādhi* is found in its intensest form in the last two stages of *citta.* Here it is interesting that Vyāsa admits that the *samādhi* is a general characteristic of all stages of *citta.* In this connection we observe the same idea in the Sarva-asti-vāda of Buddhism. As we have already seen, Vasubandhu regards *samādhi* as one of the ten *mahābhūmika-caittas* which exist in each *citta* of each moment.[138]

In the context of the *Mahābhūmika-caittas,* arises an objection : As long as the *samādhi* is one of the ten *mahā-bhūmika-caittas,* it must be always associated with *citta.* Then the *citta* must be always one-pointed.[139]

This is from the view-point of the Sautrāntikas and the Vijñāna-vādins.[140] Against this objection the Vaibhāṣikas reply : Your objection is not reasonable, because the *citta* does not become one-pointed when the power of *samādhi* is weak.[141]

In all *cittas* at every moment, the state of *samādhi* may happen. But only when it is strong the *citta* gets the state of one-pointedness. This idea of the Sarvāsti-vādins is similar to that of the Yoga philosophy.[142]

Summary : In the Buddhist thoughts, the basis of the mental functions is generally called *citta,* which comprises six classes of *vijñāna.* According to the *Abhidharma-kośa,* the forty-six mental states (caitta) are enumerated into six groups.

In the Yoga philosophy, the functions of the mind are called *citta-vṛtti,* in which the Sāṃkhyaic concept of *buddhi,* *manas* and *ahaṃkāra* are included. The *citta* has double-

phases : being in contact with *puruṣa* and at the same time with external objects.

Although Buddhists do not admit any ultimate spiritual entity, there are tendencies which regard consciousness (vijñāna) as an ultimate reality from the beginning of the Buddhist thought. The end of this tendency is the Vijñāna-vāda.

In the Yoga philosophy, the state of *citta-vṛtti* is called *citta-dharma*, and is divided into two : *vyutthāna* and *nirodha* state. The *vyutthāna* state is explained in various aspects. The state is divided into two kinds : *kliṣṭa* and *akliṣṭa*. This sort of classification that depends on ethical virtue and vice is common to the Buddhist idea of *sāsrava* and *anāsrava*.

The *vyutthāna vṛtti* is also explained with the five *citta-vṛttis*.[1] This classification seems to originate in the Yoga philosophy.

Of the five *citta-vṛttis*, *viparyaya* is made identifies with the five *kleśas*. In the five *kleśas*, *avidyā* is the root of the other *kleśas*. We find the explanation of *avidyā* of the Yoga Philosophy is similar to that of the *Abhidharma-kośa*.

There is another kind of classification of *citta* in the Yoga philosophy, namely, five *citta-bhūmis*. The concept of *samādhi* as one of the five *citta-bhūmis* is similar to the sarvāsti-vāda's idea of *samādhi* as one of the ten *mahābhūmika-caittas*.

Thus we have found that the constitution of the mind which is classified by the Yoga philosophy has similarity to that of the Buddhist philosophy. Besides such classification of the *citta-vṛtti*, it is emphasized that the important function of the mind is epistemological one. Therefore, in the next chapter, we shall observe another sphere of the *citta-vṛtti* from the view-point of epistemology.

NOTES

1. S. Channakesavan, *Concept of Mind in...*, p. 62.
2. P. Chakravarti, *Origin and...*, p. 141, 181 and p. 316 fn. 2.
   Vindhyavāsin's view is preserved in YD. ad. SK. 22—ekādaśakam iti Vindhyavāsī. tathā 'nyeṣāṃ mahati sarva-arthôpalabdhiḥ, manasi Vindhyavāsinaḥ. (p. 91.)
3. P. Chakravarti, *Origin and...*, p. 141.
   And see R. Nakamura, "Teaching of Vindhyavāsin." ; S. Takagi, "On Vārṣagaṇyāḥ (I)."
4. For example, *Dhammapada*, 1, 2, 33, 37, etc.
5. H. V. Guenther, *Philosophy &...*, p. 15.
6. An etymological explanation is shown by H. V. Guenther, ibid., p. 13.
7. See SN. 12, 61, 1, Assutavato vol. II, p. 95.—cittaṃ iti pi mano iti pi viññāṇaṃ ;
   AKkā. II. 34a.—cittaṃ mano'tha vijñānam ekârthaṃ ;
   Viṃśatikā—cittaṃ mano vijñānaṃ vijñaptiś cêti paryāyah. (p. 3, l. 3.) ;
   Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Psychology*, p. 17.
   Cf. *Compendium of Philosophy* (p. 234) regards citta and viññāṇa are synonymous, and points SN. ii. 24—cittaṃ iti pi mano iti pi viññāṇaṃ.
8. According to AKbh. I. 16, *citta* is one of 75 dharmas (viz., 11 rūpas, 1 citta, 46 caittas, 14 citta-viprayukta-saṃskāras and 3 asaṃskṛtas.) *Citta* is equal to vijñāna-skandha, which is mano-āyatana. It consists of 7 dhātus ; 6 vijñānas (vijñāna-kāya, i.e., vijñāna-dhātu) and mano-dhātu (mind). (P. ed. p. 11, ll. 6-17 ; S. ed. pp. 50-51.)
9. See AKbh. I. 39a.—ātmani asati katham ādhyātmikaṃ bāhyaṃ vā. ahaṃkāra-sanniśrayatvāc cittam ātmêty upacaryate. (P. ed. p. 27, l. 6 ; S. ed. p. 104, l. 7f.)
   The concept of *ātman* and *pudgala* is discussed in AKbh. IX ; Mahāvibhāṣā vol. 2. (Taisho, 27, 8a.) etc.
   Vide T. Kimura, *Philosophy of Hinayāna Buddhism*, pp. 355-369.
10. Vide H. V. Guenther, *Philosophy &...*, pp. 15-30.
11. cittaṃ caittāḥ sahâvaśyam.—AKkā. II. 23a.
    See AKbh. II. 23a.—na hy ete vinā'nyonyaṃ bhavitum arhati. (P. ed. p. 54, 14f ; S. ed. p. 185.)
    And see S. Chaudhury, *Analytical Study of the Abhidharmakośa*, p. 104.
    Yaśomitra's commentary on AKbh. II. 23a is quoted in H. V. Guenther, ibid., p. 30.

And also see AKbh. II. 34d.—yathaiva hy ekaṃ cittam evaṃ caittā apy ekaikā iti. (P. ed. p. 62, l. 8f; S. ed. p. 209.)

12. See AKbh. II. 23b-27; and Sphutārthā II. 28; and S. Chaudhury, ibid., 105-107; T. Kimura, *Philosophy of...*, pp. 389-391.

Abhidhammatha-saṃgha enumerates 52 cetaśikas into seven groups. On this point, see *Compendium of...*. pp. 94-97; T. Kimura, ibid. pp. 391-394.

Triṃśikā (vs. 3-14) enumerates 51 caittas into six groups. On the explanation of them, see A. K. Chatterjee, *The Yogācāra Idealism*, pp. 113-125.

13. See AKkā. II. 24.—vedanā cetanā saṃjñā cchandaḥ sparśo matiḥ smṛtiḥ, manaskāro'dhimokṣaś ca samādhiḥ sarva-cetasi.

14. See AKkā. II. 25.—śraddhā'pramādaḥ praśrabdhir upekṣā hrīr apatrapā, mūladvayam (i. e., alobha and adveṣa) ahiṃsā ca vīryaṃ ca kuśale sadā.

15. See AKkā. II. 26abc.—mohaḥ kauśīdyam āśraddhyaṃ styānam uddhavaḥ (i. e., auddhatyam), kliṣṭe sadaiva.

16. See AKkā. II. 26cd.—akuśale tv āhrīkyam anapatrāpā.

17. See AKkā. II. 27.—krodhôpanāha-śāṭyêrṣyā-pradāsa-mrakṣa-matsarāḥ, māyā-mada-vihiṃsāś ca parītta-kleśa-bhūmikāḥ.

18. See Sphutārthā II. 28.—atrâcārya-Vasumitraḥ saṃgraha-ślokam āha,

vitarka-vicāra-kautṛya-middha-pratigha-saktayaḥ,
mānaś ca vicikitsā cêty aṣṭāv anityā smṛtāḥ. (S. ed. p. 195.)

19. See AKbh. II. 24.—ime kila daśa dharmāḥ i.e. (mulābhūmikāḥ) sarvatra cittakṣaṇe samagrā bhavanti. (P. ed. p. 54, l. 19; S. ed. p. 187.)

Of this kind of caitta, Vijñāna-vāda terms '*sarvatraga*' and enumerates five caittas. See Viṃśatikā v. 3ed.—sadā sparśa-manaskāra-vit-saṃjñā-cetânvitam.

Stiramati comments; sadêti yāvad ālaya-vijñānaṃ tāvad ebhiḥ sarvatragair dharmair anvitam. (p. 20.)

Anuruddha calls seven cetasikās 'sabba-citta-sādhāraṇa', which are phassa, vedanā, saññā, cetanā, ekaggatā, jīvit-indriya and manasikāra. (*Compendium of Philosophy*, p. 94f.)

For Guenther's on the idea of classification of this kind of caittas. See *Philosophy &...*, p. 31.

20. S. N. Dasgupta mentions "Citta or mind always exists in the form of its states which are called vṛttis. These comprehend all the manifold states of consciousness of our phenomenal existence. We cannot distinguish states of consciousness from consciousness itself, for the consciousness is not something separate from its

states; it exists in them, passes away with their passing and submerges when they are submerged." (*Yoga As*..., p. 92.)

See S. Kumoi, "Citta in the Yoga School." and N. Tanaka, "The Concept of Citta in the Yoga-sūtra."

21. YS. IV. 17, see Chap. I.
22. YS. IV. 18, see Chap. I.
23. YS. IV. 19, see Chap. I.
24. darṣṭṛ-dṛśyôparaktaṃ cittaṃ sarvârtham.—YS. IV. 23.
25. YS. IV. 24, see Chap. I.
26. In this connection, see Chap. I, § 2, part 1.
27. cittaṃ hi prakhyā-pravṛtti-sthiti-śīlatvāt tri-guṇam. prakhyā-rūpaṃ hi citta-sattvaṃ rajas-tamobhyāṃ saṃsṛṣṭam aiśvarya-viṣaya-priyaṃ bhavati. tad eva tamasânuviddham adharmâjñā-nâvairāgyânaiśvaryôpagamaṃ bhavati. tad eva prakṣīṇa-mohâva-raṇaṃ sarvataḥ pradyotamānam anuviddhaṃ rajomātrayā dharma-jñāna-vairāgyaiśvaryôpagamaṃ bhavati.—YBh. I. 2. (p. 4, 1. 7-p. 5, 1. 4.)
28. See SK. 23.—adhyavasāyo buddhir dharmo jñānaṃ virāga aiśvaryam, sāttvikam etad-rūpaṃ tāmasaṃ asmād vyaparyastam.

    And SK. 44 and 45. Also see P. Chakravarti, *Origin and*... p. 300.
29. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, vol. 2, p. 291f.

    See SK. 23a.—adhyavasāyo buddhiḥ; and SK. 37—sarvaṃ pratyupabhogaṃ yasmāt puruṣasya sādhyati buddhiḥ, saiva ca viśiṇati punaḥ pradhāna-puruṣântaraṃ sūksmam.

    See YS. III. 35.—sattva—puruṣayor atyantâsaṃkīrṇayoḥ pratyayâviśeṣo bhogaḥ parârthāt svârtha-saṃyamāt puruṣa-jñānam: YS. III. 49,—sattva-puruṣânyatā-khyātimātrasya sarva-bhāvâdhiṣṭhātṛtvam sarva-jñātṛtvaṃ ca; YS. III. 55.—sattva-puruṣayoḥ śuddhi-sāmye kaivalyam iti.
30. 'Buddhi-sattva' appears in YBh. I. 47; II. 17, 20, 42; III. 35 etc. According to G. M. Koelman, S. J., *Pātañjala Yoga*, p. 99, the word 'buddhi-sattva' appears fifteen times in YBh.
31. 'Citta-sattva', only in YBh. I. 2.
32. See Chap. I.
33. For instance YBh. II. 20.—kiṃ ca parârthā *buddhiḥ* saṃhatya-kāritvāt, svârthaḥ puruṣa iti. (p. 89, 1. 2f.) Evidently this phrase is the same as the last half of YS. IV. 24.—*tad* asaṃkhyeya-vāsanābhiś citram api parârthaṃ saṃhatya-kāritvāt.

    YBh. I. 36.—hṛdaya-puṇḍarīke dhārayato yā *buddhi*-saṃvit. (p. 41, 1. 7f.) This is from YS. III. 34.—hṛdaye *citta*-saṃvit.

    YBh. I. 7.—pauruṣeyaś *citta-vṛtti*-bodhaḥ. (p. 12, 1. 2.)

This is explained as 'puruṣaḥ *buddhi*-pratisaṃvedī' in YBh. I. 29; etc.

34. See SK. 27ab.—ubhayâtmakam atra manaḥ saṃkalpakam indriyaṃ ca sādharmyāt.

    With this respect, S. N. Dasgupta calls these two as "the conative and the cognative aspects" in *Yoga As...*, p. 55. And see S. Chennakesavan, *Concept of...*, p. 28f.

35. YS. I. 35 ; II, 53 ; III. 48.

36. Vyāsa puts *manas* with ease instead of *citta* or *citta-vṛtti*. For example, YBh. IV. 23.—*mano'* bidmantavyenôparak-tam. tat-svayaṃ ca viṣayatvād viṣayinā puruṣenâtmīyayā vṛttyā abhisaṃbaddham. tad etac *cittam* eva...(p. 206, 1. 7f.), on YS. IV. 23.—draṣṭṛ-dṛśyôparaktaṃ *cittam* sarvârtham. See Chap. III, § 3.

    YBh. IV. 18.—sadā-jñātatvaṃ tu *manasas* tat-prabhoḥ puruṣasyâpariṇāmitvam anumāpayati. (p. 202, 1. 2f.) on YS. IV. 18.—sadā jñātāś *citta-vṛttayas* tat-prabhoḥ puruṣasya apariṇāmitvāt. See Chap. I.

    YBh. IV. 19.—yathêtarāṇindriyāṇi śabdâdayaś ca dṛśyatvān na svâbhāsāni tathā *mano*'pi pratyetavyam. (p 202, 1. 7f.) on YS. IV. 19.—na tat (i. e., *citta-vṛtti*) svâbhāsaṃ dṛśyatvāt.

37. lolībhūtasya manaso'pratiṣṭhasya śarīre karmâśaya-vaśād bandhaḥ pratiṣṭhêty arthaḥ.—YBh. III. 38. (p. 161, 1, 3f.)

38. manas tu sâdhikāram āśayo vāsanānām.—YBh. IV. 11. (p. 193, 1. 1.)

39. See YBh. I. 24.– avidyâdayaḥ kleśāḥ. kuśalâkuśalāni karmāṇi tat-phalaṃ vipākaḥ. tad-anuguṇā vāsanā āśayaḥ. te ca manasi vartamānāḥ puruṣe vyapadiśyante. (p. 26, 1. 11-p. 27, 1. 2.)

40. See YBh. III. 50.—evam asya tato virajyamānasya yāni kleśa-bījāni dagdha-śāli-bīja-kalpāny aprasava-samarthāni tāni saha manasā pratyastaṃ gacchati. (p. 173, 11. 7-9)

41. P. Chakravarti, *Origin and...*, p. 238f.

    See Sk. 22a.—prakṛter manāṃs tato'haṃkāraḥ : SK. 24a.—abhimāno' haṃkāraḥ.

42. dṛg-darśana-śaktyor ekātmêva asmitā.—YS. II. 6.

43. puruṣo dṛk-śaktir buddhir darśana-śaktir ity etayor eka-svarūpâpattir ivâsmitā kleśa ucyate.—YBh. II. 6. (p. 64, 1. 5f.)

44. See YS. II. 3.—avidyâsmitā-rāga-dveṣâbhiniveśāh kleśāḥ. We shall observe in detail in § 4, part 4.

45. See YS. I. 17.—vitarka-vicārânandsâmitā-rūpânugamāt saṃprajñātaḥ. We shall observe in Chap. V, § 4.

46. ekâtmikā saṃvit asmitā.—YBh. I. 17. (p. 22, 1. 1.)

47. See S. N. Dasgupta, *Yoga As...*, p. 51.

48. See S. N. Dasgupta, *Yoga Philosophy*, p. 265.
49. draṣṭṛ-dṛśyôparaktaṃ cittaṃ sarvârtham.—YS. IV. 23.
50. mano (i. e., cittam) hi mantavyenârthenôparaktam. tat svayaṃ ca viṣayatvād viṣayiṇā puruṣenâtmīyayā vṛttyā abhisaṃbaddam.—YBh. IV. 23. (P. 206, 1. 7f.)
51. ayaskānta-maṇi-kalpā viṣayā ayaḥ-sadharmakaṃ cittam abhisaṃbandhyo'parañjayanti,—YBh. IV. 17. (p. 201, 1. 1f.)

    About a simile of a magnet, see Chap. I, p. 31, fn. 1.
52. yathā sphaṭika upāśraya-bhedāt tat-tad-rūpôparakta upāśraya-rūpâkāreṇa nirbhāsate tathā grāhyâlambanôparaktaṃ cittaṃ grāhya-samāpannaṃ grāhya-svarūpākāreṇa nirbhāsate.—YBh. I. 41. (p. 43. 1. 11-p. 44, 1. 1.)

    The simile of a crystal is used again in YBh. IV. 23.
53. See YBh. I. 7.—indriya-praṇālikayā cittasya bāhya-vastûparāgāt tad-viṣayā sāmānya-viśeṣâtmano'rthasya viśeṣa-avadhāraṇa-pradhānā vṛttiḥ pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam. (p. 11. 1. 8-p. 12, 1. 1.) See Chap. IV , § 3.
54. See YBh. I. 41.—tathā grahaṇeṣv apîndriyeṣu draṣṭavyam. (p. 44, 1. 5.)
55. See YBh. I. 11.—grāhyôparaktaḥ pratyayo grāhya-grahaṇa-ubhayâkāra-nirbhāsas taj-jātīyakaṃ saṃskāram ārabhate. (p. 17, 1. 1f.)
56. On *svabuddhi-samvedana*, see Chap. I. On *pratyayânupaśya*, see Chap. I.
57. See YS. IV. 18, quoted in Chap. I.
58. See YBh. II. 20, quoted Chap. I.
59. tathā côktam. apariṇāmini hi bhoktṛ-śaktir aprati-saṃkramā ca pariṇāminy arthe partisaṃkrāntêva tad-vṛttim anupatati. tasyāś ca prāpta-caitanyôpagraha-rūpāyā buddhi-vṛtter anukāra-mātratayā buddhi-vṛtty-aviśiṣṭā hi jñāna-vṛttir ity ākhyāyate.—YBh. II. 20. (p. 89, 1. 8-p. 90, 1. 2.)

    This fragment is quoted again in YBh. IV. 22 (p. 205, 11. 6-9).
60. vyutthāne yāś citta-vṛttayas tad-aviśiṣṭa-vṛttiḥ puruṣaḥ.—YBh. I. 4. (p. 8, 1. 4.)
61. YS. IV. 19 and 24.
62. cittam ayaskāntamaṇi-kalpaṃ saṃnidhimātrôpakāri dṛśyatvena svaṃ bhavati puruṣasya svāminaḥ.—YBh. I. 4. (p. 8, 1. 5-p. 9, 1. 2.)

    The simile of a magnet in contrast to *puruṣa* is used in YBh. II. 17 (of dṛśya) and II. 18 (of guṇa).
63. See YBh. IV. 23.—etad etac cittam eva draṣṭṛ-dṛśya-uparaktaṃ

viṣaya-viṣayi-nirbhāsaṃ cetanâcetana-svarūpa-āpannaṃ viṣayât-makam apy aviṣayâtmakam ivācetanaṃ cetanam iva sphaṭika-maṇi-kalpaṃ sarvârtham ity ucyate. (p. 206, 1. 8-p. 207, 1. 1.)

The simile of a crystal is used in YBh. I. 41.

64. See YBh. II. 6, quoted in Chap. I.

65. Detailed bibliography on *anātman* of the Buddhist thoughts is shown in H. Nakamura ed., *Ātman and Anātman*, Appendix.

66. Viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ anantaṃ sabbato pahaṃ.
Ettha āpo ca paṭhavī tejo vāyo na gādhati,
Ettha dighañ ca rassañ ca aṇuṃ thūlaṃ subhâsubham,
Ettha nāmañ ca rūpañ ca, asesaṃ uparujjhati,
Viññāṇassa nirodhena etth'etaṃ uparujjhatîti.—DN. XI. 85, vol. I, P. 223.

Translated by T. W. Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, Part I. p. 284.

67. Yaṃ kiñci dukkaṃ sambhoti, sabbaṃ viññāṇa-paccayā.
viññāṇassa nirodhena n'atthi dukkhassa sambhavo.—Sn. 734.
Translated by Loard Chalmers, *Buddha's Teaching*, p. 177.

Cf. Sn. 735—Etam ādinavaṃ Tatvā dukkhaṃ viññāna-paccayā, viññāṇupassamā bhikkhu nicchāto parinibbhuto ti. (Aware that Consciousness begets all Ills, and clear that Ill's destruction comes about by stilling Consciousness, the Almsman, quit of Consciousness, find everlasting Peace.)

68. Vide H. Nakamura, *The Thoughts of the Premitive Buddhism*, vol. 2, pp. 139-140.

69. See "Mahāyāne traidhātukaṃ vijñapti-mātraṃ vyava-sthāpyate."
—Viṃśatika, p. 3.

According to S. Anacker, *Seven Works of Vasubandhu*, (p. 161, fn.) this is the Avataṃsaka-sūtra : Daśabhūmika VI, p. 32.

70. vijñapti-mātram evaitad asad-arthâvabhāsanāt, yathā taimirika-syâsat keśa-candradi darśanam.—Viṃśatikā, v. 1

Translated by T. A. Kochumuttom, *A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience*. (p. 166.)

71. See C. L. Tripathi, *The Problem of Knowledge in Yogācāra Buddhism*, p. 346.

And see Triṃśikā, v. 17 ; S. Anacker, ibid., p. 187 ; T. A. Kochumuttom, ibid., pp. 146.

72. See Chap. III, § 1.

73. cittasya *dvaye* dharmāḥ paridṛṣṭāś cāparidṛṣṭāś ca. tatra pratyayâtmakāḥ paridṛṣṭāḥ. vastumātrâtmakā apari-dṛṣṭāḥ. te ca saptaiva bhavanty anumānena prāpta-vastu-mātra-sad-bhāvāḥ.

"norodha-dharma-saṃskārāḥ pariṇāmo'tha Jīvanam, ceṣṭā śaktiś ca cittasya dharmā darśana-varjitāḥ" iti.—YBh. III. 15. (p. 138, 1, 7-p. 139, 1. 1.)

74. Vide S. N. Dasgupta, *Yoga Philosophy*, pp. 277-278. His explanation is based on TV of Vācaspati Miśra, though Vyāsa does not give any explanation about the seven.

75. See YS, 1. 3.—tadā draṣṭuḥ svarūpe'vasthānam ; I. 4.—vṛtti-sārūpyam itaratara.

In these sūtras, *nirodha-citta* and *vyutthāna-citta* are implied.

76. Vide S. N. Dasgupta, *Yoga As...*, p. 170.

77. See. YS. I. 5.—vṛttayaḥ pañcatayaḥ kliṣṭākliṣṭāḥ.

And S. N. Dasgupta, *Yoga As...*, pp. 100, 176f ; S. Chennakesavan, *Concept of...*, p. 64.

78. kleśa-hetukāḥ karmāśaya-pracaye kṣetrībhūtāḥ kliṣṭāḥ. khyāti-viṣayā guṇādhikāra-virodhino'kliṣṭāḥ.—YBh. I. 5. (p. 10, 1. 1f.)

79. citta-nadī nāmôbhayato bāhinī yā vahati kalyāṇāya vahati pāpāya ca. yā tu kaivalya-prāgbhārā viveka-viṣaya-nimnā sā kalyāṇa-vahā. saṃsāra-prāgbhārā'viveka-viṣaya-nimnā pāpa-vahā. tatra vairāgyeṇa viṣaya-srotaḥ khilī-kriyate. viveka-darśanābhyāsena viveka-srota udghāṭyate.—YBh. I. 12. (p. 18, 11. 8-11.)

80. See Akkā. I. 4-5.—sāsravânāsravā dharmāḥ saṃskṛtā mārga-varjitāḥ sāsravā āsravās teṣu yasmāt samanuśerate (4) anāsravā mārga-satyaṃ trividham câpy asaṃsāṛtam, ākāśaṃ dvau nirodhau ca tatrākāśam anāvṛtiḥ (5).

Vide S. Chaudhury, *Analytical Study of...*, pp. 70-71. *Saṃskṛta* and *asaṃskṛta dharmas* are explained as follows : So saṃskṛta dharmas are those which are caused-conditioned, mundane, temporal, impermanent, non-eternal and associated with āsravas (taints). And the asaṃskṛta dharmas are those which are not subject to cause or condition and therefore are transcendental, unchanging, eternal, inactive and free from the Āsravas. So these are called Anāsrava-dharmas. (Ibid., p. 71.)

81. pramāṇa-viparyaya-vikalpa-nidrā-smṛtayaḥ.—YS. I. 6. See S. N. Dasgupta, *Yoga As...*, p. 101.

82. See YS. I. 7.—pratyakṣânumānāgamāḥ pramāṇāni.

83. viparyayo mithyā-jñānam atad-rūpa-pratiṣṭham.—YS. I. 8.

84. See S. N. Dasgupta, *Yoga As...*, p. 172 ; S. Chennakesavan, *Concept of...*, p. 66.

Adding to this, Vyāsa remarks by Sāṃkhyaic terminology in YBh. I. 8.—eta eva svasaṃjñābhis tamo moho mahāmohas tāmisro'ndhatāmisra iti. ete citta-mala-prasaṅgenâbhi-dhāsyante. (p. 14, 1. 4f.)

Cf. SK. 47a.—pañca viparyaya-bhedā bhavanti ; 48.—bhedas tamaso'ṣṭavidho mohasya ca daśavidho mahāmoh ḥ, tāmisro'ṣṭādaśadhā tathā bhavaty andhatāmisraḥ.

85. śabda-jñānānupātī vastu-śūnyo vikalpaḥ.—YS. I. 9.

86. S. Chennakesavan, ibid., p. 68 ; and see Dasgupta, ibid., p. 173f.

Patañjali admits the existence of *vikalpa* in the *savitarka-samāpatti* in YS. I. 42. It is said that the *vikalpa* is cut off by the *nirvitarka-samāpatti* in YBh. I. 44. (p. 50, l. 6.) In this connection see Chap. IV. § 5.

We should point out that the four *kleśas* excepting *avidyā* is called *vikalpa* in YBh. II. 4. (p. 59, l. 7.)

87. abhāva-pratyayâlambanā vṛttir nidrā.—YS. I. 10.

88. See S. N. Dasgupta, *Yoga As...*, p. 174.

Nidrā is also restrained in the *samādhi* as stated in YBh. I. 10, —sā ca samprabodhe pratyavamarśāt pratyaya-viśeṣāḥ...sā ca samādhāv itarapratyayavan nirodhavyêti. (p. 16, ll. 1-7)

89. anubhūta-viṣayâsampramoṣaḥ smṛtiḥ.—YS, I. 11

90. See YBh. I 11.—grāhyâparaktaḥ pratyayo grāhya-grahaṇôbhayâkāra-nirbhāsas taj-jātiyakam saṃskāram ārabhate. sa saṃskāraḥ svavyañjakâñjanas tad-ākāram eva grāhya-grahaṇôbhayâtmakāṃ smṛtiṃ janayati. (p. 17, ll. 1-4.)

See K. Yamashita, "The Conception of *Saṃskāra* in the Yoga School."

91. S. Channakesavan, *Concept of...*, p. 79.

92. See YBh. I. 11.—sarvāś caitāḥ smṛtayaḥ pramāṇa-viparyaya-vikalpa-nidrā-smṛtinām anubhavāt prabhavanti. (p. 17, l. 7-p. 18, l. 1.)

93. tathā jātiyakāḥ saṃskārā vṛttibhir eva-kriyante saṃskāraiś ca vṛttaya iti. evaṃ vṛtti-saṃskāra-cakram aniśam āvartate.—YBh. I. 5. (p. 11, ll. 1-3.)

94. See YBh. I. 11.—sarvāś caitā vṛttayaḥ sukha-duḥkha-mohâtmikāḥ. sukha-duḥkha-mohaś ca kleśeṣu vyākhyeyāḥ. (p. 18, l. 1f.)

95. See S. N. Dasgupta, *Yoga As...*, p. 175.

96. avidyâsmitā-rāga-dveṣâbhiniveśāḥ kleśāḥ.—YS. II. 3.

97. kleśa iti pañca viparyayā ity arthaḥ. te spandamānā guṇādhikāraṃ draḍhayanti, pariṇāmam avasthāpayanti, kārya-kāraṇa-srotaṃ unnamayanti, parasparānugraha-tantrībhūtvā karma-vipākaṃ cābhinirharantîti.—YBh. II. 3. (p. 59, ll. 3-5.)

98. See YBh. II. 4.—yad avidyā vastv ākāryate tad evānu-śerate kleśā viparyāsa-pratyaya-kāla upalabhyante. (p. 61, ll. 6-8.)

99. kleśa-mūlaḥ karmâśayaḥ.—YS. II. 12, first half.

100. sati mūle tad-vipāko jāty-āyur-bhogāḥ.—YS. II. 13.

101. S. N. Dasgupta, *Yoga As...*, p. 114.

102. avidyā kṣetram uttareṣām prasupta-tanu-vicchinna-udārāṇām.—YS. II. 4.

103. sarva evâmī kleśa avidyā bhedāḥ. kasmāt. sarveṣv avidyaivâbhiplavate.—YBh. II. 4. (p. 61, 1. 5.)

104. See YBh. II. 5.—eṣā catuṣpadā bhavaty avidyā mūlam asya kleśa-santānasya karmāśayasya ca savipākasyêti, (p. 63, 1. 2f.)

105. anityāśuci-duḥkhānātmasu nitya-śuci-sukhātma-khyātir avidyā.—YS. II. 5.

These four kinds of recognition are: 1) The thinking of the non-eternal world, which is merely an effect, as eternal. 2) The thinking of the impure as the pure, as for example the attraction that a woman's body may have for a man leading him to think the impure body pure. 3) The thinking of vice as virtue, of undesirable as the desirable, of pain as pleasur. We know that for a yogin every phenomenal state of existence is painful. A yogin knows that attachment (rāga) to sensual and other objects can only give temporary pleasure, for it is sure to be seen turned into pain. Enjoyment can never bring satisfaction, but only involves a man further and further in sorrows. 4) Considering the non-self, e. g. the body as the self. This causes a feeling of being injured on the injury of the body. Vide S. N. Dasgupta, *Yoga As...*, p. 97f.

106. dṛg-darśana-śaktyor ekātmatêva asmitā.—YS. II. 6.

S. N. Dasgupta translates this "the seeming identity of the seer and the perceiving capacity is called asmitā-ega." (*Yoga As...*, p. 51.)

107. puruṣo dṛk-śaktir buddhir darśana-śaktir ity etayor ekasvarūpāpattir ivāsmitā kleśa ucyate.—YBh. II. 6. (p. 64, 1. 5f.)

Vyāsa quotes a fragment as a testimony: tathā côktam. buddhitaḥ param puruṣam ākāra-śīla-vidyādibhir vibhaktam apaśyan kuryāt tatrātma-buddhim mohenêti.—Ibid. (p. 64, 1. 8f: When one fails to see that *puruṣa* is different from *buddhi* by virtue of his form, nature and right knowledge, he regards *buddhi* as the true self through delusion.)

This is the so-called fragment of Pañcaśikha. See J. H. Woods, *Yoga System*, p. 115, fn. 1.

108. tathāsmitāyām samāpannam cittam nistaraṅga-mahodadhi-kalpam śāntam anantam asmitāmātram bhavati.—YBh. I. 36. (p. 41, 1. 9f.)

Vyasa quotes a fragment as a testimony: yatrêdam uktam. tam anumātram ātmānam anuvidyāsmîti evam tāvat samprajānīta iti.—Ibid. (p. 41, 1. 10-p. 42, 1. 1.)

This fragment is Pañcaśikha's by Vācaspatimiśra, which we have noticed.

And see J. H. Woods, ibid., p. 74, fn. 1.

109. ekâtmikā saṃvid asmitā.—YBh. I. 17. (p. 22, l. 1.)

Vyāsa regards *asmitāmātra* as the fourth *saṃprajñāta-samādhi* commenting on YS. I. 17,—vitarka-vicārânandâsmitā-rūpânugamāt saṃprajñātaḥ.

110. See S. N. Dasgupta, *Yoga As....*, p. 51.

111. sukhânuśayī rāgaḥ.—YS. II. 7.

112. See YBh. II. 7.—sukhâbhijñasya sukhânusmṛti-pūrvaḥ sukhe tat-sādhane vā yogardhas tṛṣṇā lobhaḥ sa rāga iti. (p. 65, l. 1f.)

113. duḥkhânuśayī dveṣaḥ.—YS. II. 8.

114. See YBh. II. 8.—duḥkhâbhijñasya duḥkhânusmṛti-pūrvo duḥkhe tat-sādhane vā yaḥ pratigho manyur jighāṃsā krodhaḥ sa dveṣaḥ. (p. 65, l. 4f.)

115. svarasa-vāhī viduṣo'pi tathā-rūḍho'bhiniveśaḥ.—YS. II. 9.

116. Cf. YBh. II. 9.—sarvasya prāṇine iyam ātma-rāśir nityā bhavati 'mā nā bhūvaṃ bhūyāsām'iti. (p. 65, l. 7f.)

117. S. N. Dasgupta, *Yoga As...*, p. 99. He also describes: "This is true as much of Buddhism as of the Yoga 'will to live' (abhiniveśa) which is a term coined and used in the Yoga for the first time to suit the Buddhist idea, and which has never been accepted in any other Hindu literature in this sense." (*Yoga Philosophy*, p. 68.)

118. Cf. AKbh. intro. to kā. V. 9.—catvāro viparyāsāḥ. anitye nityam iti, duḥkhe sukham iti, aśucau śuciti, anātmany ātmêti. (P. ed. p. 283, l. 5f; S. ed. p. 777, l. 1f.)

J. H. Woods points that parallel is seen in Āryadeva's Catuḥśataka. (*Yoga System*, p. 110, fn. 4.)

Also see S. Murakami, A *Study of...*, p. 717; S. Kumoi, "On Avidyā" p. 11.

119. tasya hetur avidyā.—YS. II. 24.

120. viparyaya-jñāna-vāsanêty arthaḥ.—YBh. II. 24. (p. 95, l. 8.)

121. See YBh. IV. 30.—yasmād viparyayo bhavasya kāraṇam. na hi kṣīṇa-kleśa-viparyayaḥ kaścit kenacit kvacij jāto dṛśyata iti. (p. 212, ll. 3-5.)

122. See YBh. II. 23.—adarśanaṃ saṃyoga-nimittam uktam. (p. 92, l. 8.) Vide P. Chakravarti, *Origin and...*, p. 319f.

123. See YBh. II. 5.—tasyāś câmitrâgoṣpadavad vastu-tattvaṃ vijñeyam. yathā nāmitro mitrâbhāvo na mitramātraṃ kiṃtu tad-viroddhaḥ sapatnah. yathā câgoṣpadam na goṣpadâbhāvo na goṣpadamātraṃ kiṃtu deśa eva tābhyām anyad-vastv-

antaram. evam avidyā na pramāṇaṃ na pramāṇābhāvaḥ kiṃ tu vidyā-viparītaṃ jñānāntaram avidyêti. (p. 63, 1. 4-p. 64, 1. 3.)

124. See AKkā. III. 28cd.—vidyāvipakṣo dharmo'nyo'vidyā'mitrānṛtādivat.

Bhāṣya on it is: yathā mitra-viparyayeṇa tad-vipakṣa-bhūtaḥ kaścid amitro bhavati na tu yaḥ kaścid anyo mitrān nāpi mitrābhāvaḥ. ṛtaṃ côcyate satyam. tad-vipakṣa-bhūtaṃ vākyam anṛtaṃ bhavati. adharmānarthākāryādayaś ca dharmādi-pratidvandva-bhūtaḥ. evam avidyā'pi vidyāyāḥ pratidvandva-bhūta-dharmāntaram iti draṣṭavyam. (P. ed. p. 141, 11. 1-5; S. ed. p. 463, 11. 4-7.)

125. Vide S. N. Dasgupta, *Yoga As*..., p. 173 fn., and *History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 1, p. 260f.

126. See p. 110 fn. 4 of this chapter.

127. YS. II. 15.—pariṇāma-tāpa-saṃskāra-duḥkhair guṇa-vṛtti-virodhāc ca duḥkham eva sarvaṃ vivekinaḥ.

See Chap. I.

By Vyāsa's commentary (YBh. II. 15, p. 74, 1. 7-p. 78, 1. 2), we understand these four causes of pain, thus: 1. *Pari-nāma-duḥkhatā* (pain from change): even in the experience of *sukha* there arises *karmâśaya* from *rāga, dveṣa* and *moha*, which causes pain. (2) *Tāpa-duhkhatā*: in the experience of pain there is *dveṣa*, which produces *karmâśaya*. This kind of *karmâśaya* is also made existent by *lobha* and *moha*. (3) *Saṃskāra-duḥkhatā*: the experience of *sukha* and *duhkha* make such latencies of *saṃskāra* as well as *karmâśaya* for *sukha* and *duhkha* are fruitions of *karma*. (4) All these states are after all modifications of the three *guṇas*; in each one of them the fruitions of the three *guṇas* are seen, contrary to one another. The feelings of *sukha* and *duḥkha* and *moha* are made out of them.

Those three *duḥkhatās* are originally the Buddhists'. For example, AKkā. VI. 3ab. mentions "duḥkhās tri-duḥkhatā-yogāt." Vasubandhu explains: tisro hi duḥkhatā duḥkhā-duḥkhatā saṃskāra-duḥkhatā vipariṇāma-duḥkhatā ca. tābhir yathā-yogam aśeṣataḥ sarve-sāsravāḥ saṃskārā duḥkhā. (P. ed. p. 328, 1. 22; S. ed. p. 875, 1. 6f.)

P. Chakravarti points out DN. xxxiii, 10 (xxvii) and mentions: Of these the tāpa-duḥkha of Patañjali and duḥkha-duḥkhatā of Pāli text only vary in name and not in essence, for the terms tāpa and duḥkha are held as synonimous in the Sanskrit literature. (*Origin and...*, p. 86.)

128. tad asya mahato duḥkha-samudāyasya prabhava-bījam avidyā.—YBh. II. 15. (p. 78, l. 3.)

129. tasyāś ca saṃyag-darśanam abhāva-hetuḥ. yathā cikitśā-śāstraṃ catur-vyūham, rogo roga-hetur ārogyaṃ bhaiṣajyam iti, evam idam api śāstraṃ catur-vyūham eva. tad yathā saṃsāraḥ saṃsāra-hetur mokṣo mokṣôpāya iti. tatra duḥkha-bahulaḥ saṃsāro heyaḥ. pradhāna-puruṣayoḥ saṃyogo heya-hetuḥ. saṃyogasyâtyāntikī nivṛttir hānam. hānôpāyaḥ saṃyag-darśanam.—YBh. II. 15. (p. 78, ll. 3-8.)

130. P. Chakravarti suggests "It is interesting to note that such a manner of treatment corresponds also to the four truths of Buddhism, such as the pain, the origin of pain, the cessation of pain and the path that leads to the cessation of pain. In this connection, Prof. Keith further points out that in one Buddhist text, these four truths are compared with desease, its origin, its healing, and the prevention of recurrance." (*Origin and*..., p. 84 indicating Keith, *Sāṃkhya System*, p. 30.)

The explanation is also mentioned by S. N. Dasgupta, *Yoga Philosophy*, p. 67.

131. For instance, AKbh. VI. 2.—kiṃ punaḥ kāraṇam eva eṣāṃ satyānām abhisamayaḥ. yatra hi sakto yena ca bādhyate yataś ca mokṣaṃ prārthate tad evâdau vyavacārâvasthāyāṃ duḥkha-satyaṃ parikṣyate. paścāt ko'sya hetur iti sam-udaya-satyam, ko'sya nirodha iti nirodha-satyam, ko'sya mārga iti mārga-satyam. vyādhiṃ dṛṣṭvā tan-nidāna-kṣaya-bheṣajânveṣanavat. (P. ed. p. 328, ll. 5-8 ; S. ed. p. 873, ll. 3-6.)

132. heya duḥkham anāgatam.-YS. II. 16.

133. draṣṭṛ-dṛśyayoḥ saṃyogo heya-hetuḥ.—YS. II. 17.

134. tad-abhāvāt saṃyogâbhāvo hānaṃ tad dṛśeḥ kaivalyam.—YS. II. 25.

135. viveka-khyātir aviplavā hānôpāyaḥ.—YS. II. 26.

136. yogaḥ samādhiḥ. sa ca sārva-bhaumaś cittasya dharmaḥ. kṣiptaṃ mūḍhaṃ vikṣiptam ekâgraṃ niruddham iti cittasya bhūmayaḥ.—YBh. I. 1. (p. 2, l. 1-p. 3, l. 1.)

The explanation of each stage is described by Radha-krishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, vol. 2, p. 347f ; S. N. Dasgupta, *History of*..., p. 268 and *Yoga As*..., p. 95f ; S. Chenna-kesavan, *Concept of*..., p. 63, 115 ; Swāmi H. Araṇya, *Yoga Philosophy*, p. 3f.

A good illustration of Māhāyāna Buddhist concept of *bhūmi*, see H. Dayal, *The Boddhisattva Doctorine of*..., pp. 270-291.

137. See Swāmi H. Āraṇya, *Yoga Philosophy*, p. 3.

138. See p. 87, fn. 1 and 7 of this Chapter

139. mahābhūmikāc ca samādheḥ sarva-cittānām ekâgratā-prasaṅgaḥ.—AKbh. VIII. 1. (P. ed. p. 433, l. 3f ; S. ed. p. 1127, l. 2f.)

Before this objection, Vasubandhu criticizes the Vaibhāṣikas' idea of *ekâgratā* saying :—evaṃ tarhi cittāny evaikâlambanāni, samādhir na caitasikaṃ dharmântaram iti prāpnoti.

The replay from the Vaibhāṣikas is—na cittāny eva samādhiḥ. yena tu tāny ekâgrāṇi vartate sa dharmaḥ samādhiḥ. saiva cittaikâgratā. (Ibid., P. ed. p. 432, l. 16-p. 433, l. 1 ; S. ed. p. 1126, ll. 6-9.)

140. The Vijñāna-vādins put *samādhi* in the *viniyata caittas*. See A. K. Chatterjee, *The Yogācāra Idealism*, p. 115.

141. na, durbalatvāt samādheḥ.—AKbh. VIII. (P. ed. p. 433, l. 4 ; S. ed. p. 1127, l. 3.)

On this Yaśomitra comments :—na, mahābhūmikatvāt samādheḥ sadbhāvāt sarvasya cittasya ekâgratā-prasaṅgaḥ. yac cittaṃ durbalena samādhinā saṃprayujyate, na tad ekâgraṃ bhavati. yat punar balavatā, tac cittam ekâgram iti saty api mahābhūmikatve samādher na sarva-cittānām ekâgratā-prasaṅgaḥ.—Sphutārthā, p. 1127, ll. 13-16.

See J. Imanishi, "Yoga School and Buddhism."

142. We find another similarity in relation to the *vikṣipta citta*.

Patañjali describes nine *vikṣepas* (distraction) of *citta* and calls them *antarāya* (obstacle) : YS. I. 30 - vyādhi-styāna-saṃśaya-pramādâlasyâvirati-bhrāntidarśana-alabdha-bhūmikatv-ânavasthitatvāni citta-vikṣepās te'ntarāyāḥ. (The nine are sickness, incompetence, doubt, delusion, sloth, non-abstention, erroneous knowledge, non-attainment of any stage and instability.)

By Vyāsa the nine *citta-vikṣepas* are also called *yoga-mala* (blemish of yoga) and *yoga-pratipakṣa* (foe of yoga) : YBh. I. 30—ete citta-vikṣepā nava yoga-malā yoga-prati-pakṣā yogântarāyā ity abhidhīyante. (p. 35, l. 12f.)

Again with these nine *vikṣepas* there are five *sahabhūs* (accompaniment) : YS. I. 31—duḥkha-daurmanasya-aṅgamejaya-tva-śvāsa-praśvāsā vikṣepa-sahabhuvaḥ. (The five are pain, despondency, unsteadiness of the body, inhalation and exhalation.)

The nine *vikṣepas* of Yoga might have some relation to the six *kleśamahābhūmikas* of Buddhism with regard to terminology and concept. About the *kleśa-mahābhūmikas*, see p. 87, fn. 3.

The five *sahabhūs* of Yoga is also roughly similar to *apakṣāla* of Buddhism. It is said that Bhagavat further states in the sūtra that the first three *dhyānas* are *sañjita* (shaken) due to *apakṣālas* (defects). The fourth one is *āneñjya* (non-shaken) as it is free from eight *apakṣālas*. The eight *apakṣālas* are *vitarka* and *vicāra*, *sukha* and *duḥkha*, *saumanasya* and *daurmanasya*, and *śvāsa* and *pra-śvāsa*. Vide S. Chaudhuri, *Analytical Study of...*, p. 210. See AKbh. VIII. 11—trīṇi ca dhyānāni señjitāni uktāni Bhagavatā, sāpakṣalatvāt. "aṣṭāpakṣalam uktatvād āniñjalaṃ tu caturthakam." (kā. 11ab.) ke punas te'pakṣalāḥ. "vitarka-vi-cārau śvāsau ca sukhādi ca catuṣṭayam." (kā. 11cd.) vitarkavicārau sukha-duḥkhe saumanasye-daurmanasye śvāsa-pra-svāsāś ca. (P. ed. p. 441, ll. 10-15; S. ed. p. 1149, l. 12-p. 1150, l. 5.)

Chapter IV

Epistemology in the Yoga Philosophy

In the Yoga philosophy, all human intellectual and emotional activities, i. e., perception and the like are realized in the mind (citta). We have already observed the role of *citta.* In this chapter, we shall observe the fundamental structure of perception in the Yoga philosophy and the Vijñāna-vāda.

§ 1. Object of Perception and the Vijñāna-vāda

In the ordinary perception of objects, the *citta* gets affected by the perceivable objects through the sense-organs and it makes conceptions, that is to say, *citta-vṛtti.*[1] In the Yoga philosophy this *citta* appears to have the same reality as the objects and also to have dimension of activities as *puruṣa* which seems to have the function of actor. Both, *citta* and *puruṣa,* are individually different as principle, and yet in the ordinary perception, both seems to be identified. As we have already discussed this matter, there is no need to repeat it.

Yet it is useful to see again the reality of external objects relating to perception. Vyāsa, commenting on the *Yoga-sūtra* (IV. 14),[2] tries to prove the reality of external objects and to refute the idealistic Buddhists. Vyāsa takes out the arguments of those who deny the true constitution of a thing (vastu-svarūpa). According to Vyāsa, they maintain thus: There is no object dissociated from cognition (vijñāna), but there is cognition dissociated from object just as the imagination (kalpita) in dream and the like; a thing is only an imagination of cognition (jñāna-parikalpanā-mātra), and like the object of dream, does not exist as a strict sense.[3]

In refutation Vyāsa says, thus: They dispute the

existence of objects that appear by virtue of their very existence (svamāhātmyena) and avoid the true nature of a thing (vastu-svarūpa) by the illogical imaginary conception (vikalpa-jñāna); how can their view be respected ?[4]

Vācaspatimiśra and Vijñānabhikṣu regard those idealists as the Vijñāna-vādins of Buddhists.[5] Although we cannot find out the exact passage as above said in any Vijñāna-vāda literature, we can read some particular terms of the Vijñāna-vāda, that is, *kalpita* and parikalpita (imagined).[6]

In respect of the idea referred to here by Vyāsa, what we have to add is that we can find similar ones in the *Viṃśatikā* of Vasubandhu. It is said that the word '*mātra*' of *vijñāna-mātra* is employed to deny the existence of external objects.[7] Vasubandhu mentions in the first verse, thus : This world is nothing but cognizance (vijñapti-mātra) because unreal objects appear, just as one who has a disease of the eyes sees unreal hair, the double moon and so on.[8]

In this connection, a question arises : Whether the objects exist or not is determined by *pramāna* (valid cognition). *Pratyakṣa* (direct perception) is the most important of all *pramāṇas* ; therefore when the objects do not exist, how is *pratyakṣa*, i. e., this recognition possible ?[9]

To this question, Vasubandhu replies in a verse : the recognition by *pratyakṣa* is possible, like in a dream.[10]

The idea of the verse is this : Even any object has no reality in a dream, yet we see objects. Our normal state of recognition by *pratyakṣa* is like that which occurs in a dream. Only when we are awakened from the dream, we come to recognize that the objects in a dream have no reality at all.

So it is said that the unawakened does not understand that the object seen in a dream is *non-existent*.[11] And Stirāmati explains that, because of non-existence of external objects, it should be accepted that recognition with appearance of objects happens just like the recognition in a dream.[12]

According to the Vijñāna-vādins, the objective world is

nothing but imagined, which is not real.[13] Again it is said that by each imagination each thing is imagined, the nature of which is nothing but abstractedly imagined and does not exist.[14] Therefore the whole world is the constitution of imagination, and it is called *paratantra* (dependent). The nature of *paratantra* is imagination and is produced by co-operating cause.[15] In this imagination, perception is possible, though the object (grāhya) and the perceiver (grāhaka), which are not present in reality, are abstractedly imagined.[16]

To refute the idea of the Vijñāna-vāda, Patañjali maintains : in spite of the sameness of objects, because *citta* is different, they follow the different modes of existence,[17] and a thing is not dependent upon a single *citta*. If it were so, it could not be proved, and then what would it be ?[18]

In Patañjali's description, the difference of mind and object is being shown. When from the same external object different feelings are roused in different minds, then that object and mind must be different. They are mutating in different directions. But an object is common to all, whereas a mind is peculiar to each individual.

In this connection, Vyāsa disputes the following four ideas. 1) One thing is imagined by one mind. 2) One thing is imagined by many minds. 3) One person's mind is affected by the object which is imagined by another person's mind. 4) An object is co-existent with its recognition because it is experienced, like pleasure and so on.[19]

From his standpoint, Vyāsa remarks that a thing exists by its ownself, and a thing and its recognition have their own mode of existence. Then Vyāsa comes to a conclusion : Therefore, an object is independent (svatantra) and common to all *puruṣas*, and agin, *cittas* are independent and functioning to each *puruṣa*. Because those two are conjuncted, there follows an apperception (upalabdhi), i. e., an experience (bhoga) of *puruṣa*.[20]

§ 2. Pramāṇa (valid cognition)

As we have seen before, the Yoga philosophy regards that the object and the base of recognition have their own mode of existence, that is to say, the object and the mind exist independently.

The question that may be asked is : how the object can be recognized by the mind. This problem is examined in the sphere of the matter of *pramāṇa* (valid cognition). All schools of Indian philosophy have not been able to avoid this problem.[21] The Yoga school also refers to the *pramāṇa*, although which is counted as one of the five *citta-vṛttis* as we have seen before.[22] It is said that the *pramāṇas* are *pratyakṣa* (direct perception), *anumāna* (inference) and *āgama* (testimony). The Yoga philosophy includes them in the *citta-vṛtti* which should be restrained. This point of view is peculiar to the Yoga philosophy.

Of these three, the *pratyakṣa* is more important than the other two, as it is said that the authority of *pratyakṣa* is not overpowered by any other *pramāṇas*, whereas the other *pramāṇas* can gain their activities only by virtue of *pratyakṣa*,[23] Moreover, the *pratyakṣa* plays an important role. It is therefore proposed to discuss mainly the *pratyakṣa* in the Yoga philosophy.

§ 3. Pratyakṣa (direct perception)

As to the *pratyakṣa*, Vyāsa explains thus : The *pratyakṣa* is that modification (vṛtti) of the mind which is caused by its contact with an external object through the channel of the sense-organs and which is concerned mainly with the ascertainment (avadhāraṇa) of specific feature of the object that is characterised by the specific (viśeṣa) as well as by the general (sāmānya) features. The outcome of this *pratyakṣa* is the *puruṣa's* awareness of this function of the mind as undistinguished from the *puruṣa*.[24]

In this explanation, our notice should be directed to the expression of *avadhārana* (ascertainment). According to the

Sāṃkhya there are also three *pramāṇas*[25]. Of these three, the *pratyakṣa* is the determinate cognition (adhyavasāya) produced through the sense-organs in contact with the objects.[26]

We know that the later commentators have the opinion that the *pratyakṣa* is of two kinds : determinate (savikalpa) and indeterminate (nirvikalpa)[27]. But there is no positive proof that Vyāsa, as well as Īśvarakṛṣṇa, were aware of those two kinds of *pratyakṣa*. Whatever this may be, we should not neglect the fact that Vyāsa mentions another two kinds of *pratyakṣa*, namely, *loka-pratyakṣa* (ordinary perception)[28] and *para-pratyakṣa* (superior perception).[29] Our ordinary experience is established in the *citta*, that we have already seen. Vācaspati Miśra regards that as the *loka-pratyaksa*.[30] As to the *para-pratyakṣa*, we shall next observe it with respect to the wisdom in *samādhi*.

§ 4. Wisdom and its Object in Samādhi

The above mentioned two kinds of *pratyakṣa* are referred to in the context of the wisdom (prajñā) in *samādhi*. It is said that the wisdom in *samādhi* is different from that derived from *śruta* (testimony) or *anumāna* (inference) because it relates to *specific* feature (viśeṣa) of objects.[31]

As we have seen before, Vyāsa explains that the function of *pratyakṣa* is chiefly concerned with the ascertainment of the specifics of objects. Again he mentions, in other words, that *āgama* and *anumāna* have reference to the objects in general (ṣāmānya), while *pratyakṣa* is related to the specific feature of objects[32].

We understand that Vyāsa regards the *pratyakṣa* as the sense of the wisdom in *samādhi*, which we shall observe in the next section. The specific form of a thing affects the *citta* through the sense-organ, and then from there springs *pratyaya* (conception) in the *citta*. That is, in general sense, *pratyakṣa*.

The importance of *pratyakṣa* is mentioned by Vyāsa, thus : For even though the reality of object (artha-tattva),

which is convinced by each of the sacred books, the inferences and the instruction of masters, becomes actual existence, since these means are adequate to inform the objects as they are (yathābhūtārtha); still, so long as any part of an object has not become perceivable by the appropriate organ (svakaraṇa), all seems to be unknown, and it does not produce any firm intellect (buddhi) with regard to such subtle (sūkṣma) objects as release (apavarga). Therefore for the sake of reinforcing the sacred books, the inferences and the instruction of masters, one particular object (artha-viśeṣa) must necessarily perceived.[33]

Here Vyāsa attributes to *pratyakṣa* the potentiality of putting activities into the other *pramānas*[34]. The specific form of an object can be perceived only by the *pratyakṣa.* Even if the object is subtle and beyond the ordinary senses, it must be perceived. But the subtle object is reached only by the yogins. So Patañjali remarks that on account of casting the light of sense-activities, one knows the things which are subtle, concealed and far-off.[35]

According to Vyāsa, a thing which is subtle, concealed or far-off cannot be known by the ordinary perception (loka-pratyakṣa). At the same time, it cannot be said that a thing the specific knowledge of which cannot be obtained by *pramānas* does not exist. The knowledge of specific relating to the subtle elements or the *puruṣa*-like receiver (buddhi) is, however, obtainable by the wisdom acquired through *samādhi.*[36]

By the above description, we see that, although the subtle object is beyond the ordinary perception, there is another perception which is obtained in the state of *samādhi* and which belongs to the yogins. The wisdon and its objects are dealt with in detail concerning *samāpatti* (contemplation), which is one kind of the *samādhi.* It will be our task here to observe how the wisdom and *pratyakṣa* are considered in the state of *samāpatti.*

§ 5. The object of samāpatti

The general definition of *samāpatti* as mentioned by Patañjali is that when the functions of the mind are weakened, the mind appears to take on the features of the object of meditation, whether it be the cogniser, the instrument of cognition or the object cognised, as does a transparent jewel, and this identification is called *samāpatti*.[37]

With regard to our present observation, the relation between *citta* and the perceivable, i. e., the external object is the question. In this relation, from Vyāsa's commentary, we understand that the *samāpatti* in respect of object is of three kinds : first, those relating to worldly things ; second, those relating to five gross elements ; third, those relating to five subtle elements.[38]

On the other hand, the *samāpatti* is divided into four degrees according to the object, whether it is subtle or gross. When its object is regarded as a seed, the *samāpatti* is called *sabīja-samādhi*, and is of four kinds.[39]

The first one of the four *samāpattis* is *savitarka-samāpatti*, which, according to Patañjali, is intermixed with *vikalpa* (imagination) of words, objects and knowledge.[40]

When the *samādhi* is practised in respect of 'cow', all knowledge regarding the cow will be obtained and it will come with the help of words, e. g., whose cow, what sort of cow etc., etc. When in the knowledge acquired in *samādhi* there is such *vikalpa* it is called *savitarka-samāpatti*.[41]

In this stage of *samāpatti*, there is *vikalpa* associated with the name, the object indicated and the knowledge thereof.[42] Therefore this stage does not differ from the ordinary conceptual state, in which the *citta* has not become steady and the gross object does not appear to the *citta* in its true reality. This stage is called *apara-pratyakṣa* (ordinary perception) by Vācaspati Miśra.[43]

The second stage is named *nirvitarka-samāpatti*. When the memory is purified, the mind appears to be devoid of its own nature and only the object remains illuminated. This

kind of *samāpatti* is called *nirvitarka.*[44] This has been explained thus : By practice one may think of an object without its denotative name and thus the mixing of an object with the idea formed through verbal instruction or inference may be avoided. Then the true nature of object contemplated upon is revealed and this state is called *nirvitarkā samāpatti.* In other words it is *para pratyakṣa* (superior perception).[45]

In this stage of *samāpatti*, the object appears to the steady mind in its true form or reality and no imagination (vikalpa) of the object remains in the mind. The mind becomes one with the object, so that the mind is free from the notion of the subject and object. From the point of view of *vikalpa*, this stage is said to be *nirvikalpa* (indeterminate perception), while the *savitarka* is said to be *savikalpa.* With his own terminology, Vyāsa names *lokapratyakṣa* instead of *savikalpa* and *para-pratyakṣa* instead of *nirvikalpa.*

The above mentioned two *samāpattis* are in the sphere of the perception of the persons not so trained. They perceive so far as the gross elements as object. As we have seen, the subtle elements, etc., are perceived only by yogins. Such super-normal perceptions are developed through the yoga practice. Those are named *savicāra* and *nirvicāra* as third and fourth stages of *samāpatti.* Their object is not gross elements but *tanmātras.*[46] The *savicāra* stage is, however, not so indeterminate as the *nirvicāra* stage, for that perception of *tanmātras* still has the conceptual notions of time, space and causality with the help of *vikalpa.* On the other hand, in the *nirvicāra* stage all conceptual notions disappear and then the mind is fully of only the subtle element of the object without *vikalpa.*[47]

Summary : In the Yoga philosophy, the *citta* and the external objects are both real. From this view-point, Vyāsa refutes the idea of the Vjñāna-vāda.

The external object is perceived directly. That perception is called *pratyakṣa*, one of the three *pramāṇas.* The

pratyakṣa is treated with respect of the wisdom in *samādhi*. It is clear that *samāpattis* are remarked in relation to the *pratyakṣa*. In the *samāpattis*, there is the object for contemplation. That is why they are called *sabīja-samādhi*. With respect to the four *samāpattis*, it is the standard of classification as to whether the object is gross or subtle. That which has the gross object is the *savitarka* and *nirvitarka*. That which has the subtle object is the *savicāra*. and the *nirvicāra*. Of these four, the *nirvitarka* and the *nirvicāra* are to be regarded as *nirvikalpa*. The *savitarka* is the *loka-pratyakṣa*, and the *nirvitarka* is the *para-pratyakṣa*. Furthermore, the *savicāra* and the *nirvicāra* are known as the yogic *pratyakṣa*.

The term *samāpatti* is also common to the Buddhist thoughts. We shall observe, in this respect, the relation between the Yoga philosophy and the Buddhist thoughts in the next chapter.

NOTES

1. See Chap. III, § 3.
2. See YS. IV. 14.—pariṇāmaikatvāt vastu-tattvam. (On account of the co-ordinated change of the three *guṇas*, there is reality of things.)
3. See YBh. IV. 14.—"nāsty artho vijñāna-visahacaraḥ. asti tu jñānam artha-visahacaraṃ svapnādau kalpitam" ity anayā diśāye vastu-svarūpam apahnuvante "jñāna-pari-kalpanā-mātram vastu svapna-viṣayôpamaṃ na paramarthato 'sti" iti. (p. 196, ll. 1—3.)
4. ya āhus te tathêti pratyupasthitam idaṃ svamāhātmyena vastu katham apramāṇātmakena vikalpa-jñāna-balena vastu-svarūpam utsṛjya tad evāpalapantaḥ śraddheya-vacanāḥ syuḥ.—YBh, IV. 14. (p. 196, l. 3-p. 197, l. 3.)
5. TV. IV. 14 (p. 196); YV. IV. 14 (p. 425). This is not referred to in Vivaraṇa.
6. For instance we can find those words in Viṃśatikā v. 10.—tathā pudgala-nairātmya-praveśo hi anyathā punaḥ deśanā dharma-nairātmya-praveśaḥ kalpitâtmanā ; and in Triṃśikā v. 20.—yena yena vikalpena yad yad vastu vikalpyate parikalpita evâsau sva-bhāvo na sa vidyate.
   The idea of the former verse is : by Buddha's teaching about the

āyatanas, one attains the selfless in personality, and by the teaching of *vijñaptimātra*, i.e., as being imagined *dharmas* have no self, one attains the selfless in attributes.

On the ideas of *dharma-nairātmya* and *pudgala-nairātmya*, see C. L. Tripathi, *The Problem of*......, p. 327 and p. 333.

The latter verse metions *parikalpita*, which is the first one of the three-fold nature of *dharma*. (Other two are *paratantra* and *pariniṣpanna*.) The idea of this verse is : each thing is imagined by each imagination, the nature of a thing is nothing but the abstructedly imagined, so it does not really exist.

A brief explanation on the three-fold nature, see A. K. Chatterjee, The *Yogâcāra Idealism*, p. 148.

7. mātram ity artha-pratiṣedhārtham.—Viṃśatikā-vṛtti, p. 3, 1. 4.
8. vijñaptimātram evaitad asad-arthāvabhāsāt, yathā taimirikasyāsat-keśa-candrādi-darśanam.—Viṃśtikā v. 1.
9. pramāṇa-vaśād astitvaṃ nāstitvaṃ vā nirdhāryate, sarveṣāṃ ca pramāṇānāṃ pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇaṃ gariṣṭham ity asaty arthe katham iyam buddhir bhavati pratyakṣam iti. —Vimśatikā-vṛtti, p. 8, 11. 22-24.
10. pratyakṣa-buddhiḥ svapnâdau yathā—Viṃśatikā v. 16ab.
11. svapne dṛg-viṣayâbhāvaṃ nâprabuddho'vagacchati—Viṃśatikā v. 17 cd.
12. evaṃ bāhyārthābhāvād vijñānam evārthākāram utpadyate svapnavijñānavat ity abhyupeyam. Triṃśikā-bhāṣya, p. 17. 1. 2f.
13. See Triṃśikā v. 17—vijñāna-pariṇāmo'vikalpo yad vikalpyate, tena tan nāsti tenêdaṃ sarvaṃ vijñaptimātrakam.
14. Triṃśikā v. 20.
15. paratantra-svabhāvas tu vikalpaḥ pratyayôtbhavaḥ—Triṃśikā v. 21 ab.
16. See Triṃśikā-bhāṣya—tasmin vikalpe grāhya-grāhaka-bhāvaḥ parikalpitaḥ, tathā hi tasmin vikalpe grāhya-grāhakatvam avidyamānam eva parikalpyata iti parikalpitam ucyate. (p. 40, 11. 2-4.)
17. vastu-sāmye citta-bhedāt tayor vibhaktaḥ panthāḥ—YS. IV. 15.
18. na caika-citta-tantraṃ vastu tad apramāṇakaṃ tadā kiṃ syāt,—YS. IV. 16.
19. See YBh. IV. 15—(1) eka-citta-parikalpitam. (2) aneka-citta-parikalpitam. (3) anya-citta-parikalpitenârthenānyasya cittôparāgaḥ. (4) jñāna-sahabhūr evārtho bhogyatvāt sukhādivat.

    A. K. Chatterjee refers to YBh. IV. 15 as 'another objection' against the Yogācāra school. But he does not pick out our third and fourth refutation by Vyāsa. (*Yogācāra Idealism*, p. 80.)
20. tasmāt svatantro'rthah sarva-puruṣa-sādhāraṇaḥ svatantrāṇi ca cittāni pratipuruṣaṃ pravartate. tayoḥ saṃbandhād upalabdhiḥ puruṣasya bhoga iti.—YBh. IV. 16. (p. 200, 11. 4-6.)

21. *Pramāṇa* is discussed in SK. 4 ; BS. IV. 2, 9 ; VS. IX. 2, 4 : NS. I. 1.1, 3 ; I. 2.1 ; II. 1.9, 10, 13, 14, 17, 18, 45 etc. ; MS. I. 1.5 ; I. 3.2, 10, 15.

22. See Chap. III.

23. na ca pratyakṣasya māhātmyaṃ pramāṇāntareṇābhibhūyate. pramāṇāntaraṃ ca pratyakṣa-balenaiva vyavahāraṃ labhate.— YBh. I. 32. (p. 39, 11. 1-3.)

24. indriya-praṇālikayā cittasya bāhya-vastûparāgāt tadviṣayā sāmānya-viśeṣātmano'rthasya viśeṣāvadhārana-pradhānā vṛttiḥ pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam. phalam aviśiṣṭaḥ pauruṣeyaś citta-vṛtti-bodhaḥ—YBh. I. 7. (p. 11, 1. 8-p. 12, 1.3)
Here by '*phala*', *puruṣa's pratisaṃvedana* is referred to.
As to Buddhist concept of *yratyakṣa* and *sva-saṃvédana*, S. Mukherjee, *The Buddhist Philosophy of*......pp. 274-281 and pp. 319-335 ; The Stcherbatsky, *The Buddhist Logic*, Vcl. I, pp. 146-162 and pp. 163-169.)

25. See SK. 4.—dṛṣṭam anumānam āpta-vacanaṃ ca sarva-pramāṇa-siddhatvāt, trividhaṃ pramāṇam iṣṭam prameya-siddhiḥ pramāṇād dhi.

26. See SK. 5a —prativiṣayādhyavasāyo dṛṣṭam.
The commentator breaks up this definition: viṣayaṃ viṣayaṃ prativartate iti prativiṣayām. kintat. indriyam. tasmin yo'dhyavasāyaḥ sa prativiṣayādhyavasāhay. (YD. p, 35)
'*Prativisaya*' means that which comes in contact with particular objects, i.e., the sense-organ in its inter-course with the object. By that a real object must be present and it thus differentiates perception from illusion. '*Prati*'denotes proximity (sannikarṣa) i.e., the sense-organ must be in contact with the object and this characteristic excludes perception from inference. '*Adhyavasāya*' is the function of intellect (adhyavasāyo buddhiḥ. kā. 23) This means 'ascertainment' and by this doubtful cognitions are excluded. The entire definition comes thus : the senses come in contact with their objects, the *buddhi* then operates in it. Vide, P. Chakravarti, *Origin and*......, p. 172.

27. According to Vācaspatimiśra, the *nirvikalpa* is the immediate cognition of an object, pure and simple, the *savikalpa* is definite cognition of an object related with its properties and qualified by its generic and specific characteristics.
Vide P. Chakravarti, ibid. p. 173 ; and S. N. Dasgupta, *Yoga Philosophy*, pp. 263-266 ; S. C. Vidyabhusana, *A History of Indian Logic*, p. 137f ; S. Chennakesavan, *Concept of*......, p. 54.

28. YBh. I. 49. (p. 83, 1. 4.)

29. YBh. I. 43 intro. (p. 46, 1.1.)

30. Introducing YBh. IV. 23, Vācaspati Miśra describes : saṃprati loka-pratyakṣam apy atra pramuṇyati. (p. 206, 1. 15.)
31. śrutânumāna-prājñabhyām anya-viṣayā viśeṣârthatvāt.…YS. I. 49.
32. See YBh. I. 49—śrutam āgama-vijñānaṃ tat sāmānya-viṣayam. ……tathānumānaṃ sāmānya-visayam eva……tasmāc chruta-anumāna-viṣayo na viśeṣaḥ kascid astîti. (p. 52, 1. 10-p. 52, 1.3.) : III. 44—sāmānya-viśeṣa-samudayo'tra dravyaṃ draṣṭavyam. (p. 167, 1. 1.)

   It is not easy to find the influence from Buddhist logic. Yet we should compare with the concept of *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* and *sva-lakṣaṇa* of a thing in Buddhist logic. See M. Hattori, *Dignāga on Perception* ; NB. I. 12—tasya viṣayaḥ svalakṣaṇam (p. 12) ; I. 16—anyat sāmānya-lākṣaṇam ; I. 17—so' numānasya viṣayaḥ. (p. 14.) ; S. C. Vidyabhusana, *A History of*……, pp. 277f, 310.
33. yady api hi tat-tac-chāstrânumānâcāryôpadeśair avagatam artha-tattvaṃ sadbhūtam eva bhavati, eteṣāṃ yathābhūtârtha-pratipādana-sāmarthyāt, tathâpi yāvad eka-deśo' pi kaścin na svakaraṇa-saṃvedyo bhavati tāvat sarvaṃ parokṣam ivâpa-vargādiṣu sūkṣmeṣv artheṣu na dṛḍhāṃ buddhim utpādayati. tasmāc chāstrānumānācāryôpadeśôpodbalanārtham evāvaśyaṃ kaścid artha-viśeṣaḥ pratyakṣīkartavyaḥ.—YBh. 1. 35. (p. 40, 11. 10-14.)
34. See YBh. I. 32.
35. pravṛtty-āloka-nyāsāt sūkṣma-vyavahita-viprakṛṣṭa-jñānam.—YS. III. 25.
36. YBh. I. 49—na cāsya sūkṣma-vyavahita-viprakṛṣṭasya vastuno loka-pratyakṣeṇa grahaṇam asti. na cāsya viśeṣasya apramāṇaka-syābhāvo' stîti. samādhi-prajñā-nirgrāhya eva sa viśeṣo bhavati bhūta-sūkṣma-gato vā puruṣa-gato vā. (p. 53, 11. 4-6.)
37. kṣīṇa-vṛtter abhijātasyêva maṇer grahītṛ-grahaṇa-grāhyeṣu tat-stha-tad-añjanatā samāpattiḥ.—YS. 1. 41.

   Vide Swāmi H. Āraṇya, *Yoga Philosophy*, p. 89.
38. Vide Swāmi H. Āraṇya, ibid. p. 91.

   See YBh. 1. 41—yathā sphaṭika upāśraya-bhedāt tat-tad-rūpôparakta upāśraya-rūpākāreṇa nirbhāsate, tathā grāhyaālam-banôparaktaṃ cittaṃ grāhya-samāpannaṃ grāhya-svarūpa-ākāreṇa nirbhāsate. tathā bhūta-sūkṣmôparaktaṃ bhūta-sūkṣmā-pannaṃ bhūta-sūkṣma-svarūpābhāsaṃ bhavati. tathā sthūlālam-banôparaktaṃ sthūla-rūpa-samāpannaṃ sthūla-rūpa-ābhāsaṃ bhavati. tathā viśva-bhedôparaktaṃ viśva-bheda-samāpannaṃ viśva-rūpābhāsaṃ bhavati. (p. 43, 1. 11-p. 44, 1. 4.)
39. See YS. I. 46—tā eva sabījaḥ samādhiḥ.

   YBh. I. 46—tāś catastraḥ samāpattayo bahir-vastu-bījā iti samādhir api sabījaḥ. (p. 50, 1. 4.)

40. See YS. I. 42—tatra śabdārtha-jñāna-vikalpaiḥ saṃkīrṇā savitarkā.
41. Vide Swāmi H. Āraṇya, *Yoga Philosophy*, p. 92f.
    See YBh. I. 42—tatra samāpannasya yogino yo gavādy-arthaḥ samādhi-prajñāyāṃ samārūḍhaḥ sa cec chabdārtha-jñānaṃvikalpānuvidha upāvartate sā saṃkīrṇā samāpattiḥ savitarkêty ucyate. (p. 45, 11. 3-5.)
42. Vide Swāmi H. Āraṇya, op. cit.
    On *vikalpa* S. N. Dasgupta mentions that the function of mind, by virtue of which, despite this unreality or want of their having any real identity of connection, they seem to be so much associated that name cannot be differentiated from the thing or its idea, is called vikalpa. (*Yoga As...*, *p.* 150.)
43. See TV. I. 42—tad anena yogino' paraṃ pratyakṣam. (p. 45, 1. 18f.)
44. smṛti-pariśuddhau svarūpa-śūnyêvārthamātra-nirbhāsā nirvitarkā. —YS. I. 43. Vide Swāmi H. Āraṇya, ibid, p. 94.
45. See YBh. I. 43 intro.—yadā punaḥ śabda-saṃketa-smṛti-pariśuddhau śrutānumāna-jñāna-vikalpa-śūnyāyāṃ samādhi-prajñāyāṃ svarūpamātreṇāvasthito' rthas tat-svarūpâkāra-mātratayaivāvacchidyate sā ca nirvitarkā samāpattiḥ. tat-paraṃ pratyakṣam. (p. 45, 1. 6-p. 46, 1. 1.)
    Vide Swāmi H. Āraṇya, op. cit.
46. See YS. I. 44—etayaiva savicārā nirvicārā ca sūkṣma-viṣayā vyākhyātā.
47. See YBh. I. 44; Swāmi H. Āraṇya, ibid. p. 100f; S. N. Dasgupta, *Yoga As......*, p. 152.

Chapter V

Samādhi Theory in the Yoga Philosophy and Buddhism

§ 1. Samādhi as a State of the Mind

Samādhi (concentration) is the name of the ideal stage of the mind. This stage is obtained after restraining the functions of the mind and it precedes the final stage of liberation (apavarga). With regard to the concept of *Yoga*, Vyāsa explains that *Yoga* is *samādhi*. This *samādhi* is the *dharma* (attribute) of *citta* which belongs to all stages. The stages (bhūmi) of *citta* are *kṣipta* (restless), *mūḍha* (stupified), *vikṣipta* (distracted), *ekāgra* (one-pointed), and *niruddha* (restrained). Of these, the states upto the *vikṣipta*, in which *samādhi* is subordinated to *vikṣepa* (distraction), cannot be regarded as pertaining properly to *Yoga*.[1]

The state of *samādhi* may occur in all these five stages, while the state of *Yoga* is limited to the last two stages of *citta*. The idea of *samādhi* which is a general characteristic of all stages of *citta* may have some relation with similar concept of the Sarvâsti-vāda school of Buddhism.[2]

In the Abhidharma literature, the words *samādhi*, *samāpatti* and *dhyāna* are sometimes used synonymously. But when they are used in strict sense, there is distinction. *Samādhi* is, because of being one of the *mahābhūmika-dharmas*, not only in the *samāhita-citta* but also in the *vikṣipta-citta*. *Samāpatti* is always in the *samāhita-citta* and also encloses in itself the *asaṃjñi-samāpatti* and the *nirodha-samāpatti* which are *acitta-samāpattis*. Dhyāna is used as the *samādhi* in the *rūpa-dhātu*.[3]

In this respect, we should also see the function of concentration of the Vijñāna-vāda. They classify the function into two kinds : *manaskāra* and *samādhi*. *Manaskāra*

is that by which the *citta* is attracted towards the object. It is attention which holds the *citta* towards the object. This last clause of the definition is necessary because *manaskāra* functions, not in a single moment of consciousness, but in the series. [One moment of *citta* does certainly go to some objects or other, and there would be no case of inattention.] Attention means, not the attention of a single moment which is exhausted in that very moment, but the directing of the *citta* again and again to the same object.[4]

Samādhi is concentration of mind on the object which is to be examined either on its merits or demerits. This gives rise to correct knowledge, since the concentrated mind knows a thing as it is.[5]

Relating to the *ekāgra*, Vyāsa takes note of the concepts accepted by the Buddhists, by pointing out that the *citta* is fixed on each object and is nothing *but conception (pratyaya-mātra) and is momentary.*[6] Then Vyāsa refutes by arguing that if the *citta* is always one-pointed it cannot be distracted.[7]

The idea of what Vyāsa remarks is that if the *citta* is fixed on one object in each moment, it must be always one-pointed, so that the function of *citta* such as *vikṣepa cannot* exist at all.

Vyāsa further points out that those who hold that the *citta* becomes one-pointed through the continuous flow of of discrete but similar ideas, would have to say that one-pointed is a character of the flow of such ideas. But that also cannot be true, because in their one view the *citta* itself is momentary and how in that case can there be a flow of one *citta* ?[8]

What Vyāsa refutes is that, so far as the *citta* is momentary and fixed on an object, in every moment there must be one-pointed *citta*. That *citta* flows as a stream. Besides, the *samādhi* is regarded as the state of one pointedness. By those thoughts of the Vijñāna-vādins, the *citta* must be

always one-pointed and the distracted state of *citta* connot happen. Therefore it is to be held that the *citta* is not fixed on one object only. Yet, the *citta* can have all object with it. But the *citta* becomes one-pointed only when it is withdrawn from various objects and set on only one object.[9]

That is why admitting the concept of *samādhi* of the Sarvāsti-*vāda*, Vyāsa refutes that of the Vijñāna-vāda. From the view point of the Yoga philosophy, the state of *Samādhi* may occur in all stages of the *citta*, while the state of *yoga* belongs only to the last two stages of *citta*, i. e. *ekāgra* and *niruddha*.

Comparing the concept of *samādhi* of the Yoga philosophy with that of the Sarvâsti-vāda and *manaskāra* of the Vijñāna vāda, we find that those three concepts are similar. The same may be stated in respect of *yoga* of the Yoga philosophy, *samāpatti* of the Sarvāsti-vāda and *samādhi* of the Vijñāna-vāda.

§ 2. Ways to Sāmadhi

The purpose of yoga practice is to make the *citta-vṛttis* steady so that they may at last disappear altogether. For the purpose of restraint of the *citta-vṛttis*, the commonest means is *abhyāsa* (habitual practice) and *vairāgya* (detachment).[10] The former is exertion for the steadiness (sthiti) in the state of restraint.[11] The latter is the consciousness of mastery (vaśīkāra-saṃjñā) possessed by one who has got rid himself of desire for either the seen of the revealed objects.[12]

Beyond this getting rid of desire for the objects, there is the highest form of *vairāgya* (para-vairāgya), which is attained by the discernment of self (puruṣakhyāti) and is called *guna-vaitṛṣṇya* or the lack of desire for *guṇas*.[13] Then the *para-vairāgya* and *kaivalya* are inseparable. This *vairāgya* is also called the culmination (parā-kāṣṭhā) of knowledge.[14]

To suppress the distracted mind, which, is antagonistic

to *samādhi*, one should perform *abhyāsa* and *vairāgya*.[15] To be indifferent to all other things, one should concentrate one's mind on a single principle.[16] Therefore the *abhyāsa* and the *vairāgya* are an inseparate way. At the early stage to get one-pointed mind, it is necessary to dissociate the mind from another objects. At the final stage one should be indifferent even to one-pointedness.

As we have seen before, the *abhyāsa* is exertion for the steadiness (sthiti) in the state of restraint. Here the steadiness means the tranquil flow of *citta* without functions.[17] This state of the tranquil flow of *citta* cannot be obtained all of a sudden. Before the *citta* can be fit for this state of steadiness, it is necessary to purge the mind of ordinary impurities. This way of purification is called *parikarman*.[18] Patañjali refers to the two ways of purification of mind : One is the cultivations (bhāvanā) of friendliness, compassion, good-will and equanimity respectively towards happy, miserable, virtuous and sinful creatures,[19] and the other is exhaling and restraining of the breath.[20]

The four cultivation are also accepted by the northern tradition of Buddhism, namely, *apramāna* (immeasurable)[21] and by the southern tradition, namely, *brahma-vihāra* (divine behavior of human mind.)[22]

In the Yoga philosophy, the four *bhāvanās* (cultivation) give rise to unadulterated merit and then the *citta* becomes pure. The purified *citta*. becoming one-pointed, eventually attains the stage of steadiness (sthiti-pada).[23]

In the *Abhidharma-kośa* the *apramāna* is regarded as the meritorious result from *samādhi*,[24] while in the Yoga philosophy the *bhāvanā* is the preliminary performance for *samādhi*. In this respect, the concept of *bhāvanā* of the Yoga philosophy is rather similar to the *brahma-vihāra* of the Thera-vāda Buddhism.[25]

The latter way of purification, namely, exhaling and restraining the breath, is relating to *prānāyāma* (breath control). By the *prāṇāyāma*, the *citta* obtains steadiness,[26]

and the *citta* becomes fit for *dhāranā* (sustainment),[27] which is the sixth limb of the yoga practice as we shall observe later.

By the above mentioned ways, the *citta* becomes pure and fit for steadiness. Then in the state of steadiness the *citta* appears as having particular functions, namely, the higher perception with special objects (viṣayavatī)[28] and the higher perception free from sorrow (viśoka) with radiance (jyotiṣmatī).[29] And also in the same state, the *citta* has the object free from desire[30] or has the supporting-object of knowledge in dream or in sleep.[31]

The meditation (dhyāna) on whatsoever thing one may like is also regarded as one way to the state of steadiness.[32]

Now we shall observe the representative way for liberation in the Yoga philosophy, so that we may understand that the other ways above mentioned are inclusive in one set of method, namely, *aṣṭâṅga-yoga.*

Patañjali remarks that by practice of the *yoâṅga*, when impurities are destroyed, there is irradiation of knowledge (jñāna-dīpti) reaching upto the discriminative knowledge (viveka-khyāti).[33] The eight *yogâṅgas* are *yama* (restraint), *niyama* (observance), *āsana* (posture), *prānāyāma* (regulation of breath), *pratyāhāra* (withdrawal of senses), *dhāraṇā* (abstainment or fixed attention), *dhyāna* (meditation) and *samādhi* (concentration).[34]

We shall briefly observe each *yogâṅga* noticing the relation to the other aids for purifying the mind which we have seen before.

(1) *Yamas* (restraint) are *ahiṃsā* (non-injury), *satya* (truth), *asteya* (abstention from stealing), *brahmacarya* (continence) and *aparigraha* (abstience from avarice).[35]

Of these, *ahiṃsā* is given such a high place that it is regarded as the root of the other *yamas* and *niyamas.*[36]

By the practice of *yamas*, the gross impurities of ordinary minds are removed. When the *yamas* are performed without any limitation of the condition of birth, place, time or

circumstances at all cases, they are called *mahāvrata* (great vow).[37]

In this connection, we see that the four cultivations (bhāvanā), which we have seen before, are only different aspects of universal sympathy, which should remove all perversities in our nature and unite us with our fellowbeings. This is the positive aspect of the mind with reference to abstinence from injuring.[38]

(2) *Niyamas* (observance) are *śauca* (cleanliness), *samtoṣa* (contenment), *tapas* (austerity), *svādhyāya* (recitation of the veda) and *īśvara-praṇidhāna* (devotion or dedication to God).[39]

Of these, the former two are practised to make the body and mind fit to the latter three. The latter three are called *kriyā-yoga* (yoga in the form of action).[40] It is mentioned that the *kriyā-yoga* is for the cultivation of *samādhi* and for the attenuation of *kleśas*.[41] This practice should be performed by those whose mind is not easy to be concentrated.[42] Among the *kriyā-yoga*, the *iśvara-praṇidhāna* is regarded as the means of attaining the *samprajñāta* and the *asamprajñāta samādhi*,[43] which we shall observe later. And it is said, by means of *īśvara-praṇidhāna*, *samādhi* is completed.[44]

(3) *Āsana* (posture) is motionless and agreeable form.[45] *Āsana* becomes perfect by relaxation of effort and contemplation of the infinite.[46] When *āsana* has been mastered there is no disturbance through the contraries of heat and cold etc.[47]

(4) After having secured stability in the *āsanas* the *prāṇāyāma* (regulation of breath) should be attempted.[48] By the practice of *prāṇayāma*, the mind becomes fit for *dhāranā* as seen before. In this connection, *sthiti* (steadiness) means fixty of the mind on a desired object. Thus the *āsana* and the *prāṇāyāma* are the control of the mind and the breath so that the mind will be steady and fit for the higher stage of yoga, that is *samyama*.

(5) *Pratyāhāra* (withdrawal of senses) is that, when the senses are dissociated with their corresponding objects, they

follow, as it were, the nature of the mind.[49] Vyāsa explains that when the *citta* is restrained, like the *citta*, the senses are restrained and do not require any further method such as the subjugation of the senses.[50]

We can say that the *pratyāhāra* is a kind of *vairāgya*, while the *āsana* and the *prāṇāyāma* are a kind of *abhyāsa*.

The above mentioned five *yogâṅgas* are called the external limbs (bahir-aṅga).

(6) *Dhāraṇā* (sustainment) is the mind's fixation on a particular point.[51]

(7) In that the continuous flow of similar mental modifications is called *dhyāna* (meditation).[52]

(8) When the mind becomes transformed into the shape of the object, as though devoid of the nature of thought, that state is called *samādhi* (concentration).[53]

These three represent the three stages of one process of practice, of which the last one is the perfection. These three taken together is called *saṃyama*.[54] It can be said that the *saṃyama* is regarded as the means of acquiring wisdom (prajñā) which leads to the final discriminative knowledge of the distinction of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. In this respect, Vyāsa explains that by mastering the *saṃyama* there rises the light (āloka) of the wisdom of concentration (samādhi-prajñā). As the *saṃyama* gradually gets the stable stage, so the wisdom of concentration becomes more clarified.[55]

Here the *saṃyama* is understood to lead to and is immediately followed by the *saṃprajñāta-samādhi*, whereas the other five *yogâṅgas* are only its indirect or remote causes.[56] As to a means of *samādhi*, the perfection of *saṃyama* is the way to the *saṃprajñāta-samādhi*.[57] And with respect to the state of the mind, the *samādhi* denotes the state of the *saṃprajñāta*.[58] And again we see that the *samādhi* is similar to that of the *nirvitarka-samāpatti*.[59] About the comparison of the various states of *samādhi* we shall see in the following sections.

As we have seen before, the *abhyāsa* and the *vairāgya* are the commonest means to restrain the *cittavrttis*, that is to say, both are the way to the *samprajñāta-samādhi*.[60] The *samprajñāta-samādhi* has an object to concentrate, so it is called *sâlambana-samādhi* (concentration having an object).[61] While, the *samprajñāta-samādhi* is called *nirālambana-samādhi*.[62]

Now we should notice another way to the *asamprajñāta-samādhi*. For the yogins the *asamprajñāta-samādhi* caused by *śraddhā* (faith), *vīrya* (energy), *smṛti* (recollection), *samādhi* (concentration) and *prajñā* (wisdom).[63] Vyāsa remarks that by the *abhyāsa* on them and by the *vairāgya* towards their objects there becomes the *asamprajñāta-samādhi*.[64]

Thus the *śraddhā* and others become intensified by the advancement of the *abhyāsa* and the *vairāgya*. So we can say that the *abhyāsa*, the *vairāgya* and the *śradhā* etc., are by their nature included within the eight *yogâṅgas* and are not to be considered as independent means.[65]

In the Buddhist tradition too, the *śraddhā* and others are regarded as the way to lead the goal.[66] For example, we may see the *Abhidharma-kośa* of Vasuvandu. The *śraddhā* and others are enumerated as the five faculties (pañcēndriya) or the five powers (pañca-bala). These ten are among the thirty-seven means pertaining to enlightenment (sapta-triṃśad-bodhi-pakṣa-dharma) which are a synonym of the *mārga* (way).[67]

Vasubandhu explains how the two sets of five function in one's mind, thus: One who has *śraddhā* begins *vīrya*; *smṛti* becomes firm for one who has begun *vīrya*; when firmed *smṛti* avoids distraction, the mind becomes concentrated (samādhīyate); and then one who has concentrated the mind knows well (prajānāti) the things as they really are (yathābhūtam.)[68]

Comparing this with the explanation of Vyāsa on the *śraddhā* etc.,[69] we see there must be a certain inter-relation between the Yoga philosophy and Buddhism in this respect.

As we have already pointed, the *īśvara-praṇidhāna* is one of the ways to both the *saṃprajñāta* and the *asaṃpajñāta samādhi*. From *īśvara-praṇidhāna* the spiritual knowledge is obtained through God's grace. Through contemplation on God, as on a liberated being, the mind in the normal course also becomes calm and thereby concentrated.[70]

Thus, we have observed various ways to the *samādhi*, which are all included in the *yogâṅgas*. Next we shall observe the states of various *samādhis* of Yoga philosophy.

§ 3. Nature of Samādhi of the Aṣṭâṅga-yoga

We have already observed the *samādhi* of the *aṣṭāṅga-yoga*. Here we should notice that when the state of *dhyāna* becomes so deep that only the object stands by itself, obliterating, as it were, all traces of reflective thought, it is known as *samādhi*.[71]

It is also to be noticed that the *saṃyama* is regarded as more internal in respect to the *saṃprajñā-samādhi* than *yama*, *niyama* etc.,[72] and also is regarded as external in respect of the *nirbīja-samādhi* because the *nirbīja* is attained when the *saṃyama* is also absent.[73]

Next we shall observe the *saṃprajñāta* and *asaṃprajñāta*, and then proceed to the *sabīja* and *nirbīja samādhi*.

§ 4. Saṃprajñāta and Asaṃprajñāta

In the Yoga philosophy, the word *saṃprajñāta* is used to modify both *samādhi* and *yoga*. Although the difference of both is not always distinguished, we should remember that the *samādhi* belongs to all stages of the mind, while the *Yoga* is limited to the last two stages of the mind, i. e., *ekāgra* and *niruddha*.

According to the definition of *yoga* (i. e., *yoga* is restraint of the function of mind), the *yoga* is of two kinds : *nirbīja* and *asaṃprajñāta*.[74] In this section, it will be our task to follow the state of mind from *saṃprajñāta* to *asaṃprajñāta*.

The concentration attained by a mind which is one-pointed, which brings enlightenment about a real entity,

weakens the *kleśas*, loosens the bonds of *karma* and paves the way to the restrained state of the mind, is called *samprajñāta-yoga*.[75]

Here we understand that the *samprajñāta-yoga* is not simply concentration. When the knowledge acquired by a concentrated mind becomes firmly fixed in the mind and is retained there, it is called *samprajñāta-yoga*.[76]

With regard to its object and nature, the *samprajñāta-samādhi* is divided into four classes : *vitarkānugata*, *vicārānugata*, *ānandānugata* and *asmitānugata*.[77]

Making reference to the description on the *vitarka* and the *vicāra* relating to the four *samāpattis*, we may note that in the state of the *vitarkānugata-samādhi*, the gross objects, i. e., the things made of the five elements (pañca-bhautika) are concentrated through the sense-organs with *ānanda* and *asmitā*. When that is mastered, the subtle objects, i. e., *tanmātras* are concentrated in the state of the *vicārānugata-samādhi* with *ānanda* and *asmitā*. In the *ānandānugata* state, the objects are the sense-organs. In this state also *ānanda* and *asmitā* remain. In the state of *asmitânugata-samādhi*, the object of concentration is the *asmitāmātra* (pure I-sense). This I-sense is called *grahītṛ* (cogniser). It is manifested with the help of the *puruṣa*. Therefore, the object concentrated upon in this *samādhi* is not real *puruṣa* but its imitation, i. e., the mutative ego or *buddhi*. As all those four *samprajñāta samādhis* have reference to objects, they are called *sâlambana-samādhi*.[78]

This classification of the four *samādhis* is very similar to the idea of the four *dhyānas* of the Buddhist thought. Here we shall observe the systematized explanation in the *Abhidharma-kośa*.

The *samāpatti-dhyānas*[79] of the *rūpâvacara* are of four kinds. The first *dhyāna* is accompanied by *vitarka*, *vicāra*, *prīti* (joy) and *sukha*. The second *dhyāna*, freed from *vitarka* and *vicāra*, is accompanied by *prīti* and *sukha*. The

third *dhyāna,* freed from *vitarka, vicāra* and *prīti,* is accompanied by *sukha.* The fourth *dhyāna,* freed from all four qualities, has only *ekâgratā,* because the *ekâgratā* is common to all the four *dhyānas* as their essence.[80]

On a comparison between the four *samādhis* of the Yoga philosophy and the four *dhyānas* of the Buddhist thought, we may notice similarity of both the ideas.

The question of mutual influence is yet to be decided. To that end we shall further discuss the *asaṃjñisamāpatti* of the Buddhist thought.

Asaṃjñi-samāpatti (non-conscious contemplation) is one of the two *acitta-samāpattis* (mindless contemplation).[81] The *asamjñi-samāpatti* is the *samāpatti* of beings who do not have consciousness (asaṃjñi) or the *samāpatti* which has no consciousness (asaṃjñā). It is the restraint (nirodha) of *citta* and its modifications (caitta).[82] Although it is the restraint, it is limited on the stage of the fourth *dhyāna* and does not go to any upper stage.[83] Therefore the *asamjñi-samāpatti* is not accepted as the best one by Buddhists.[84]

On the other hand, the *asaṃprajñāta-samādhi* of the Yoga philosophy is regarded as the goal of the yoga practice. By Patañjali, the *asaṃprajñāta-samādhi* follows the *abhyāsa* of cessation of conception (virāma-pratyaya) and wherein only *samskāras* remain.[85]

On this definition of the *asaṃprajñāta-samādhi,* Vyāsa explains the means of it : The *para-vairāgya* (supreme detachment) is the means of attainment, because the *abhyāsa* with supporting-object (sālambana) is not adequate to accomplish it. So the cessation of conception which has no substance (nirvastuka) should be its supporting-object.[86]

Then Vyāsa explains the nature of the state thus

It is devoid all objects (artha-śūnya), because the mind based on the *abhyāsa* of it has no supporting-object. This kind of *nirbīja-samādhi* (seedless concentration) is the *asaṃprajñāta.*[87]

Here we understand that the *saṃprajñāta* is the constant awareness of the knowledge acquired through concentration in one-pointed state of the mind. Similarly, the *asaṃprajñāta* is that wherein concentration is attained in a habitually arrested state of the mind after having realised abiding knowledge by the *saṃprajñāta*. The *nirbīja-samādhi* is not necessarily the *asaṃprajñāta-samādhi*. The *asaṃprajñāta-samādhi* leads to *kaivalya* (state of liberation) but the *nirbīja-samādhi* does not always lead to *kaivalya*.[88]

Next we shall observe the *sabīja* and the *nirbīja samādhi*.

§ 5. Sabīja and Nirbīja

We have already observed the four kinds of *samāpattis*.[89] Without going into detailed study of each one of them, we should here note that the *savitarka* and the *nirvitarka*, both are the *prajñā* (wisdom) relating to the gross object. In this respect, they are also called *vitarkânugata* classified in the *saṃprajñāta-samādhi*. Moreover when we compare the definition of the *nirvitarka-samāpatti* with that of the *samādhi* of the *aṣṭâṅga*, it is evident that both are the same. We May regard that the *dhyāna* of the *aṣṭâṅga* is equivalent to the *savitarkasamāpatti*.[90] The *savicāra* and the *nirvicāra* are called *vicāraânugata* in the *saṃprajñāta-samādhi*. The object of the *samāpatti* is not only the things knowable (grāhya) but also the means of knowledge (grahaṇa), that is, the sense-prgans and the *puruṣa*.[91] Thus, the object of the *samāpatti* has degrees from the gross to the subtle, that is, from the worldly things to the *prakṛti* to the *puruṣa*.[92]

Those four *samāpattis* have objects as their seed (bīja), so they are also called *sabīja*.[93] Thus, with respect to the *sabīja-samadhi*, the word '*bīja*' means the object of concentration. But that is not fit for the case of the *nirbīja-samādhi*. The *bīja*, as we shall see below, is to be understood to *saṃskāra*.[94]

When the *nirvicāra* is clarified, there becomes inner clarity (adhyātma-prasāda).[95] The inner clarity means the

clear light of wisdom (prajñāloka) which has true object without any sequence of time.[96] In this state of concentration, there appears *prajñā* (wisdom) called *ṛtambhara*[97] (truth-bearing). The *prajñā* is also nothing but a *cittavṛtti*. Therefore, it is mentioned that the same kind of *saṃskāra* is produced by the *samādhi-prajñā*.

Such a *saṃskāra* produced by the *samādhi-prajñā* shuts out the *vyutthāna-saṃskārāśaya*. When the *vyutthāna-saṃskāra* is subdued, no more *pratyaya* (conception) can emerge thereof. When the *pratyaya* is restrained, the *samādhi* is achieved. From that comes the *prajñā* which is born of the *samādhi*, and then from that comes the *saṃskāra* which is produced by the *prajñā*. Thus newly again and again the *saṃskāraāśaya* is born, then the *prajñā* and then the *saṃskāra* is born.[98]

When the *saṃprajñāta-samadhi* reaches its highest stage in the *viveka-khyāti*, the activities of the mind cease.[99] Thus the *citta-vṛttis* are entirely restrained. In this stage, the *saṃskāra* born of the *prajñā* still remains. That has been observed with respect to the *nirodha-pariṇāma*. This stage is also called *nirodha-samādhi*.[100]

It is easy to understand that this state implies the *asaṃprajñāta-samādhi*. In other words, the *citta's* change from *vyutthāna* state to *nirodha* state is equal to the change of concentration from *saṃprajñāta* to *asaṃprajñāta*. Even when the mind is in the *saṃprajñāta* state, it is said that the mind is in the *vyutthāna* (active) in comparison with the *nirodha* state, just as the ordinary conscious state is called *vyutthāna* in comparison with the *saṃprajñāta* state.[101]

When the *nirodha* state, i. e., the *asaṃprajñāta-samādhi* is habitually practised, there comes a tranquil flow (praśānta-vāhitā) in the mind by the *nirodha-saṃskāra*. If the *nirodha-saṃskāra* is weak, the mind turns back to the *vyutthāna* state.[102] When the *asaṃprajñāta-samādhi* is practised harder, the *nirodha-saṃskāra* becomes stronger and shuts out

the *saṃskāra* produced by the *prajñā* of *saṃprajñāta-samādhi.*[103] This subduing process is the same as the *saṃskāra* produced by the *samādhi-prajñā* shuts out the *vyutthāna-saṃskāra.*

Thus the *samādhi-prajñā* and its *saṃskāra* become totally restrained, and then all modifications of the mind are restrained. This state is called *nirbīja-samādhi.*[104]

It is desirable for us to compare some of the *samādhis* of the Yoga philosophy with those of the Buddhist thought. For example, it is mentioned in the *Abhidharmakośa* that there preserved some sets of three *samādhis* in the *Āgama* literatures. One of those sets is (1) *samādhi* with *vitarka* and *vicāra*, (2) *samādhi* without *vitarka* but only with *vicāra*, and (3) *samādhi* without *vitarka* and *vicāra.*[105] Taking this from the *Āgama*, Vasubandhu tries to adjust them into the four *dhyānas.*[106] Thus various *samādhis*[107] stored in the *Āgama* literatures are interpreted avoiding contradiction in the system of *Abhidharma.*

The classification of the *savitarka* and the like of the Yoga philosophy is not completely the same as that of the *Abhidharma.* But there seems to be the common ground of thought. In the Yoga philosophy, there are two sorts of *vitarka*: the *vitarkânugata* in the *saṃprajñāta-samādhi* and the *savitarka-samāpatti* in the *sabīja-samādhi.* Both originate from different source, but they are explained avoiding contradiction.

Before we proceed to comparison of the *nirodha-samāpatti* of the *Abhidharma* with the *nirodha-samādhi* of the Yoga philosophy, we should observe the mental states based on the Buddhist concept of the universe.

According to the Buddhist cosmology, the universe is composed of the three spheres (or world, dhātu) of existance, namely, *kāma* (desire), *rūpa* (material object) and *arūpa* (matterless). These three *dhātus* or spheres are not to be conceived as three different physical strata, one above the

other, or one different from another. Their difference consists in their living beings having different mental and physical constitutions.[108]

In the *kāma-dhātu* live eight kinds of herish beings (naraka), spirits (preta), animals (tiryag-yoni), human beings (mānuṣa) and six kinds of heavenly beings (deva).[109]

The beings in the *rūpa-dhātu* are sub-divided into seventeen categories described as dwelling in seven heavens. The first to the third heaven correspond to the state of the first *dhyāna*. The fourth to the sixth heaven correspond to the second *dhyāna*. The seventh to the ninth heaven correspond to the third *dhyāna*. The tenth to the seventeenth heaven correspond to the fouth *dhyāna*.[110]

The *arūpa-dhātu* is divided into four, namely, (1) *ākāśânantyâyatana* (state of boundless space), (2) *vijñānânantyâtana* (state of infinite consciousness), (3) *ākiñcanyâyatana* (state of absolute non-existence) and (4) *naivasaṃjñānâsaṃjñâyatana* (state of neither consciousness nor unconsciousness).[111] Those terms are identical to the four kinds of the *ārūpya-samāpatti*,[112] which are superior to the four *dhyānas*. The four *dhyānas* of the *rūpa-dhātu* and the four *samāpattis* of the *arūpa-dhātu* are altogether called eight *samāpattis*[113] from the aspect of the practice of meditation.

Now, the *nirodha-samāpatti* is one of the two *acittasamāpattis*. Another one is *asañmjñi-samāpatti* which we have seen before. Like the *asaṃjñi-samāpatti*, the *nirodha-samāpatti* is the restraint of *citta* and *caitta*.[114] But there is difference. The *asaṃjñi* is the state of contemplation with the attention on the consciousness of being released, on the other hand, the *nirodha* is the state of contemplation with the attention on the consciousness of calmness of mind.[115] The *asaṃjñi* is limited in the stage of the fourth *dhyāna*, on the other hand, the *nirodha* is in the highest stage (bhavāgra), that is, the *naivasamjñānâsaṃjñâyatana*, the fourth *ārūpya-samāpatti*.[116]

The ordinary people can achieve only the *asaṃjñisamāpatti*, on the other hand, the saints can achieve the *nirodha-samāpatti*.[117]

In the Yoga philosophy, the *nirodha-samādhi* is admitted in both the *asaṃprajñāta* and the *nirbīja samādhi*. It is peculiar to the Yoga philosophy to take notice of *saṃskāra*. When the mind is free from the *samādhiprajñā-saṃskāra* and is filled with the *nirodha-saṃskāra*, then this state is called *nirbīja-samādhi*. Therefore we may say that the ultimate stage of yoga is called *asaṃprajñāta* from the view point of *pratyaya*. It is also called *nirodha* from the view-point of *citta-vṛtti*. And also it is called *nirbīja* from the view-point of *saṃskāra*.

§ 6. Dharma-megha-Samādhi

It is desirable for us to observe another *samādhi*, namely, *dharma-megha-samādhi*. It is mentioned that when one is disinterested in *prasaṃkhyāna* (meditative discernment) by *viveka-khyāti* (discriminative enlightenment) in every case, he attains *dharma-megha-samādhi* (concentration known as the virtue-pouring cloud).[118]

Here the *prasaṃkhyāna* is a certain knowledge which eliminates *kleśa* and is obtained in the state of *dhyāna*. Vyāsa explains thereon the gross activities of *kleśa* having been attenuated by the *kriyā-yoga* are to be destroyed by the *prasaṃkhyāna* of *dhyāna* until they subtilized and become like burnt seeds.[119]

The *kriyā-yoga* is practised for cultivating *samādhi* and attenuating *kleśas*.[120] The attenuated *kleśas* will be sterilised by the *prasaṃkhāyna*, like burnt seeds.[121] Thus the *prasaṃkhyāna* eliminates the *kleśas*.[122] When the *kleśas* are eliminated, the *viveka-khyāti*, i. e.. the subtle wisdom (sūkṣma prajñā) is not obscured by them. Such realisation then lapses in the absence of the manifestation of the *gunas*.[123] And then when the yogin renounces the *prasaṃkhyāna*, his mind becomes filled with the *viveka-khyāti*.[124] That is the *dharma-megha-samādhi*.

Patañjali remarks the state of the *dharma-megha-samādhi* thus: *Kleśas* and *karmas* cease.[125] In this case, because the knowledge freed from the cover of all impurities becomes infinite, the knowable is little.[126] One who attains this stage is regarded as authority over all beings and the omniscience.[127]

This stage is known as *para* (supreme) *prasaṃkhyāna*.[128] After the emergence of that, the *guṇas* having fulfilled their purpose, the sequence of their mutation ceases.[129] Then the *kaivalya* of *puruṣa* is achieved.[130]

Summary: The Yoga philosophy regards the state of *samādhi* in all stages of the mind. Only the state of *ekāgra* and *niruddha* are called *yoga*. Comparing that with the Buddhist concept of concentration of mind, we find that the *samādhi* of the Yoga philosophy is similar to the *samādhi* of the Sarvāsti-vāda and the *manaskāra* of the Vijñāna-vāda; the *Yoga* of the Yoga philosophy is similar to the *samādhi* of the Vijñāna-vāda and the *samāpatti* of the Sarvāsti-vāda. (§ 1.)

To get continuous state of *samādhi*, i. e., steadiness of the mind, the commonest way is the *vairāgya* and the *abhyāsa* in the Yoga philosophy. Before the mind can be fit for the steadiness, it is necessary to purify the mind. This way of purification is called *parikarma*, that is to say, four kinds of cultivation (bhāvanā) of the mind, which is common to Buddhism. Another way of purification is considered relating to *prāṇāyāma*. *Dhyāna* is also enumerated as the way of steadiness.

The most peculiar way to get steadiness is the *aṣṭa-anga-yoga*. All other ways of purification, in any case, may be included in one of the *aṣṭânga*. The last three stages of the *aṣṭāṅga* is named *samyama* as one set of mental activity.

The *samyama* leads to and is followed by the *asaṃprajñāta-samādhi*, which is similar to the state of the *nirvitarka-samāpatti*. For the yogins, the *asaṃprajñāta-samādhi* is

caused by *śraddhā, vīrya, smṛti, samādhi* and *prajñā.* Those are common idea to the Buddhist thought. (§2, 3)

The *saṃprajñāta-samādhi* has four stages ; *vitarkânugata, vicārânugata, ānandânugata* and *asmitânugata.* This classification is similar to the four stages of *dhyāna* of the Buddhist thought.

The *asaṃprajñāta-samādhi* has no object but has *saṃskāra* in it. (§4)

In the *sabīja-samādhi,* there enumerated four *samāpattis.* When the *nirvicāra* is clarified, there appears *prajñā.* Its *saṃskāra* destroys the *vyutthāna-saṃskāra.* When the *sabīja-samāhi* or the *saṃprajñāta-samādhi* reaches the highest stage and activities of the mind cease, this state is also named *nirodha-samādhi.*

The *nirodha-saṃskāra* destroys the *samādhi-saṃskāra.* Then the mind is totally restrained. There is no *samskāra* to be destroyed. This state is called *nirbīja-samādhi.*

There taught some kinds of *samādhi* in the Buddhist *Āgamas. Abhidharma* philosophers adopt them into the four *dhyānas.* In this respect, the *nirodha-samāpatti* of the Buddhist thought should be compared. The *nirodha-samāpatti* is attained at the highest stage by the saints, on the other hand the ordinary people can reach only the *asamjñi-samāpatti.*

In the Yoga philosophy, the *nirodha-samādhi* is attained in both the *asaṃprajñāta* and the *nirbīja-samādhi.* It is peculiar to the Yoga philosophy to take notice of *saṃskāra* for explanation of the *nirodha-samādhi* and the *nirbīja-samādhi.* (§ 5)

In the Yoga philosophy, *dharma-megha-samādhi* is also mentioned. But we cannot realize the actual relation to the Mahāyāna Buddhism to which the same is known. (§ 6)

NOTES

1. Yogaḥ samādhiḥ. 'sa ca sārva-bhaumaś cittasya dharmaḥ. kṣiptaṃ mūḍhaṃ vikṣiptam ekâgram niruddham iti. Cittasya bhūmayaḥ. tatra vikṣipte cetasi vikṣepôpasarjanībhūtaḥ samādhir na yoga-pakṣe vartate,—YBh. I. 1. (p. 2, 1. 2- p. 3, 1.2.) See J. Imanishi, "On the meaning of the word *yoga.*"
2. About the five stages of the mind and *samādhi*, and the similarity with that concept of the Sarvâsti-vāda, see Chapter III.
3. Vide H. Sakurabe, *Abhidharma-kośa*, p. 246 and 249. See AKkā. VIII. 1c—samāpattiḥ subhaikâgryam. In detail, see S. Kumoi, "Dhyāna and samādhi in Indian philosophy."
4. A. K. Chatterjee, *Yogācāra Idealism*, p. 114. manaskāraś cetasa ābhogaḥ. ābhujanam ābhogaḥ. ālambane yena cittam abhimukhīkriyate. sa punar ālambane cittadhāraṇa-karmā. citta-dhāraṇaṃ punas tatraivâlambane punaḥ punaś cittasyâvarjanam. etac ca karma citta-saṃtater ālambane-niyamena viśiṣṭaṃ manaskāram adhikṛtyôktaṃ na tu yaḥ prati-citta-kṣaṇam. tasya hi pratikṣaṇam eva vyāpārī na kṣaṇântare—Triṃśikā p. 20.
   Manaskra is one of the five universal *cetasikas* (sarva-tra-ga). See Triṃśikā kā. 3cd—sadā sparśa-manaskāra-vit-saṃjñā-cetanânvitam ; A. K. Chatterjee, ibid. p. 113.
5. samādhir upaparikṣye vastuni cittasyaikâgratā. upaparīkṣyaṃ vastu guṇato doṣato vā. ekâgrtā ekâlambanatā. Jñāna-samniśraya-dāna-karmakaḥ. samāhite citte yathā-bhūta-parijñānāt.—Triṃśikā p. 26 ; A. K. Chatterjee ibid, p. 115.
   Samādhi is one of the five determinate *cetasikas* (viniyata). See Trimśikā kā. 10 abc—chandâdhimokṣa—smṛtayaḥ saha samādhi-dhibhyāṃ niyatāḥ.
6. Commenting on YBh. I. 32, Vācaspati Miśra and Vijñānbhikṣu attribute this idea to the Vaināśikas. Śaṅkarabhagavata-pāda attributes it to the kṣaṇika-vādins.
   See TV. p. 36, l. 23 ; YV. p. 4, 1. 9 ; V. varana p. 84. 1. 22
7. yasya tu pratyartha—niyataṃ praṭyaya-mātraṃ kṣaṇikam ca cittaṃ tasya sarvam eva ekâgraṃ nâsty eva vikṣiptam.—YBh. I. 32. (p. 36, 1. 10—p. 37, 1.1.)
8. yo'pi sadarśa-pratyaya-pravāhena cittam ekâgram manyate tasy aikâgratā yadi pravāha-cittasya dharmaś tadaikam nâstī pravāha-cittaṃ kṣaṇikatvāt.—YBh. I. 32, (p. 37, 1. 3f.)
9. See YBh. I. 32—yadi punar idam sarvataḥ pratyāhṛtya ekasminn arthe samādhīyate tadā bhavaty ekâgram ity ato na pratyartha-niyatam. (p. 37, 1, 1f.)

The matter of *ekāgratā* is also discussed in AKbh. VIII. 1. (P.ed P. 432, l.16-p. 433, l. 6 ; S. ed. p. 1126, l. 6-p. 1127, l. 5.)

10. See YS. I. 12.—abhyāsa-vairāgyābhyāṃ tan-nirodhaḥ.
11. tatra sthitau yatno'bhyāsaḥ—YS. 1. 13.
12. dṛṣṭānuśravika-viṣaya-vitṛṣṇasya vaśīkāra-saṃjñā vairāgyam.—YS. I. 15. In general, see H. Honda, "Means to the final 'samādhi' in the Yoga School."
13. See YS. I. 16—tat-paraṃ puruṣa-khyāter guṇa-vaitṛṣṇyam. Radhakrishnan mentions, "In the highest form of vairāgya, where the discernment of the self arises, there is no danger of any subjection to the desire for objects or there qualities. This leads to ultimate freedom, while the lower form of vairāgya, which has a trace of rajas (and so pravṛtti) in it, results in the condition of absorption in prakṛti (prakṛti-laya)." (*Indian Philosophy*, vol 2, p.351f.)
14. See YBh. I. 16——jñānasyaive parā para kāṣṭhā vairāgyam. etasya eva hi nāntarīyakaṃ kaivalyam iti. (n. 21,1.3f.). *Para-vairāgya* is called *para-vaśīkāra saṃjñā* in YBh II.26 ; III. 49.
15. See YBh I. 32—athaite vikṣepāh samādhi-pratipakṣās tābhyām evābhyāsa-vairāgyābhyāṃ niroddhavyāḥ. (p. 36, & 7 f.)
16. See YS. I 32—tat-pratisedhārtham eka-tattvābhyāsah.
17. Cittasyāvṛttikasya praśānta-vāhitā sthitiḥ.—YBh.I, 13. (p. 18, l. 14)
18. See YBh. I. 33 intro.—yad idam śāstreṇa parikarma nirdiśyate tat katham. (p. 39, l. 4.)
19. See YS. I. 33—maitri-karuṇā muditopekṣāṇāṃ sukhaduḥkha-puṇyāpuṇya-viṣayānāṃ bhāvanāteś citta-prasādanam.
20. See YS. I. 34—pracchardana vidhāraṇābhyāṃ vā prānasya.
21. See AKbh. VIII, 29-31 ; S. Chaudhury, *Analytical Study*, pp. 218-219.

    P. Chakravarti does not mention this, but remarks that the Sanskrit-Buddhist texts also do not leave them untouched ; for the Gaṇḍavyūtha-Sūtra is found to refer to them. (*Origin and......*, p. 88.)
22. See *Dialogues of the Buddha*, vol. 1, p. 298 ; DN. vol. 1. 'Tevijjya sutta.'

    H. V. Guenther refers to *Visuddhimegga*. IX. 1.-124 and *Atthasālinī* III. 399-416. (Philosophy & ...., pp. 106-109.).

E. Conze, *Buddhist Thought in India*, pp. 80-91. He mentions "They are not specially Buddhistic, occur also in the Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali, and may have beed borrowed from other Indian religious systems." (ibid. p. 80.)

23. evem asys bhāvayataḥ śuklo dharma upajāyate, tataś ca cittaṃ prāśīdati. prasannaṁ ekāgraṃ sthiti-padaṃ labhate.—YBh. I.33. (p. 39, II. 8-10.)

24. The meritous results (guṇa) from the *samādhi* are explained by Vasubandhu as four *apramāṇas* (immeasurable state) in ĀKka. VIII. 29-31, eight *vimokṣas* (deliverance) in VIII. 32-34, eight *abhibhavāyatanas* (stages of mastery) in VIII. 35 and ten *kṛtsnāyatanas* (totalization) in VIII, 36.

25. The idea that the *apramāna* and so on are the meritous results from the *samādhi* is peculiar to the northern tradition of Buddhism. In the Theravāda Buddhism, the *apramāna* (also called brahma-vihāra) and the *kṛtsnayatana* are listed in the forty stations of religious exercises (kammaṭṭhāna). Vide H. Sakurabe, *Abhidharmakośa*, p. 343 f.

As to the general idea ef *kammatthāna*, see H. Guenther, *Philosophy &......*, p. 101 f; *Compendium*.. ...pp. 202-204.

26. tābhyāṃ vā manasaḥ sthitiṃ saṃpadayet.—YBh. I. 34. (p. 40, l.2.

27. dhāraṇāsu ca yogyatā manasaḥ.......YS. II. 53.

28. viṣayavatī vā pravṛttir utpannā manasaḥ sthitinibandhanī. ......YS. 1.35.

According to vyāsa, '*pravṛtti*' means the perception of noble smell (divya-gandha-saṃvit), taste, colour, touch and sound, and also the light of the sun, the moon, the planets lamps etc.

29. viśokā vā jyotiṣmatī.—YS. I. 36.

According to Vyāsa, this perception free from sorrow is of two kinds : one relating to objects, the other relating to pure I-sense ; and is called radiant.

30. vīta-rāga-viṣayaṃ vā cittam.—YS. I. 37.

31. svapna-nidrā-jñānālambanaṃ vā.—YS. I. 38.

32. yathābhimata-dhyānād vā.—YS. I. 39.

33. yogāṅgānuṣṭhānād aśuddhi-kṣaye jñāna-dīptir a-viveka-khyāteḥ.—YS. II. 28.

34. yama-niyamāsana-prāṇāyāma-pratyāhāra- dhāraṇā-dhyānasamādhayo' ṣṭāv aṅgāni.—YS. II. 29.

35. ahiṃsā-satyāsteya-brahmacaryāparigrahā yamāḥ.—YS. II. 30. These five are identical with the Jaina's *anuvrata* (small vow)

rather than the five *prātimikṣa-samvara* of the Buddhist *upāsakas* and *upāśikās* in Akkā, VI. 15.

The *anuvratas* are the duties of the layman, which are called thus as compared with the *mahāvratas* (great vow) taken unconditionally by the monk. Vide W. Schubring, *The Doctorine of the Jaina*, p.297; S. Stevenson, *The Heart of Jainism*, pp. 205-210 (anuvrata), pp. 234-238 (mahāvrata).

36. See YBh. II. 30—uttare ca yama-niyamās tan-mūlās tat-siddhi-paratayaiva tat-pratipādanāya pratipādyante. tat-avadāta-rūpa-karaṇāyaivopādīyante. (p. 103, 11. 9-11.)
Vide S. N. Dasgupta, *Yoga As......*, p. 139.

37. jāti-kāla-samayānavacchinnāḥ sārvabhaumā mahāvratam. —YS. II. 31. See J. Kashio "Yoga and Ethics."

38. Vide. S. N.Dasgupta, ibid. p. 137f.

39. śauca-saṃtoṣa-tapaḥ-svādhyāyeśvara-praṇidhānāni niyamaḥ —YS. II. 32.

40. See YS. II. 1—tapaḥ-svādhyāyeśvara-praṇidhānāni kriyāyogaḥ.

41. See YS. II. 2—samādhi-bhāvanārthaḥ kleśa-tanūkaraṇārthaś ca.

42. In detail. see S. N. Dasgupta, *Yoga As......*, p. 129f.

43. See YS. I. 23—īśvara-pranidhānad vā. See S. Kumoi, "On the devotion to īśvara in the Yoga Sūtra."

44. Samādhi-siddir īśvara-praṇidhānāt ....YS. II. 45.
But S. N. Dasgupta describes: this Īśvara-praṇidhāna (devotion to god) is different from the Iśvara-praṇidhāna mentioned in Yoga-sūtra i. 23, where it meant love, homage and adoration of God, by virtue of which God by His grace makes samādhi easy for the Yogin. (Ibid. P. 142 f.)

45. sthira-sukham āsanam.—YS. II. 46.

46. prayatna-śaithilyānanta-samāpattibhyām—YS. II. 47.
Swāmi H. Āraṇya notes : On attaining further steadiness ; it will be felt that the body is non-existent as it were. 'My body has become like void dissolving itself in infinite space and I am like the wide expanse of the sky.' This form of thought is called meditation on the infinite (ananta-samāpatti). *Yoga Philosophy*, p. 229.

47. See YS. II. 48—tato dvaṃdvānabhighātaḥ.
Vide S. N. Dasgupta, ibid. p. 145.

48. See YS. II. 49—tasmin sati śvāsa-praśvāsayor gati-vicchedaḥ prāṇāyāmaḥ. Vide S. N. Dasgupta, *Yoga As......*, P. 145.
The various ways in which the suspention of the movement of of air can be practised are shown in YS. II. 50 and 51.

49. svaviṣayāsaṃyoge citta-svarūpānukūra iveidriyānāṃ pratyāhāraḥ. —YS. II. 54.

50. citta-nirodhe cittavan nirudhānīndriyāni netatendriya-jayavad upāyāntaram apekṣante.—YBh, II. 54. (p. 117, 1. 1 f.)

51. deśa-bandhaś cittasya dhāraṇā.—YS. III. 1.

52. tatra pratyayaika-tānatā dhyānam.—YS. III. 2.
Dhyāna is said the way to *sthiti* or *citta* ; see p. 148. From this we can say that the state of *sthiti* denotes the state of *saṃyama*.

53. tad evārthamātra-nirbhāsam svarūpa-śūnyam iva samādhiḥ.—YS. III. 3.

54. See YS. III. 4 trayaṃ ekatra saṃyamaḥ.
Vide S. N. Dasgupta, *Yoga As......*, p. 148f.

55. tasya saṃyamasya jayāt samādhi-prajñāyā bhavaty āloko yathā yathā samyamaḥ sthira-pado bhavati tathā tathā samādhi-prajñā viśāradībhavati.—YBh. III. 5. (p. 121, 1. 7f.)

56. Vide S. N. Dasgupta, *Yoga As......*, p. 148f.
See YS. III. 7—trayam antar-aṅgaṃ pūrvebhyaḥ ; YBh. III. 7.. —tad etad dhāraṇā-dhyāna samādhi trayaṃ antaraṅgaṃ saṃprajñātasya samādheḥ pūrvebhyo yamādibhyaḥ pañcabhyaḥ sādhanebhya iti. (p. 123.1. 2f.)

57. S. Chennakesavan mentions. Saṃyama is applicable at all stages of life. When once the lower stage is conqured, it is applied to the higher stage of meditation. It is a means up to the cognitive trance stage, where the vṛttis of the citta becomes one-pointed or ekāgra. (*Concept of......*, p. 128.)

58. Swāmi H. Āraṇya explains : The light of knowledge referred to here denotes the enlightenment attained in Saṃprajñāta-yoga. (*Yoga Philosophy*, p. 254.)

59. The similarity is clearly seen when we compare the definition of the *samādhi* of *yogāṅga* in YS. III. 3 (see p. 153. fn. 3) with that of the *nirvitarka-samāpatti* in YS. I. 43 (see p. 137, fn. 2).

60. Also see YBh. 1. 17 intro.—athopāya-dvayena niruddha citta-vṛtteḥ katham ucyate saṃprajñātaḥ samādhir iti. (p 21,1. 5f.)

61. See YBh. 1. 17—sarva ete sālambanāḥ samādhayaḥ. (p. 22, 1. 3f)

62. We shall observe in the following sections.

63. See YS. I. 20—śraddhā-vīrya-smṛti-samādhi-prajñā-pūrvika itareṣām.

64. tad-abhyāsāt tad-viṣayāc ca vairāgyād asaṃprajñātaḥ samādhri bhavati.—YBh. I. 20. (p. 25, 1. 3f.)

65. Vide S. N. Dasgupta, *Yoga As ......pp.*, 128 and135.

66. The relation between the Yoga philosophy and Buddhism regarding to the *śraddhā* etc. is simply referred to by J. H. Woods, *The Yoga System*, p. 52 ; S. N. Dasgupta, ibid. p. 332 ; by Swāmi H. Āraṇya, *Yoga Philosophy*, p. 52 ; P. Chakravarti, *Origin and ......*, p. 88.
About the investigation of the Buddhist *śraddhā* etc. see H. F. Guenther, *Philosophy & ......*, pp. 61-72.

67. See AKbh. VI. 66...punar eṣa mārgo bodhi-pakṣyākhyâṃ labhate, sapta-triṃśad-bodhi-pakṣā dharmāḥ. catvāri smṛty-upasthāni. catvāri samyak-prahāṇāni. catvāri ṛddhi-pādāḥ. pañcêndriyāni. pañca balāni. sapta bodhy-aṅgāni. āryâṣṭaṅgo mārgaḥ iti. (p.ed. p. 382, 11. 17-19 ; S. ed. p. 1015,11. 6-8.)
Vide S. Chaudhury, *Analytical Study*, p. 184f.

68. indriyāṇāṃ kiṃ kṛto 'nukramaḥ. śraddha-dhāno hi phala-arthaṃ vīryam ārabhate. ārabdha-vīryasya smṛtir upatiṣṭhate. upasthita-smṛter avikṣepāc cittaṃ samādhīyate. samāhita-citta yathābhūtaṃ prajānāti.—ibid. (P. ed. p. 384, 1. 10f ; S. ed. p. 1020 11. 2-4)

69. See YBh. 1. 20—tasya hi śraddha-dhānasya vivekârthano vīryam upajāyate. samupajāta-vīryasya smṛtir upatiṣṭhate. smṛty-upasthāne ca cittam anākulaṃ samādhiyate. samāhitacittasya prajñāviveka upāvartate. yena yathârtham vastu jānāti tad-abhyāsāt tad-viṣayāc ca vairāgyād asaṃprajñātaḥ samādhir bhavati. (p. 24, 1. 6 - p. 25, 1. 4.)

70. Vide H. Āraṇya, *Yoga Philosophy*. p. 56.

71. See YBh. III. 3.—dhyânam eva dhyeyākāra-nirbhāsaṃ pratyayâtmakena svarūpena śūnyam iva yadā bhavati dhyeyasvabhāvāveśāt tadā samādhir ucyate, (p. 120, 1. 6—p. 121, 1. 1.)
M. Kato, "Samādhi in the Yoga system.

72. See YS. III. 7 ; p. 154 fn. 1 of this chapter.

73. See YS. III. 8.—tad api bahir-aṅgaṃ nirbījasya.
YBh. III 8.—tad apy antar-aṅgaṃ sādhana-trayaṃ nirbijāsya yogasya bahir-aṅgaṃ bhavati, kasmāt. tad-abhāve bhavād iti. (p. 123, 1. 5f.)

74. See YBh. I. 2.—tad avasthaṃ saṃskā^opagaṃ bhavati. sa nirbījaḥ samādhiḥ. na tatra kiṃcit saṃprajñāyata ity asaṃprajñātaḥ, dvi-vidhaḥ sa yogaś citta-vṛtti-nirodha iti.(p.7, 11 2-4.)

75. yas tv ekâgre cetasi sadbhūtaṁ artham pradyotayati kṣiṇoti ca kleśān karma-bandhanāni ślathayati, nirodham abhimukhaṃ karoti sa saṃprajñāta yoga' ity ākhyāyate.—YBh. I. 1. (p. 3, 1.2-p. 4,1.2.)

76. Vide swāmi H. Āraṇya, *Yoga Philosophy*, p. 6.

77. See YBh. I. 1.—sa ca vitarkânugato vicārânugata ānanda —anugato 'smitânugata ity upariṣṭān nivedayiṣyāmaḥ. (p.4, l. 2f.); YS. I. 17.—vitarka-vicārânandāsmitā-rūpânugamāt saṃprajñātaḥ. See J. Kashio. "On the Yoga-sūtra 1. 17."
Vitarka means the gross direct experience (ābhoga) of the mind relating to thesupporting-object. *Vicāra* means the subtle direct experience of the mind relating to the supporting-object. *Ānanda* means pleasure. *Asmitā* means the awareness of individual personality. (vitarkaś cittasyâlambane sthūla ābhogaḥ. sūkṣmo vicāraḥ. ānando hlādaḥ. ekātmikā saṃvid asmitā.—YBh. I. 17, p. 21, l. 8-p. 22, l. 1.)
About *asmitā*, see Chapt. III, p. 111f.

78. According to the description in Chap. IV. pp. 135-138 and YBh. I. 17.—tatra prathamaś catuṣṭayânugataḥ samādhiḥ savitarkaḥ dvitīyo vitarkavikalaḥ sāvicāraḥ. tṛtīyo vicāra-vikalaḥ sānandaḥ caturthas tad-vikalo 'smitāmātra iti. sarva ete sâlambanāḥ samādhayaḥ. (p. 22, ll. 1-4.)

79. According to Vasubandhu, *dhyānas* are broadly divided into two groups. viz., *upapatti-dhyāna* and *samāpatti-dhyāna*. The *upapatti-dhyāna* is *dhyāna*-effect and *samāpatti-dhyāna* is *dhyāna*-cause.
See AKkā. VIII, la.—dvidhā dhyānāni.
Bhāsya on it—samāsato dvividhāni dhyānāny upapatti-samāpatti-dhyāna-bhedāt. (P. ed. p. 432, l.4f ; S. ed.p. 1124, l. 6f.)
Vyākhyā on it—dvidhā dhyānāni iti kārya-dhyānāni kāraṇa-dhyanāni-cety arthaḥ. (p. 1124, l. 24.)
The four *upapatti-dhyānas* are of seventeen *rūpa*—heavens : three heavens in each *dhyāna* upto the third *dhyāna*, eight heavens in the fourth *dhyāna*.
See AKkā. III. 2.—ūrdhvaṃ saptadaśa-sthāno pṛthak pṛthak pṛthak, dhyānaṃ tri-bhumikaṃ tatra caturthaṃ tv aṣṭa-bhūmikam. Vide S. Chaudhury, *Analytical Study*...p. 127.
The *samāpatti-dhyāna* is defined as the application of the wholesome mind on a single object, for the *dhyānas* have *samādhi* as their characteristic.
See AKkā. VIII. 1c.......samāpattiḥ śubhaikāgryam.
Bhāṣya on it......abhedena kuśala-cittaikagratā dhyānam, samādhi svarūpatvāt. (P. ed. p. 432, ll.12-14 ; S ed. p. 1126, ll.1-3.)
Vide S. Chaudhury, ibid. p. 207.

80. See AKkā. VIII. 2a ......vicāra-prīti-sukhavat.
Bhāṣya on it......vicāra-prīti-sukha-saṃyuktaṃ kuśalam aikagryaṃ tat pratham dhyānam. vicāra-vacanād vitarko 'py ukto bhavati. sāhaccaryād dhūmâgnivat. na hi.. sukhavān vicāro vinā vitarkenâsti.
AKkā. VIII. 2b...... pūrva-pūrvâṅga-varjitam.
Bhāṣya on it......śubhaikāgryam iti vartate. vicāra-varjitaṃ prīti-sukhavat dvitīyam, vicāra-prīti-varjitaṃ tṛtīyam, vicāra-prīti-sukha-varjitāṃ catutham iti. (P. ed. p. 433, 11. 15-21 ; S. ed. p. 1129, 11.2-10.)
Vide S. Chaudhury, ibid. 208.

81. The otner is *nirodha-samāptti*, which we shall see soon after (pp. 169 ff).

82. asaṃjñinām sattvānāṃ samāpattiḥ asaṃjñā vā samāpattir ity asaṃjñā-samāpattiḥ. sâpi citta-caittānāṃ nirodhaḥ....... Kbh. II.42. (P. ed. p. 69, 11. 1-3 ; S. ed. p. 234, 1. 8f.)

83. See AKkā. II. 42b......dhyāne'ntye.
Bhāṣya on it......antya-dhyānaṃ caturtham. tat-pary-āppannā-'sau nânya-bhūmikā. (P. ed. p. 69, 11.3-5 ; S. ed. p. 234 11.10-12.)

84. See AKkā. II. 42cd......nâryasya.
Bhāṣya on it......na hy āryā asaṃjñi-samāpattiṃ samāpad-yante viṅipāta-sthānām ivaitāṃ paśyantaḥ, niḥsarana-saṃjñino hi tām samāpadyante. (P. ed. p. 69, 11.14-17 ; S. ed p 235. 11.7-10.)
Buddhists should go to the *ārūpya-samāpattis* beyond the four *dhyānas*, the *rūpya-samāpattis*. The *ārūpya-samāpattis* are mentioned in AKbh. VIII. 2a, 3 and 4. Both *rūpya* and *ārūpya* are together called the eight *samāpattis* in AKbh. VIII. 5 and 6.

85. virāma-pratyayâbhyāsa-pūrvikaḥ saṃskāra-śeṣo'nyaḥ......YS. I. 18.

86. tasya paraṃ vairāgyam upāyaḥ. sâlambano hy abhyāsas tat-sādhanāya na kalpeta iti virāma-pratyayo nirvastuka ālambanī-kriyate.......YBh. I. 18. (p 22, 1.8—p. 23, 1.1.)

87. Sa cârtha-śūnyah tad-abhyāsa-pūrvikaṃ hi cittaṃ nirālambanam abhāva-prāptam iva bhavatity eṣa nirbījah samādhir asaṃprajñātah....... YBh. I.18. (p. 23. 11. 1-3.)

88. Vide Swāmi H. Aranya, *Yoga Philosophy*, p. 46.

89. See Chap. IV, pp. 135-138.

90. Cf. YS. I.42 (p.136 fn. 2) and YS. III-2 (p. 153 fn. 2).

91. See YBh. I. 41.......tad evam abhijāta-maṇi-kalpasya cetaso grahītṛ-grahaṇa-grāhyeṣu puruṣêndriya-bhūteṣu. yā tat-stha-tad-añjanatā teṣu sthitasya tad-ākārâpattiḥ sā samāpattir ucyate. (p.44, 11.9-11.)

When being contemplated on the sense organs, the consciousness is called *ānadânugata* ; on the *puruṣa* it is called *asmitânugata*.

92. See YS. I. 45.......sūkṣma-viṣyatvaṃ câliṅga paryavasānam.
93. tāś catasraḥ samāpattayo bahir-vastu-bījā iti samādhir api sabījaḥ.......YBh. I. 46. (p. 51, 1.4.)
94. But later commentators seem to regard *bīja* as *kleśa* or *karma*. See TV. I.2.......kleśa-sahitaḥ karmaśayo jātyāyur-bhoga-bīja, tasmin nirgata iti nirbījaḥ (p. 7, 1. 12f.) ; Vivaraṇa I. 2.......sa nirbījaḥ. nirgataṃ bījam atra lkeśâdi bījaṃ sarvam utsannam asmin iti. (p. 12, 1.25.) ; and Radha-krishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, vol. 2, p. 360f.
95. nirvicāra-vaiśāradye 'dhyātma-prasādaḥ.......YS. I. 47.
96. See YBh. I. 47.......adhyātma-prasādo bhūtârtha-viṣayaḥ kramânurodhī sphutaḥ prajñālokaḥ. (p. 51, 1. 10f.) This is the same stage of mastering *samyama*. See p. 153 of this chapter.
97. See YS. I. 48.......ṛtambharā tatra prajñā.
98. samādhi-prajñā-prabhavaḥ saṃskāro vyutthāna-saṃskāra-āśayaṃ bādhate. vyutthāna-saṃskārâbhibhavāt tat-prabhavāḥ pratyayā na bhavati. pratyaya-nirodhe samādhir upatiṣṭhate. tataḥ samādhi-jā prajñā, tataḥ prajñā-kṛtāḥ saṃskārā iti navo navaḥ saṃskāraśayo jāyate. tataś ca prajñā tataś ca saṃskāra iti....... YBh. I. 50. (p. 54, 11 1-4.) And see p. 108.
99. Vide Swāmi H. Āraṇya, *Yoga Philosophy*, p. 109. Yet, he identifies *samprajñāta* with *sabīja*.
100. This term is seen in YBh. 11.27, III.9.
101. Vide S. N. Dasgupta, *Yoga as*......, p. 155.
102. See YS. III. 10.......tasya praśānta-vāhitā saṃskārāt. Bhāṣya on it......nirodha saṃskā râbhyāsa-pāṭavâpekṣā praśānta vāhitā cittasya bhavati. tat-saṃskāra-mānd ye vyutthāna-dharminā saṃskāreṇa nirodha-dharmaḥ saṃskāro 'bhibhūyata iti. (p. 124, 11.8-10.)
103. See YBh. I. 51.......nirodha-jaḥ saṃskāraḥ saṃādhi-jān saṃskārān badhata iti. (p. 55, 1.3f)
104. See YS. I. 51.......tasyâpi nirodhe sarva-nirodhān nirbījaḥ samādhiḥ.
105. See AKbh. VIII. 23......punaḥ sarva-samādhīn saṃkalayytrayaḥ samādhayaḥ uktāḥ sūtre. Savitarkaḥ savicāraḥ samādhiḥ. avitarko vicāramātraḥ. avitarko'vicāra iti. (P. ed. p. 448, 1. 18-p. 449, 1. 1 ; S. ed. p 1163, 11. 4-6.)

The other sets mentioned in AKbh are 1) *śūnyatā*, 2) *ānimitta*. 3) *aparinihita* (kā. VIII. 24, 25a); and 1) *śūnyatâ-śūnyatā*, 2) *aparinihitâparinihita*, 3) *ānimittânimitta* (kā VIII. 25b-27a.) See S. Chaudhury, *Analytical Study*, p. 216f.

106. The first one is in the first *dhyāna*, the second one is in the middle stage between the first and the second *dhyāna*, and the third one is in the second *dhyāna* and upper than that. See AKbh. VIII. 23; S. Chaudhury, op. cit.

107. N. Dutt mentions some of them (*Early Monastic Buddhism*, p. 160f.)

108. N. Dutt, *Early Monastic Buddhism*, p. 195.

109. AKbh. III. 1. (P. ed. p. 111; S. ed. pp. 379-381.) In details see S. Chaudhury, *Analytical Study*, pp. 121-126; N. Dutt, op. cit.

110. AKbh. III.2. (P. ed. p. 111; S. ed. p. 381 f.) In the first *dhyāna*, there are 1) *brahma kāyika*, 2) *brahma-prohita* and 3) *mahā-branaman*. In the second *dhyāna*, there are 4) *parittābha*, 5) *apramānabha* and 6) *ābhāsvara*. In the third *dhyāna* there are 7) *paritta-śubha*, 8) *apramāna-śubha* and 9) *śubha-kṛṣṇa*. In the fourth *dhyāna* there are 10) *anabhraka*, 11) *punya-prasava*, 12) *bṛhat-phala*, 13) *avṛha*, 14) *atāpa*, 15) *sudṛśa*, 16) *sudarśana* and 17) *akaniṣṭha*, In details see S. Chaudhury, ibid. p. 127; N. Dutt, ibid. p. 195f.

111. AKbh. III. 3ab.......upapatti-bhedena catur-vidha ārūpyadhātuḥ. yad uta ākāśânantyâyatanaṃvi jñānânantyâyatanaṃ ākiñcanyayatanaṃ naivasaṃjñānâsaṃjñānâyatanaṃ iti.(P. ed. p. 112; S.ed. p. 383.) See S. Chaudhury, ibid. p. 128; N. Dutt, ibid. p. 196f.

112. See AKkā. VIII. 2cd.......tat ārūpyāḥ catuḥskandhāḥ adhobhūmi vivekajaḥ; and VIII. 4........ākāśânantya-vijñānânantyâkiñcanya-saṃjñakāḥ; tathā-prayogāt māndyāt tu nasaṃjñānâpy asaṃjñakaḥ.

113 See AKbh. VIII. 5ab ....ity etāny aṣṭau maulāni samāpattidravyāṇi yad uta catvāri dhyānāni catvāra ārūpyā iti.' (P. ed. p. 436; S. ed. p. 1139.)

114. See AKkā II. 43a.......nirodhakhyā tathaivêyam. Bhāṣya on it......yathaivâsaṃjñi-samāpattiḥ. tathāśabdena kaḥ prakāro gṛhyate. "nirodhaś citta-caittānām" iti. (P. ed. p. 70, 11. 1-2; S. ed. p. 236, 11. 6-8).

115. See AKkā. II. 43b.......vihārârtham. Bhāṣya on it......śānta-vihāra-saṃjñā-pūrvikeṇa manasi-kāreṇa enāṃ samāpadyante. tāṃ tu niḥsaraṇa-saṃjñāpūrvikeṇa. (P. ed. p. 70, 11. 4-5; S. ed. p. 236, 11. 9.11.)

116 See AKbh. II. 43b.......sākhalv api catur-dhyāna-bhūmikā. bhavâgra-jā. (kā. II. 43b.)

naivasaṃjñānâsaṃjñâyatana-bhūmikaiva. (P. ed. p. 70, 11. 5-8 ; S. ed. p. 236, 11. 11-13.)

117. See AKkā. II. 43d.......āryasya.

Bhāṣya on it ...na hi pṛthag-janā nirodha-samāpattim utpādayituṃ śaknuvanty ucceda-bh rutvād ārya-mārga-balena c^otpādanād dṛṣṭa-dharma-nirvāṇasya tad-adhimuktitaḥ. āryasyâpi cêyaṃ vairāgya-lābhyā. (P. ed. p. 70, 11. 15-17 ; S ed. p. 237, 1. 8-238, 1. 1.)

118. Prasaṃkhyāne'py akusīdasya sarvathā viveka-khyāter dharma-meghaḥ samādhiḥ......YS. IV. 29.

YBh IV. 29......yadâyaṃ brāhmaṇaḥ prasaṃkhyāne 'py aksīdas tato 'pi na kiṃcit prārthayate. tatrâpi viraktasya sarvathā viveka-khyātir eva bhavatiti saṃskāra-bīja-kṣayān nâsya pratyayântarāṇy utpadyante. tadâsya dharma-megho nāma samādhir bhavati. (p. 211, 11. 6-9.)

119. kleśānāṃ yā vṛttayaḥ sthūlās tāḥ kriyā-yogena tanūkṛtāḥ satyaḥ prasaṃkhyānena dhyānena hātavyā yāvat sūkṣmīkṛtā tāvad dagdha-bīja-kalpā iti.......YBh. II. 11. (p. 66. 1.9- p. 67, 1.1.)

120. Samādhi-bhâvanārthaḥ kleśa tanūkaraṇârthaś ca.......YS. II. 2.

121. pratanūkṛtān kleśān prasaṃkhyānâgninā dagdha-bija-kalpān aprasava-dharmiṇaḥ kariṣyatiti. ......YBh. II. 2. (p. 58, 11.5.7.)

122. This idea is found also in the phrases ; prasaṃkhyānavato dagdha-kleśa-bījasya....YBh. II. 4. (p. 60, 1. 1f.) ; tathā kleśâvanaddhaañ karmâśayo vipāka-prarohī bhavati nâpanītakleśo na prasaṃ-khyāna-dagdha-kleśa-bīja bhāvo vêti.......YBh. III. 13. (p. 61, 11. 1-3

123. See YBh. II. 2.......teṣāṃ tanūkaraṇāt punah kleśair aparāmṛṣtā sattva-puruṣânyatāmātra-khyātih sūkṣma samāptaadhikāra prati-prasavāya kalpisyata iti. (p. 58, 1. 7f.)

124. See YBh. IV. 29.......yadhayaṃ brāhmanaḥ prasaṃkhyāme 'py akusīdas tato'pi na kiṃcit prārthayate. tat râpi viraktasya sarvathā viveka-khyātir cva bhavatīti. (p. 211, 1. 6f.)

125. tatah kleśa-karma-nivṛttiḥ.......YS. IV. 30.

126. tadā sarvâvaraṇa-malâpetasya jñānasya anantyāj jñeyam alpam.......YS. IV. 31.

127. See YS. III. 49.......sattva-puruṣânyatā-khyātimātrasya sarva-bhāvâdhiṣṭhātṛtvaṃ sarva jñātṛtvaṃ ca.

Bhāṣya on it says that in this stage the yogin gets *para vaśīkāra-saṃjñā* and *vaśika*.

128. See YBh. I. 2.......tat paraṃ prasaṃkhyānam ity ācakṣate dhyāyinaḥ. (p. 6, 1.2.)

129. tataḥ kṛtarthānāṃ pariṇāma-krama-samāptir guṇānām.......YS. IV.32.

130. See YS. IV.34.......puruṣārtha-śūnyānāṃ guṇānām pratipra-savaḥ kaivalyaṃ svarūpa-pratiṣṭhā vā cici-śaktir iti.

Dharma-megha-samādhi is also known to Buddhists. This is the tenth, highest stage of the training of the *bodhi-sattva*. The term is found in the *Daśa-bhūmika-sūtra*. But we can hardly find the inter-relationship between the Yoga school and the Mahāyāna Buddhism.

About *dharma-megha*, see N. Dutt, *Mahāyāna Buddhism*, pp. 134-136; about the *Daśa-bhūmika-sutra*, see R. Kimura, *A Historical Study*......pp. 134-138.

CONCLUSION

A comparative study of mind from the Yogic and the Buddhist points of view as attempted in this disquisition may humbly claim more or less as an unexplored field. Scholars have been surprisingly baffled often by the similarity of expressions and ideas between the texts of Yoga philosophy and those of Buddhism. Some approaches, however, have been made to that end and special reference may be made to the following texts.

The Yoga System of Patañjali, by J. H. Woods.

The Central Conception of Buddhism, by Th. Stcherbatsky.

Yoga Philosophy, by S. N. Dasgupta.

Many factors which played an important role to form the whole concept of the Yoga philosophy have been pointed out as similar to those of the Buddhist concepts. It could not be ascertained in the absence of proper records whether who of the two was the borrower. It is well-known that historical records of the ancient Indian philosophical texts have not been scientifically maintained.

In this disquisition, the Buddhist concepts in the Yoga philosophy have been searchlighted on in the context as to how the Yoga philosophy constructed its system of thought of the mind.

In the first chapter, the fundamental theory of ontology of the Yoga philosophy has been treated, because when we discuss the analysis of mind we have to refer to its ontology very often, Moreover, unless we do not know the basic idea of its ontology, we can not go into depth or in detail of the philosophy. The *parināma* theory has been noticed from the aspect to interpret the phenomenal world.

In the second chapter, the *pariṇāma* theory has been focused again in the respect of inter-relationship between the Buddhist and the Sāṁkhya (Yoga) school. We have treated argument between Vyāsa, and Vasubandhu. It has become evident that Vyāsa, in his commentary on the *Yoga-*

sūtra, made use of the thoughts of the *Sarvâsti-vāda* for elaborating on the theory of the *dharma-pariṇāma.*

In the third chapter, the theory of *citta* (mind) has been discussed from various aspects. Classifications of the *citta* and ideas of the function of *citta* have been found to be similar both in the Buddhism and the Yoga philosophy. Some ideas of the Yoga philosophy might have been constructed under the influence of the Buddhism.

In the fourth chapter, the theory of *citta* has been discussed through the epistemological aspects. We have observed that Vyāsa tries to prove the reality of the external objects and to refute the idealistic Buddhism. We have also discussed about perception by degree from the ordinary state of the mind to that of the most trained mind. The theory of special perception in the state of concentration of the Yoga philosophy can be well understood through the concept of perception of the Buddhist state of concentration.

In the last, the fifth chapter, we have observed the state of the mind in the light of *samādhi*. The *Abhidharma* thinkers have acknowledged that the various kinds of the way of *samādhi* are preserved in the *Āgama* literature and they have tried to conform the different traditions of *samādhi* to their own system of thought. In like manner, it may be possible that Patañjali and Vyāsa, by taking some ideas of *samādhi* from the Buddhist source, have utilized them for elaborating the Yoga system of thought.

Through our observation in this disquisition, we may conclusively say that Vyāsa utilized some Buddhist ideas especially stored in the *Abhidharma-kośa* to elaborate the Yoga philosophy. But the lender-borrower relations on those ideas have been left undiscussed. Space not permitting, we have no opportunity of discussing the concepts like *saṃskāra, vāsanā, karma, āśaya* etc. on a comparative basis in both the schools. They are left for the future researchers in the field.

APPENDIX—I

Pariṇāma-Vāda

1. Characteristics and History.

The origin and development of the Sāṃkhya thought have been a big problem in the history of Indian philosophy. Scholars have tried to search for the origin and to trace its historical development.[1] This attempt has been made mainly in finding the germs or the original feature of the thought in the Brahmanical texts in the light of full-fledged Sāṃkhya thought, i.e., that of Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* as well as Patañjali's *Yoga-sūtra* and Vyāsa's commentary on it. In this paper, we call the former 'Sāṃkhya philosophy' or 'classical Sāṃkhya' and the latter 'Yoga philosophy' or 'classical Yoga' on account of distinguishing them from their original and early feature

The classical Sāṃkhya thought has the following fundamental characteristics diverse from the other Indian thought :

1) It challenges against the authority of Vedic creed as does not mean the final emancipation or renunciation

2) Denying the supreme Being, it holds dualism, i.e., one side the spritual principle (puruṣa) and the other side the material principle (prakṛti).

3) It holds that the phenomenal world, either material or physical, is developed from the material principle (pariṇāma).

4) It is of opinion that the effect is real, not entirely new production and always exists in its cause as a latent form even before its production (sat-kārya).

Nobody says that those fundamentals of the Sāṃkhya thought was formulated at a sudden, at one age by one philosopher. There had been long history until full-fledged tenet

was established as we call Systematic Sāṃkhya, both the classical Sāṃkhya and Yoga into one.

It is convenient to grade its historical development as four stages, namely :

1) *Original* āṃ*khya* in which all the prototype of the fundamental thought can be traced and the source of which is the so-called oldest *Upaniṣads* of the pre-Buddhistic.

2) *Early Sāṃkhya* in which the dualism occupied its inflexible position and the theory of *tṛguṇa* was introduced to signify the characters of the mental and physical existence, and the source of which is the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, *Maitrī Upaniṣad* and the *Mahābhārata*[2] ; from 4 C. BC. to 1C. BC., mainly in the Maurya dynasty.

3) *Systematic Sāṃkhya* in which the *tanmātra* obtained its own position in the series of development of the twenty-four principles (tattva) and all the four above said fundamental thoughts were formulated, was the yield during five centuries AD. ; as may be called the age of formation of the classical schools of Indian philosophy, from 1C. AD. to 3C. AD,, mainly in the age of Kuṣāṇa dynasty, and then from 4C. AD. to 5C. AD. as the age of accomplishment of the classical schools, mainly in the age of Gupta dynasty.

The sources are the *Carakasaṃhitā*, the *Buddhacarita* (2C), the *Mahāvibhāṣā* (2C), ` āgārjuna (3C) 's the *Dvādaśa-mukha Sāstra* : Āryadeva (3C)'s the *Akṣaśataka* Śāstra, the *Śataka* Śāstra and the *Catuḥ-śataka Śāstra* and Vasubandhu (4C) 's the *Abhidharma-kośa*, etc.

We may presume the archaic Sāṃkhya in the Vedic age before the original Sāṃkhya. In a hymn of the Ṛg-*veda*, I.10.121, the first existent, being is called *Prajā-pati*, facing the chaos of waters. He impregnates the waters and manifests in them in the form of a golden egg or germ (hiraṇya-garbha), from which the whole universe develops. He is called the one life or soul of the gods (devānām asuḥ)[3].

It is quite possible that the Sāṃkhya system was a development from the idea suggested in this hymn.[4] Though the idea is found to be the origin of the Sāṃkhya thought, we can not regard this as the very direct origin of it. Yet, the direct origin is clearly traced in the oldest *Upaniṣads.*

In this paper, we draw a sketch out the development of the fundamental Sāṃkhya thoughts excepting the first one of the above said four as it has less importance of philosophycal discussion, then we describe in detail the development of the *parināma* theory.

2. Dualism :

The dualistic idea started primitively with the notion of the male and female principles. In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, I. 4. 3, it is stated that the *Ātman* divided himself into two parts, from the two as husband and wife human beings were produced[5].

The two, being products from the *Ātman*, are not separate ones. Therefore the theory is not the genuine dualism. But this theory may be regarded as the shoot of dualism. Thus, some dual opposit characters are seen in the monistic speculations ; such as, in the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, I. 9, 12, the enjoyer (bhoktr), i.e., *ātman* and the objects of enjoyment (bhogya), i.e., *prakṛti*, the both being supported by the supreme *Brahman.* In the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, I. 3. 4, the *ātman* being associated with the body, the senses and the mind is called the enjoyer'. And in the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, IV. 5, we read the following passage :

'The one unborn (female), red, white and black, who produces manifold offspring similar in form (to herself), there lies the one unborn (male) delighting. Another unborn gives her up, having had his enjoyment."[6]

It speaks of the one unborn (ajā), i.e., she-goat which signifies the *prakṛti.* Among the two male unborns i.e., he-goats, the first one is he who is ignorant and therefore subject to the influence of *prakṛti.* The second one is he who has overcome his ignorance and he is therefore free from bondage to *prakṛti*[7].

Though in the same tendency of speculation, the *Maitrī Upaniṣad,* VI. 10 shows more elaboration on the theory of dualism, thus:

'The conscious person (puruṣa) abides within nature (pradhāna). He is the enjoyer (bhoktṛ) for he enjoys (feeds on) the food (supplied by) of nature. This elemental self (bhūtātman), verily, is food for him, its maker (kartṛ) is nature...... Therefore the person is the enjoyer, nature is what to be enjoyed. Abiding in it, he enjoys......'[8]

The *Mahābhārata* still keeps the idea of threefold of the supreme soul. The 24 categories of Sāṃkhya, including *avyakta,* constitute the physicomental conglomeration known as the *kṣetra* (field). The 25th category the individual witnessing the self, is the *kṣetra-jña.* Here the distinction of spirit as inactive and nature as active is recognised, but this duality is transcended in the final state of release when the *kṣetra-*jña becomes emancipated from the clutches of the *guṇas* by his becoming one with the absolutely supreme spirit (puruṣottama) or the 26th principle, which is the final support of all.[9]

With regard to the terminology and phraseology, although the literatures of early Sāṃkhya are so much saturated with the Sāṃkhya idea and appear to be the *Upaniṣads* of the Sāṃkhya school, yet the main speculation is laid on the direction of monism or absolutism and not on the direction of rigid dualism or pluralism.[10] So is the case of the *Mahābhārata.*

But there also is much improved speculation of the

Sāṃkhya thought in the *Mahābhārata*, pure dualism being distinguished from that which admits the 26th principle, *brahman* or *purusottama*, beyond the *prakṛti* or the bhūtâtman. It is stated that there are only two : that which is *puruṣa* and that which is not *puruṣa*[11]. Then the atheistic teaching is naturally set forth. This trend proceeds to the Sāṃkhya of Pañcaśikha and that of the *Caraka-saṃhitā*[12].

Now we proceed to the Systematic Sāṃkhya. The twelfth chapter, namely *Arāḍa-darśana*, of Aśvaghoṣa's *Buddha-carita* seems to show a further development of the dualistic Sāṃkhya. Here it is evident that the two principles, *kṣetra* and *kṣetra-jña*, are explicitly recognised as matter and individual spirit,[13] deleting the concept of the absolute Being.

The dualism with support of the absolute Being as is the 26th principle lasted till later ages. Haribadra noticed that.[14] But in the Buddhist literatures at the age of the Systematic Sāṃkhya, as far as I know, there is no information about such monistic dualism of Sāṃkhya.

3. Pariṇāma :

The *pariṇāma* theory of Sāṃkhya consists of the mental and physical phases. The principles (tattva) of the mental side are *buddhi*, *ahaṃkāra*, *manas* and five *buddhīndriyas*, while the principles of the physical side are five *tanmātras*, five *bhūtas* and five *karmêndriyas*. The spiritual principle (puruṣa) tinges the integrated body with consciousness.

The original scheme of the Sāṃkhya *parināma* may be rooted in the theory of *pañca-kośa* of the *Taittrīya Upaniṣad*, which states that the creation starts from the universal consciousness (ātman). From it first arises ether (ākāśa). From this etheric state successively arise grosser elements of air (vāyu), fire (agni), water (āp) and earth (pṛthivī). These five elements are the **person (puruṣa) or the ego (jīvâtman)**

which consists of food (anna-rasa). (II. 1). Secondly, different from and within that which consists of the essence of food is the self that consists of life (prāṇa). (II. 2.). Thirdly, the self consists of mind (namas) (II.3), then the self consists of understanding (vijñāna) (II.4), Fifthly the self consists of bliss (ānanda). (II.5).[15]

This *pañca-kośa* theory is a combination of both the material world and the individual originated from *Brahman.* This looks to have no relation with the Sāṃkhya thought. But when we examine the way of thinking of the creation, we may notice the parallel idea, thus :[16]

Pañca-kośa	Sāṃkhya	
1. annarasa maya	bhūta, tanmātra	Prakṛti
2 prāṇa-maya	indriya	
3. mano-maya	manas	
4. vijñāna-maya	buddhi, ahaṃkāra	
5. ānanda-maya	puruṣa	

Then the theory of *pariṇāma* is referred to among the sources in the age of the early Sāṃkhya, but as we observe later the theory connects only with view point of the development of principles. It is emphasized that the world is created from the material principle in such series as to numerating *avyakta*, *mahat* or *buddhi* and so on.

Only in the ages of the systematic Sāṃkhya the phenomenal change became one of the most important problems. We shall observe, later, the view of the creation of the world and that of the change of the phenomenal world.

4. Sat-kārya-vāda :

This is the theory that the effect really exists beforehand in its cause. Scholars felt that the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, VI. 2.1-4 gives a hint or rather a clear exposition of the theory.[17] It is stated that : In the beginning this was Being

alone, one only without second. By Its power of thought, it sent forth fire, water then food.[18]

But this teaching is still vague about what particular effect exists in what particular cause. The vivid idea of *sat-kārya* was recognised later in the age of the Systematic Sāṃkhya. It is stated by Vasubandhu that the view of Vārṣagaṇya is this :

"yad asty asty eva tat, yan nâsti nâsty eva tat.

asato nâsti saṃbhavaḥ, sato nâsti vināśaḥ."[19]

This doctrine seems to overwhelmly gain the representative position among the Sāṃkhya schools before and then the time of Vasubandhu since the time of *Mahāvibhāṣā* (2C).[20]

The theory of *sat-kārya* is discussed always with connection to the theory of *parināma.* We shall proceed to the topic of historical view of the theory of *pariṇāma.*

5. **Pariṇāma-vāda :**

The theory of *pariṇāma* in the sense of Sāṃkhya terminology is referred to in the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, I. 3.10-11 :

> "Beyond the senses are the objects (of the senses) and beyond the objects is the mind ; beyond the mind is the understanding and beyond the understanding is the great self."
>
> "Beyond the great self is the unmanifested ; beyond the unmanifested is the spirit. Beyond the spirit there is nothing. That is the end (of the journey) ; that is the final goal"[21].

The same doctorine with some modification is again repeated in the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, II.3.7-8.[22] The series of evolution is tabulate like this :

(I. 3. 10-11)	(II. 3. 7-8)
puruṣa	puruṣa (vyāpaka, aliṅga)
|	|
avyakta	avyakta
|	|
mahā ātman	mahā ātman
|	|
buddhi	sattva
|	|
manas	manas
|	|
artha	indriya
|	
indriya	

The account in the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* is different from the Classical Sāṃkhya in many respects ; there is no mention of *ahaṃkāra.* While the Sāṃkhya identifies *buddhi* and *mahat*, this *Upaniṣad* distinguishes them. The *puruṣa* of the dualistic Sāṃkhya is not beyond the *avyakta* or *prakṛti* but is a co-ordinate principle.[23] Though there are differences, it is noticed that an effort is made here for the first time to distinguish the spiritual principle, *puruṣa,* from the physical body which is a peculiar feature of the Sāṃkhya.[24]

Much more developed account of the Sāṃkhya thought relating to the evolution is to be found in the *Svetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, I. 4 and 5,[25] in which the world is compared to a rotating wheel and a flowing stream. Adopted the interpretation from the Sāṃkhya, we have the complete coincidence as followings :

(I. 4)	(Sāṃkhya)[26]
wheel :	world
with one felly :	*prakṛti*
with three tires :	three *guṇas*

with sixteen ends :	sixteen *vikāras*
with fifty spokes :	fifty psychic states of the *buddhi*
with twenty counter-spokes :	ten *indriyas* and their functions
six sets of eight :	1) eight-fold of *prakṛti* 2) eight modifications of the *buddhi* 3) eight perfections 4) eight-fold *daiva-sarga* 5) eight-fold *tamas* 6) eight fold *moha*
whose one rope is manifold :	*prakṛti*'s evolution
which has three different paths :	three kinds of emancipation as *dharma*, *adharma* and Jñāna
whose one delusion (arises) from two causes :	identity of the *buddhi* and the *puruṣa* which brings forth delusion
(I.5)	
a river :	*avidyā*
of five streams :	the five object of the sense
from five sources :	five *karma-yonis*
five vital breaths :	five *vāyus*
five-fold perception :	five *buddhīndriyas*
five wheelpools :	five *dosas* or five *indriyas*
five pains :	five-fold *kleśas*
fifty kinds :	fifty psychic states of the *buddhi*
five branches :	five-fold *avidyā*

Thus, the early Sāṃkhya thought reached almost its well developed stage, which was known as a philosophycal school not later than the time when Pañcaśikha[27] expounded his teachings.

In the *Maitrī Upaniṣad*, III. 2, first time, the term *tanmātra* was introduced :

> "The five subtle elements (tanmātra) are called by the name element (bhūta). Likewise the five gross elements (mahābhūta) are called by the name element. Now the combination (amudaya) of these is called body. Now he, indeed, who is said to be in the body is called the elemental self (bhūtâtman). Now its immortal self (amṛta ātman) is like a drop of water on the lotus leaf. This (elemental self), verily, is effected by nature (prakṛti)'s quality (guṇa)."[28]

Here the five *tanmātras*, likewise the five *mahābhūtas*, are called *bhūta* which consists of the body. But still the *tanmātra*'s position in the series of evolution is not explicit. The five *tanmātras* occupied their proper position in the series of evolution only at the time of the Systematic Sāṃkhya.[29] Nāgārjuna (3C.AD.) in his *Mahā-prajñāpāra-mitā Śāstra* exposes the series of evolution, which is tabulated thus.[30]

prakṛti
|
buddhi
|
ahaṃkāra
|
five tanmātras
|
five mahābhūtas
|
eleven indriyas

The *Dvādaśa-mukha Śāstra* is a small treatise to examine the twelve subjects. The author, Nāgārjuna, examines the

sat-kārya in the second chapter of the treatise. His purpose is to refute the opponent theories but not to axplain the theories. Therefore, there is a certain limit in that which Nāgārjuna speaks of the Sāṃkhya. But it is to be noticed that he quotes some theories of *sat-kārya* and among them two are important with regard to relation to the argument between the Buddhist and the Sāṃkhya.

Firstly it is quoted that "the effect, though it exists previously cannot be perceived because it exists in an unmanifested form."[31]

Secondly, "the effect, subtle at the time of non-production, is transformed into gross, and hence it is perceived."[32]

These two are found to be the same ideas as the *pariṇāma*-vāda and the *tirobhāvâvirbhāva-vāda* in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, and the *hetu-phala-sadbhāvavāda* and the *abhivyakti-vāda* in the *Yogacāra-bhūmi.*[33]

Thus, Nāgārjuna knew the theory of *sat-kārva*, which Buddhists had been tried to refute till Buddhism declined in India.

Another importance of the *Maitrī Upaniṣad* is that it mentions for the first time the specific names of the *tṛ-guṇa* ; *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas.*[34] It is told in the *Maitrī* Upaniṣad, V. 2 that in the beginning there was *tamas*, and it further is stated how from *tamas* came out *rajas* and from *rajas* came out *sattva* and from *sattva* the essence (rasa) flowed forth. The knower of the body (kṣetrajña, is called the intelligence-principle, which has the marks (liṅga) of conception (saṃkalpa), determination (adhyavasāya) and self-love (abhimāna).[35]

The *Maitrī Upaniṣad*, III. 5, numerates the different kinds of mental qualities in the light of *tamas* and *rajas.*[36] Again in this *Upaniṣad*, VI. 10, it is recognised that the *tṛguṇa* plays as a factor in the material evolution, starting thus :

"All that begins with the intellect (mahat) and ends with the elements (viśeṣa), being a transformation of the distinction of nature with its three qualities (tṛguṇa-bheda-pariṇāmatva), is the sign (liṅga). And by this, the fourteen course is explained."[37]


According to the Sāṃkhya investigation in this book, the 'fourteen' is explained to be intellect (buddhi) and determination (adhyavasāya) as the function of *mahat*, self-love (abhimāna) as the function of *ahaṃkāra*, conception (saṃkalpa) as the function of *manas* ; and the five organs of action (indriya-karma) and the five organs of sense-perception (prāṇa-karma).[38]

In this *Upaniṣad*, the three *guṇas* are found to be the factor both in the mental and material development from the original Nature. It is to be much noticed that the phrase, *tṛguṇa bheda-pariṇāmatva*, is the linking conception of the Early Sāṃkhya to the Systematic Sāṃkhya. Object of this phrase is 'to bring the multifariousness of the world under a single principle, a matter with which early Sāṃkhya, devoting all its attention to the analysis of the individual, was little concerned. The epic does not use the word *pariṇāma*, which belongs to a late stage of philosophical development and need not have originated in the Sāṃkhya school at all.[39]

Next, the Sāṃkhya thought in the *Mahābhārata* is mainly the extension of the Sāṃkhya in the *Upaniṣads*. But the more developed feature is that there found the well arranged numeration of categories. Though there are many different arrangement, it is the more close to the Systematic Sāṃkhya that 'the twenty four constituents of Sāṃkhya, i.e., the *prakṛti* and its twenty-three evolutes are divided into two groups of (1) eight primary constituents and (2) sixteen modifications. The former which is called

the eight-fold *prakṛti* constitutes of the *prakṛti*, *mahat*, *ahaṃkāra* and the five gross elements ; the latter being the ten organs, mind and the five objects of the senses.'[40]

If the five objects of the senses were replaced by the *tanmātras*, the categories are completed like as in the Classical Sāṃkhya. Then we have the representative numeration of categories in the *Mahābhārata*, XII. 306.27-29,[41] tabulated thus :



Among the literatures supposed to be contemporary with the Classical Sāṃkhya and the Classical Yoga, we may take up the Chinese Translation of the *Catuhśataka Śāstra* of Āryadeva (3C.) and Dharmapāla (530-561)'s commentary[42] on it. But it is also difficult to reconstruct the then living Sāṃkhya from above said source, because that is written on account of refuting the other opponent ideas which are not fully explained by the author and the commentator. Though, we can understand the points which were the important topics for refuting, and which were supposed to be held by the Buddhists as the theory of Sāṃkhya.

The fundamental theory of Sāṃkhya *pariṇāma* is stated, thus :

"The *prakṛti* or the *pradhāna* consists of three : *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. The nature of *sattva* is brightness, that

of *rajas* is movement and that of *tamas* is darkness. These three, as being the enjoyed (bhogya), variously appear and act on account of the *puruṣa*. The *puruṣa* has consciousness as its nature. The movement of the nature of *rajas*, when it is enjoyed by the consciousness, drives the *sattva* and the *tamas* to evolve various effects. The three in union evolve into *mahat* and the forth being one thing. That is called *pariṇāma*. Like as, the sea is one but when it is blown by the wind it evolves various waves"[43].

Here it is remarkable that the *pradhāna* is clearly characterised as the *prakṛti-vikṛti* of the term of the Classical Sāṃkhya, and that the three *guṇas* are the constituents of the *prakṛti* or the *pradhāna*.

And it is stated that:

> "It is taught the distinctive elevation that the effects, *mahat* and the forth, are evolved and changed (pariṇāma and vikāra) from the One (prakṛti) when one thing appears. The effects, *mahat* and the forth are *anitya* because they are changeable, while the nature of the One is *nitya* because it is unchangeable"[44].

In this context, it is also stated that the *prakṛti* is eternal its latent state (tirobhāva) is eternal, while its manifested state (āvirvhāva) appears and disappears.[45]

The evolution of phenomena from the material cause, *prakṛti*, is called *pariṇāma*, in which the phenomenal change is included. We have noticed the same tilt that the phenomenal change is explained by the theory of appear and disappear.[46] This theory seems to be fully developed at the age of the Systematic Sāṃkhya and is stored in the Buddhist literatures, or we may say that, only at that age, the phenomenal change of the world and the individual mental states were observed attentively, and the theory of appear and disappear was employed to explain it. This is the last stage of the development of the *pariṇāma* theory. Such theory has been discussed fully.

NOTE

1. In all the books that treat the history of Indian philosophy, the historical development of the Sāṃkhya thought is somehow described, such as, S. Ṛadhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy* vol. 2, pp. 249-258 ; S. N. Dasgupta, *History of Indian Philosophy* vol. 1, pp. 211-222, etc.

2. As to the age of the present volume of the *Mahābhārata*. M. Winternitz, *A history of Indian Literatute* vol. 1, p. 454 : "Between the 4th century B. C. and the 4th century A. D., the transformation of the epic Mahābhārata int› our present collected work has taken place——probably gradually."

3. S. Radhakrishnan, *the Principal Upaniṣads*, introduction, p. 37f.

4. Op. cit., p. 38, fn. 1.

5. See Anima Sen Gupta, *The Evolution of thr Sāṃkhya School of Thought*, p. 53.

6. Tr. S. Radhakrishnan, ibid., p. 732.

7. S. Radhakrishnan, ibid., p. 733. Also see P. Chakravarti, *Origin and Development of the Sāṃkhya System of Thought*, pp. 24-26

8. Tr. S. Radhakrishnan, ibid., p. 824.

9, Anima Sen Gupta, ibid., 70-74

10. See P. Chakravarti, ibid., p. 25 and Anima Sen Gupta, ibid., p. 53.

11. T. Kimura. *Indo Roppa Tetsugaku* (Six Schools of Indian Philosophy), p. 110 : Mbh. XII. 305. 25.

12. The atheistic account of pre-classical Sāmkhya is pointed out by Anima Sen Gupta, ibid., pp. 77-80, 118-119 and 137-140.

13. Anima Sen Gupta, ibid., p. 120f. She further points that "An important feature of Arāḍa's teachings detailed in the canto XII of this book, is the omission of the three *guṇas*, which play such an important role in the Classical Sāṃkhya" (p. 122). But this statement is not correct. For when Gotama Siddhârta critisizes the teaching of Arāḍa, in XII. 77 and 78, the *ātman* is regarded as *nirguna* and the terms, *guṇa* and *guṇin* are used.

14. See P. Chakravarti's account on Haribadra. "Haribadra also in his *Saddarśana-samuccaya* speaks of a school of Sāṃkhya which admits īśvara, but the function of this īśvara is not distinctly stated by him anywhere." (ibid.. p. 29).

15. See S. Radhakrishnan, ibid., pp. 541-547, introduction, p. 56f.

16. Vide T. Kimura, ibid., pp. 96-98.

17. See P. Chakravarti, ibid., p. I2 ; Anima Sen gupta, ibid., p. 66 ; S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*. vol. 2, p. 257 ; S. N. Dasgupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 1, p. 557.

18. S. Radhakrishnan, *the Principal Upanisads*. pp. 447-449.

19. English translation is : what exists is always exclusively existent, what does not exist is not always existent. A non-entity can never come into existence and an entity can never be annihiliated.

20. E. H. Johnston, *Early Sāṃkhya*. pp. 66-67, speaks that "The principle so enunciated, which need not go back to Vārṣagaṇya himself according to the actual wording of Vasuvandhu's statement, is not, it should be noted, equivalent to the *satkāryavāda* of Iśvarakṛṣṇa, a doctorine which was still unknown to Nâgarjuna, and which cannot, therefore, be held to have arisen before the third century A. D.; I would regard the Vārṣagaṇya axiom as a half-way house to the later theory."

    But Nāgārjuna knew the theory of *sat-kārya* as I show later.

21. Tr. S. Radhakrishnan, ibid., p. 625.

22. Op. cit., p. 643f. ; Aaima Sen Gupta, ibid., p. 59 ; P. Chakravarti, ibid., p. 15f.

23. S. Radhakrishnan, ibid.. p. 627.

24. P. Chakravarti, ibid., P. 17.

25. S. Radhakrishnan, ibid., pp. 711-713 :

    tam-eka-nenim trvrtaṁ ṣoḍaśāntaṁ śatārdhāraṁ viṁśati pratyarābhiḥ

    aṣṭakaiḥ ṣaḥbhiḥ viśva-rūpaika-paśaṁ tri-mārga-bhedaṁ dvinimittaika-moham. (I. 4).

    pañca-sroto'mbum pañca-yony ugra-vakrām pañca-prāṇormim pañca-buddhyādi-mūlam

    pañcā-vartām pañca-duḥkhaugha-vegām pañca-ṣaḍ-bhedām pañca-parvām adhimaḥ. (I.5).

26. This interpretation is based on P. Chakravarti, ibid., pp. 19-23.

27. Prof. H. Nakamura refers to the time of "Pañcaśikha from 150 BC. to 50 ca. BC. bases on H. Ui, Sāṃkhyayoga-ni-tsuite" (On Sāṃkhyayoga) : H. Nakamura, *Indo Sh'so shi* (History of Indian Thought), p. 139.

28. Tr. S. Radhakrishnan, ibid., p. 805.

29. P. Chakravarti, ibid., P. 42 speaks that "The Mbh. in its exposition of Sāṃkhya does not generally speak of the *tanmātras* and they occur only in I. 90. 13-14 and XIII. 14. 202 and Hopkins holds this passages to be the latter additions in the epic."
The *tanmātra* is not spoken in the *Buddha-carita.*

30. T. Kimura, ibid., p. 113.

The same exposition is spoken to by Vasu (4C) commented on Āryadeva (3C)'s.
Śataka Śāstra, thus : "Kapila and Uluka etc. speak that the *ātman* and *dharmas* exist. Kapila speaks that from *prakṛti* arises *buddhi*, from *buddhi* arises *ahamkāra*, from *ahamkāra* arises five *tanmātras*, from five *tanmātras* arises five *mahābhūtas*, from five *mahābhūtas* arises eleven *indriyas*. The *ātman* is main and eternal ; appearing to be of the shape of *buddhi*, it is eternal, not destroyed, not defeated and it experiences the *dharmas*. He who knows these twenty-five principles obtain the emancipation and he who doesn't know can not release himself from birth and death." (Taisho., vol. 30, p. 170b).

31. Taisho. val. 30, p. 160c, Tr. N. Aiyaswami sastri, "Dvādaśamukha Sastra of Nagarjuna", *the Visva-Bharati Annals*, vol. VI, 1954, p. 171

His Sanskṛt restoration (ibid., p. 191) : kāryaṃ pūrvaṃ sad apy anabhivyaktatvān na dṛśyate,

32. Taisho. Vol. 30, p. 161a. Tr. N. Aiyaswami Sastri, ibid., p. 172, His Sanskṛt restoration (ibid.. p. 193) : anutpatti-kāle (sthitaṃ) sūkṣmam utpannaṃ sad-audārikaṃ pariṇamate.

33. See my Thesis.

34. P. Chakravarti, ibid., p. 36 ; Anima Sen Gupta, ibid., p. 63.

The Historical development of the *guṇa* theory has been studies by scholars ; E. H, Johnston, ibid., pp. 24-41 ; Anima Sen Gupta, ibid., pp. 62-65, etc.

Some points of the historicals development of the *guṇa* theory. are as followings :

1) The doctorine of *tṛvṛt-karana* (fire, water and earth.) in *Bṛhad*. Up V1, 4. 4.
2) The *tṛvṛta* of the *brahmacakra* in *Śvet. Up*. 1. 4.
3) Three colours of an *ajā* in *Śvet. Up*. IV. 5 ; *Mahānārāyana Up*. IX. 2.

4) The term *guṇa* or *triguṇa* in *Śvet. Up.* I. 3 ; V. 5, 7 ; VI. 4 ; *Mait. Up*, III. 2 ; V. 10.

5) The characteristics of *guṇas* in *Mait. Up.* III. 5.

35. See S. Radhakrishnan. ibid., p. 814f.
Tamas as the first existing principle in the *Ṛg-veda* X. 129. 3 : P. Chakravarti, ibid., p. 9.

36. See S. Radhakrishnan, ibid., p. 807f.

37. Op. cit., p, 824. By Hume, the *Thirteen Principal Upanisad*, p. 431, *liṅga* means the subtle body.

38. S. Radhakrishnan, ibid., p. 824f.

39. E. H. Johnston, ibid., P. 33. And 'The Yoga school seems also, though probably at a fairly late date, to have invented the *guṇa-pariṇama* theory, by which the *guṇas* were stripped of much of their moral significance and held to be the agents which brought about the multifariousness of the universe' : op. cit. p, 87.

40. P. Chakravarti, ibid., p. 42. And see Anima Sen Gupta, ibid., p. 75.

41. T. Kimura, ibid., p. 112. He seems to use Garbe's edition of the *Mahābhārata*.
The *tanmātra* is the newest idea of the Sāṃkhya thought. See p. 16 fn. (1) of this Paper.

42. The data of Dharmapāla is mentioned in the introduction of Japanese translation from the *Taisho Tripitaka* : H. Ui, "Daiba no Shihyakuron to Kō-shihyakuron to Hyakuron" in his *Indo Tetsugaku Kenkyū* vol. 1, pp. 267-290.

The Catuhśataka of āryadeva. Reconstructed and Edited by Vidhushekhara Bhattacarya, Part II (Visva-Bharati Series, No. 2). Calcutta. 1931 encloses the commentary of Candrakīrti.
As to the choronological view. H. Ui, "Genjyo izhn no Indo Sharonji no Nendai" (Chronology of the Indian Scholars before Hiuen-Tsang) in his *Indo Tetsugaku Kenkyū* vol. V. pp. 109-161, especially on Dharmapāla, pp. 129-132.

43. Taisho, Vol. 30, p. 199b. Japanese tr. p. 209f. ; Commentary on Vol. 1 (Chap. IX of the *Catuhśataka*), verse 12.

44. Op. cit.

45. Taisho, vol. 30, p. 187b. Japanese tr. p. 199 ; Commentary on vol. 1 (Chapter IX), verse 3a.

46. See this book.

APPENDIX—II

Brief Idea of Samādhi in Buddhism

From the very beginning of Buddhist thought, the concentration (samādhi) of mind is the one of the topmost important topics for destroying the afflictions (kleśa). The historical observation on the theory of concentration is itself so big theme that needs to collect vast materials from the Buddhist canons and literatures. Difficulty is to determine which text is the older. Even in one text the old and the new are mixed up with.

Prof. H. Nakamura suggests, after considering the possible standards to fix the chronological order of the Pāli canons, as follows :

(1) The *Suttanipāta* of the *Khuddaka-Nikāya* and the *Sagāthavagga* of the *Saṃyutta-Nikāya* are before the King Aoka.

(2) The *Atthakavagga* and the *Pārāyaṇavagga* of the *Suttanipāta* convey the thought close to that of the Buddha's age.

(3) Most verses of the early Buddhist canons seem to be before the King Aśoka.

(4) Although the texts of the Pāli Five *Nikāyas* and the Four Āgamas of Chinese translation contain very old materials, most prose parts were probably written and compiled after the King Aśoka.[1]

Thus, to investigate the historical development of the practices in the early Buddhism requires another big research.

It is said generally that the first teaching of the Buddha was the Four Noble Truth, the fourth of which is the Eightfold Path, the practice leading to the final emancipation of of *nirvāna.*[2] Thence, many kinds of practice were taught and performed as recorded in the canons.

Here, we shall be satisfied only with observing the position and the role of *samādhi* among the thirty-seven acquisitions, formulated into seven groups, for leading to the attainment of Perfect Knowledge (bodhi-pakkhiya dhamma ; bodhi-pakṣika dharma).[3]

The seven groups are as follows :

1) Four *Satipatthānas* (Skt. Smṛti-upasthāna) or the speculation on the body (kāya), the feeling (vedanā), the mind (citta) and the facts (dhamma) as they are non-eternal, un-happy and non-ego.[4]

2) Four *Sammappadhānas* (Skt. Samyak-prahāṇa) or the right efforts. These are the right exertions to eradicate demerits, to collect merit and to preserve and increase merits, the same as those of *sammāvāyāma* of the Eight-fold Path.[5]

3) Four *Iddhipādas* (Skt. Ṛddhi-pāda) or the attainment of supernormal powers through meditations, for which are required strong desire, energy, mental application and discrimination (chandana, viriya, citta and mīmāṃsā,[6]

4) Five *Indriyas* or the dominant faculty of faith (saddhā), energy (viriya), memory (sati), concentration (samādhi) and intellect (Paññā). This *samādhi* is the same practice of the four *Jhānas* [7]

5) Five *Balas* or the internal strength. The five terms, faith etc. constituting the *Balas* are the same as in the case of the *indriyas*. The main difference between *indriya* (faculty) and *bala* is that the former is actively operating while the latter is the result of the activity of the dominant faculty and steady strength.[8]

6) Seven *Sambojjhaṅgas* (Skt. Sambody-aṅga) or the acquisitions leading to full enlightenment is arranged in such a way that one is a stepping stone to the next and may well be compared to the rise of a meditation from the

first to the forth meditation. They are *sati*, *dhammavicaya*, *viriya*, *pīti*, *passaddhi*, *samādhi* and *upekkhā* [9].

7) Eight-fold path : (i) right view (ii) right aspiration, (iii) right speech, (iv) right doing, (v) right livelihood, right effort, (vii) mindfulness and (viii) right rapture[10] are one of the most important practice of Buddhism.

Prof. H. Nakamura has an opinion that the Eight-fold path was not preached at the very beginning, because the Eight is not found in the oldest verses; but two or five items of the Eight are there.[11] Later in prose formulated the Eight. Then it is connected with the fourth of the Four Noble Truth.[12]

There became to put further two stages than the Eight : right discrimination (sammāñāṇa) and right emancipation (sammā vimutti).[13]

There also taught another kind of practice. One of them is the triplet of trainings (sikkhā); Sila Samādhipad paññā which might be formulated in the age of compilation of the proses,

The triplet of trainings and the Eight.fold path began to teach with inter-relation. *Sīla* includs the third, fourth and fifth of the Eight, *samādhi* includs the sixth, seventh and eighth; and *paññā* includs the first and the second.[14]

In this exposition followed the order of the triplet of training *sīla*, *samādhi* then *paññā*, the process of the Eight-fold path results into disorder, that is, the first and the second come to the last stage. To regularize this, the tenfold path became to be inter-related with the triplet of trainings. Thus the Eight is connected with *sīla* and *samādhi*, and the ninth, right discrimination, and the tenth, right renunciation with *paññā*.[15]

Later this triplet of trainings became the main way of

discipline as we see that th Visuddhimagga was composed according to the exposition of the triplet of trainings.

The above said Buddhist ways of discipline[16] have connection more or less to *samādhi*, or some of them have *samādhi as* its limb of practice. In any case, the *samādhi* is thought to be the four meditations (jhāna, dhyāna), which does not seem to be taught at the very beginning of the Buddha's teaching.[17] But at an early date, the four meditations were regarded to be practised by the Buddha himself to get enlightened under the bodhi-tree.[18] Then the four *jhānas* are systematized into the *rūpa* adding it further the four *arūpas*, totally the eight contemplations (samāpatti).[19]

(A) Rūpa Jhāna[20]

1) The fiirst *jhāna*, in short, is composed of five parts, viz., discursive cognition, determination, joy, pleasure and one-pointedness (vitakka vicāra, pīti, sukha and cittekaggatā).

2) The second *jhāna* is characterized by the cessation of discursive thoughts and determination, the attainment of inward calmness (ajjhatta sampasādana), the derivation of pleasure and pleasant feeling through concentration of mind (samādhija pīti and Sukha), and the one-pointedness.

3) The third *jhāna* is freed from pleasure (pīti) and stays in the equanimaty (upekkhā), the inspection and full awareness (sati and sampajañña) and pleasant feeling (sukha),

4) The fourth *jhāna* is without pain and pleasure (adukkha and asukha), and full of purified inspection (sati-pārisuddhi) through the equanimaty.

There are four higher concentrations called *samāpattis*. These concentration are induced by the cogitations of the four *āruppas*.[21]

1) The first subject of meditation of the *āruppas* is unlimited space (ākāsānañcāyatana).

2) The second subject is unlimited consciousness (viññaṇānañcāyatana).

3) The third subject is nothingness (ākiñcaññāyatana).

4) The fourth subject said to be neither perception nor non-perception (n'evasaññānāsaññāyatana).

NOTES

1. H. Nakamura, *Genshibukkyo no shisō* : Ge (Genshibukkyō 4): Nakarura Hajime Senshū, vol. 14 (the Thoughts of the Primitive Buddhism, Part 2: the Collection of works of Nakamura Hajime, vol. 14), p. 397.
2. H. Ui, "Hasshodo no Gen-i oyobi sono Hensen" (Original Meaning of the Eight Noble Path and its Transition) in *Indo Tetsugaku Kenkyū* vol. 3, p. 6 : Mv. I. 6, 15 : SN. vol. 5, p. 421.
3. N. Dutt. *Early Monastic Buddhism*. pp. 246-251. As to the original description of each group, see H. Nakamura, ibid., p. 179 fn(4).
4. N. Dutt, ibid., p. 247 points DN. II, *Mahāsatipatthāna-suttanta* and MN. I, p. 45, *Satipatthānasutta*.
5. N. Dutt, ibid., p. 247,
6. Op. cit.
7. Op. cit., p. 248.
8. N. Dutt, ibid., p. 249.
9. In detail, see op. cit., pp. 249-251.
10. (i) sammādiṭṭhi, (ii) sammāsaṅkappa, (iii) sammāvācā, (iv) sammākammanta, (v) sammājīva, (vi) sammāvāyāma, (vii) sammāsati and (viii) ammāsamādhi. The English translation is by T. W. Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, II, p. 343,
11. H. Nakamura, *Genshi Bukkyō no Seikatsu-rinri* (Genshī Bukkyō 5): Nakamura Hajime Senshū, vol. 15 (the Ethics of the Primitive Buddhism : the Collection of works of Hajimi Nakamura, vol. 15), pp. 20-22.
12. Op. cit., p. 25ff. MN. (No. 141 Saccavibhaṅgasutta) vol. III. pp. 249-252. ; D. N. (No. XXII Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna-sutta, 21) vol. II. pp. 304-315 ; K. N. Paṭisaṃbhidā-magga 1, pp. 37-42.

13. Op. cit., p. 41 : MN. (No. 117 Mahācattārīsaka-sutta) vol. III, pp. 71-78.
14. See N. Dutt, ibid., pp. 142-145 and Table I. ; H. Ui, ibid, p. 36 ; MN. vol. I, I, p. 301.
15. H. Ui, ibid., pp. 33-37.
16. There is also another categorization of practice, i. i. e., the four *brahma-vihāras*. Vide. Vishwanath Prasad Varma, *Early Buddhism and its Origins*. pp. 188-192 etc.
17. H. Ui, ibid., p. 48f.
18. M. N. vol. I, pp. 17, 114, 240 ; vol. II. pp. 93,212. Some *suttas*, though telling the enlightenment, do dot expose the four meditations : MN. vol. I, p. 163 ; S. N. vol. II, pp. 10,104, 170 ; vol. III, p. 27 ; vol. IV, pp. 6, 8, 97, 233 ; vol. V, pp. 179. 263, 281 ; AN. vol. I, p. 258 ; vol. III, p. 82 ; vol. IV, pp. 302, 439 : H. Ui, op. cit.
19. Briefly vide. V. P. Varma, ibid., p. 272f.
20. *Vtsuddhimagga* pp. 139-168. Vide. N. Dutta, ibid., pp. 188-192.
21. *Visuddhimagga* pp. 326-338. Vide. N. Dutt, ibid., pp. 176-178.

APPENDIX—III

Time Theory of the Pātañjala Yoga Philosophy

1. Temporality of phenomena

The topic of this paper is how " time " is considered in the Pātañjala yoga philosophy.

Patañjali takes up the fundamental problem of temporality lying the change of *dharmin* (substance) and *dharma* (phenomena), declaring in the *yoga-sūtra* III. 14 thus :

> *Dharmin* is that which remains common to the quiescent (śānta, i. e.; past) the uprisen (udita, i. e., present) and the unpredicable (avyaprdeśya, i. e., future) *dharmas.*[1]

This sūtra teaches how the single *dharmin* obtains the three duration-times (*kāla*, as its time aspects.

Vyāsa's commentary on this *sūtra* is put in order the following three contents. First is the nature of *dharmin*. Second is the standard which divides the duaration-time into the three time-series (adhvan). Third is the direction of time-current.

Firstly, the *dharmin* has capability (yogyatā) and power (śakti), and is the essence of a number of *dharmas*. Again the *dharmin* remains common to the *dharmas*, and has generic (sāmānya) and particular (viśeṣa) forms, and is inseparably connected (anvayā) with the *dharmas.*[2] The "generic" means the past and the future *dharmas*, for they are merged into the *dharmin*. The *dharmin* is nothing but the original matter and the *dhamas* are its various manifestations as forms. The present *dharmas* are regarded as the particular. They are also not absolutely different from the original matter, *dharmin*. So the *dharmin* is inseparably connected with the *dharmas.*[3]

Secondly, the standard of division of the three time-series is the concept of operation (vyāpāra). Vyāsa refers to the "operation" as followings : Both restraint and fluctuating state of mind have three temporal phases (lakṣaṇa). That phase of time which is yet to be is known as the first period i. e., future. The second period occurs when it is manifested with its own character (svarūpa, by its operation (vyāpāra) in the present. When the state marges into the past, leaving the present without changing its essential character (dharmatva), it is in its third temporal phase as past.[4]

Here we find that the present *dharma* is characterized by its operation. This is the standard of division of the three time-series. In this connection, Vyāsa explains thus : The *dharmas* which are within a dharmin are quiescent, uprisen and unpredicable. Of these three, the quiescent is those which have done to cease their operation. The uprisen is those which are having operation. That is immediately-contiguous (samanantara) from the future time. The past is contiguous from the present.[5]

We recoginze that the three *dharmas*, viz., past, present and future, distinguished by the existence of operation, that which has been completed or that which is being done or that which is to be done. Thus the temporality of phenomena is conceived io the idea of operation.

Now a question will arise. How does the future *dharmas* come to be present ? Answering it depends on soms conditions. In fact the future *dharma* does not appear all at once, because it is connected with place, time, form and efficient cause.[6] This means that the pcwer of *dharmin* comes to be present according to the conditions which are place, and so on,

Thirdly, we observe the direction of time-current. Vyāsa maintains time-stream frcm future to present, from present to past. The basic idea of his thought is a relation of before-

and-after (pūrva-paścimatā). He explains thus : why is not the past *dharma* contiguous towards present ? Because there is no relation of before-and-after. As in the case between future and present there is the relation of before-and-after, so is not in the case between past and present. Therefore there is nothing immediately contiguous to the present.[7]

Thus we understand that the relation of before-and-after means the relationship that the time-current goes from future to present, from present to past.

From the above mentioned three contents, we can understand as followings : The power of *dharmin* remains common to the *dharmas.* The future *dharma* gaining operation under the definite conditions, comes to be present, and then leaving the present passes to the past. So the three time-series (adhvan) is divided. The dharmas change through the three time-series.

2. Concept of time

Next we shall observe the concept of time. This problem is examined with respect to the difference of *parināma* (change of phenomena). Patañjali declares in the *Yogasūtra* III. 15, thus :

> The differentiation of *krama* (sequence) is the cause in the case that the *parināmas* are different.[8]

In this *sūtra,* Patañjali makes clear the reason why the three *parināmas,* i. e., *dharma. laksana,* and *avasthā,* change in their own time-series.

Then what is *karma* (sequence) ? *Vyāsa* explains it regarding each one of the three *parināmas.* 1) The *krama* of *dharmaparināma* : That the fact one *dharma,* immediately contiguous to the next *dharma,* it is the *krama* for the next.[9] 2) The *krama* of *laksana-parināma* : The existence in the future stage comes into the present stage, and again it passes

into the past stage. That is the *krama* of this *Parināma*.[10]
(3) The *krama* of *avastā-parināma*: Anything new gradually becomes old in due course. This happens by the *krama* which remains common to the succession of moments.[11]

Thus those three *parināmas* follow their *kramas*. The idea of *krama* is based upon an uninterrupted series of moments.[12] *Krama* means the succeeding relation between the future and the present, the present and the past. The concept of time is basically formed by the idea of sequence. The Yoga philosophy calls it *krama*.

No what is the nature of the *krama*? We can find it in the fact that all phenomena are momentary (*kṣaṇika*). The *citta-parināma* (change of mind) is investigated in relation to the moment of restraint, because the *citta* is momentary.[13] *Parināma* indeed means the sequence of moments (kṣaṇa-krama). Patañjali refers it in the *Yoga-sūtra* III. 52:

> By means of *samyama* (constraint) upon *ksaṇa* and their *krama*, there rises the knowledge proceeding discrimination.[14]

Commenting on this *sūtra*, Vyāsa clarifies the concept of time, thus: Just as the atom (paramāṇu) is the minutest limit of matter (dravya), so the moment (kṣaṇa) is the minutest limit of time (kāla). Or, as much the time when an atom in motion leaves its former place and reaches the next place so much the time is a moment. While, the uninterrupted flow of these is a sequence (krama). Moments and its sequence do not belong to any aggregate of realities (vastusamāhāra). So hour, day, night, and so on, are the aggregates of intellect (buddhi-samāhāra).[15]

Here it is said that the concept of time as discrete moment is the real one, whereas the concept of time as successive or as continuous is unreal, being only due to the imagination of the empirical and relative consciousness.[16] All

that are conceived as the hour and so on are based upon the succeeding sequence of moments (kṣaṇa-krama). This is called 'time', which is not a substantive reality (vastuśūnya in itself but is a structure by the intellect (buddhinirmāna) and follows the knowledge by words (śabda-jñāna-anupātin) and appears to ordinary minds as if it wete a substantive reality (vastu-svarūpa).[17] This concept of time is nothing but the imagination, (vikalpa) for the five mind-functions.[18] Like objects of imagination, any quantity of time is not real. The reason why such time is not substantive existence is that two *kṣaṇa* cannot happen together, nor two *kramas* can co-exist. The *krama* in fact means that the next happening *kṣaṇa* immediately continues to the former *kṣaṇa.*[19] While *kṣaṇa* itself is a real thing (vastu-patita) and is supporting the *krama.* The *krama* involves uninterrupted succession of *kṣaṇa.*[20] Therefore, there is only the present *kṣaṇa* and there are no preceeding and late *kṣaṇas.* So there is no aggregates of them. The past and future *kṣaṇas* must be said to be inseparately connected to *parināma.*[21]

Now we understand that only the present *kṣaṇa* exists, but the past and future one are connected to *pariṇama* that is to say, they are related to the *kṣaṇe-krama* (sequence of moments), which is basis of the concept of time and is not substantive existence.

The concept of the *lakṣaṇa-parināma* (change of the phase of time) which refers to the three time-series is grasped as the sequence of *kṣaṇa.* Like the past and future *lakṣaṇas* remain common to the present *lakṣaṇa*, the past and future *kṣaṇas* are relative to the present *kṣaṇa.* In one moment, namely, in the present moment the whole world undergoes *parināma.*[22] Only the present is the temporal field where the whole world exists.

With respect to that, some questions come forth. Do the present and the future not exist ? What is there essence ? We shall inquire them in the next section.

3. Existence of three time-series

Before we search the existentiality of time in the Yoga philosophy, let us take the *Abhidharma-kośa* of the Buddhist literature. There, with respect to the criticism of the *Sarvasti-vāsa*, the author Vasubandhu refers to the view of Vārṣagaṇya,[23] one of the classical Sāṃkhya teachers previous to the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, thus : The view of Vārṣagaṇya explains like this ; what exists is always existent; what does not exist is not always existence. A non-entity can never come into existence and an entity can never be annihiliated.[24]

Vasubandhu quotes this phrase of Vārṣagaṇya in the context that he refutes the *Sarvâsti-vāda* from the view point of the Sautrāntikas.[25] He mentions that if the past and the future exist as substantive, then the effects of deed of them must be eternal and any fitness of deed to the effect if not possible. If all *dharmas* exist through the three time-series (sarva evâsti), then any deed does not fit to any effect.[26] After thus mentioning, he quotes the phrase of Vārṣagaṇya. He seems to regard the *Sarvâsti-vāda* as a Sāṃkhya thought.

Vyāsa, introduction the *Yoga-sūtra* IV. 12, takes a question from the opponents, in which he quotes the phrase of Vārṣagaṇya, thus : Since 'a non-entity can never come into existence and an entity ean never be annihiliated', how will *vāsanās* (subconscious-impressions) which exist as substantive disappear ?[27]

Here we can suppose that Vyāsa imagined the above refutation of Vasubandhu. The Yoga philosophy accepts the existence of the past and the future just as the Sarvâsti-vādins. Patañjali remarks it in the *Yoga*-sūtra IV. 12, thus :

> The past and the future exist with their own forms (svarūpato'sti). For the *dharmas* have their own divisions of time-series (adhvan).[28]

Commenting on this *sūtra*, Vyāsa, makes clear the nature of the three time-series. The future is that the manifestation of which will appear (bhaviṣyad-vyaktika). The past is that the manifestation of which has been experienced (anubhūta-vyaktika). The present is that which manifests its operation (svavyāpāroparuḍha).[29]

Here Vyāsa makes a compromise between the Buddhistic theory that the time-series is divided by *vyāpāra* (*operation*) or *kāritra* (action) and the Sāṃkhyāic theory of *parināma* that the unmanifested (avyakta) changes into the manifested (vyakta).

Vyāsa furthermore explains thus: By the time-variation (adhva-bheda) of the *dharmin*, the *dharmas* are made conditioned. But just as the present which takes a particular manifestation exists as substantive (dravyato'sti), not so the past and the present. The future exists with its own form (svarūpeṇâsi) which will manifest itself. The past exists with its own form which has experienced its manifestation. There is the manifestation of its own form (svarūpa-vyakti) only in the present time-series, but not in the past and future.[30]

As we have already observed,[31] the *lakṣaṇa* of the past and future are not severed from the present *lakṣaṇa* and also the past and future *kṣaṇas* are relative to the present *kṣana*. Similarly, Vyāsa explains that in a certain time (samaya) of the one particular time-series, the two other time-series are inseparably connected with the *dharmin*. Therefore it cannot be said that an object can come to exist at the present moment without leaving any reference to previous moments (abhūtvā bhāvaḥ).

We understand as followings: The Sarvâsti-vādins maintained that the *dharmas* in the three time-series exist as substantive (dravyato'sti). Vasubandhu criticized this view,

even quoting the phrase of Vārṣagaṇya, from the Sautrāntika view point, whose opinion is that the *dharmas*, not being previously, then come to existence now (abhūtvā bhāvaḥ).[32] Taking Vasubandhu's criticism into consideration, Vyāsa maintains that the *dharmas* in the three time-series exist with their own forms (svarūpeṇasti), although the present only exists as substantive (drāvyato'sti). And he denys the opinion of the Sautrāntikas, that is, 'abhūtvā bhāvaḥ'.

Thus Vyāsa explains the mode of existence of the three time-series. Then he gives the following three proofs of the fact that the past and the future exist with their own forms.

Firstly, the three-fold thing (vastu) in the time-series is the object (jñeya) for the knowledge. If that does not exist with their own forms, then this knowledge, having no objects, would not emerge.[33] This is the epistemological reason.

Secondly, if the resultant effects of actions lending to experience or salvation were unreal, then nobody would be engaged in such pursuits.[34] This is the practical reason.

Thirdly, an efficient-cause (nimitta) is capable of making an already exist result in present, but not producing something new. The well established efficient-cause gives an aid to particularize the effect, but it does not produce anything non-existent (apūrva).[35] This is the reason by the *pariṇāma-vāda*.[36]

By those proofs, it is said that the past and the future exist with their own forms, but they do not exist as the same as the present. To tell in the context of the theory of *pariṇāma*, the *dharmin* which is the nature of the *dharmas* manifests itself according to each time-variation with its

own form. This means the change from the unmanifested (i.e., future) to the manifested (i.e., present), and from which to the unmanifested (i.e. past).

Next, Patañjali refers to the nature of the three time-series, thus:

> These *dharmas* are manifested or subtle, and their essence is the *guṇas*.[37]

Vyāsa comments thus: These, in fact, are the *dharmas* of three time-series. The present one is the manifested as its essence. The past and the future ones are the subtle as their essence, that is, the six non-specifics (saḍavośeṣa). Those *dharmas* are all only the special configuration of the *gunas*. So they have, in the strict sense, the *gunas* as their essence.[38]

In the context of the *guṇas* of the *pariṇāma-vāda*, we understand as followings: For the *guṇas* are subtle and imperceptible.[39] the essence of the past and the future is impossibie to perceive. Although imperceptible, it is not a non-existence, because it is the *guṇas* as its essence. This is the explanation from the theory of *pariṇāma* for the fact that the past and the future exist with their own forms, and that their existence is not the same as the present.

To summarize, we acknowledge that the Yoga philosophy regards the problem of time as, ontologically, that of *pariṇāma* (phenomenal change) of the world. The fundamental idea lying on the *parināma* is the fact that all phenomena we manifestation from the *dharmin* to the *dharma*, because the *dharmin* is the nature of all *dharmas*, and inseparably connected with them. This theory is based on the Sāṃkhyaic *parināma-vāda*.

The *dharma* which is not yet manifested from the *dharmin* is the future, which is now being manifested is the

present, and which has already been manifested is the past. So the current of time flows from future to present and past.

To solve the problem of time, the Yoga philosophy employs the concept of *kṣaṇa* and *krama*. In a single *kṣaṇa*, all manifestations are completed. The series of *kṣana*, i.e., *krama* is not a real existence but only based on imagination of *buddhi*.

When constructing his theory of time, the Yoga school has a close connection with the Buddhists, especially, with the Sarvast-vādins With respect to the concept of time, both schools have the dame idea. Vasubandhu criticized the Sarvâsti-vāda from the view-point of the Sautrān-tikas. Vyāsa takes that criticism into consideration and refutes the Sautrāntikas view. That is one of the historical backgrounds when the Yoga school established his own theory, at least, the theory of time.

NOTE

1. śāntoditāvyapadeśya-dharmânupāti dharmi——*YS*. III. 14.
2. *YBh*. III. 14 (p. 136, 1. 2f).
3. See Chakravarti Original, p. 206.
4. *YBh*. III. 13 (p. 126, I.6-p. 127, 1. 7).
5. *YBh*. III. 14 (p. 134, 11. 5-7). See Chakravarti ibid., p. 256.
6. *YBh*. III. 14 (p. 136, 1. f).
7. *YBh*. III. 14 (p. 134, 1.7, p. 35, 1-2).
8. Kramânyatvaṃ pariṇāmânyatve hetuḥ=— *YB*. III. 15. As to the three Pariṇāmas of the bhūta and indriya. see *YS*. III. 13, and Dasgupta, yoga as philosophy and religion, pp. 73-74. and Chakra-varti, ibid. p. 261.
9. *YBh*. II. 15 (p. 167, 1. 4f).
10. *YBh*. III. 15 (p. 137, 11. 5-7).

11. YBh. III. 15 (p. 167, l. 9-p, 168. l. 1).

12. As to 'krama' see Chakravarti ibid. pp. 262-264,

13. In this connection, see Imanishi, "Yoga School and Buddhism", pp. 23-30.

As to the three kinds of citta-pariṇāma, viz., nirodha, samādhi and ekâgratā, see YS. III. 9. 11 and 12.

In YBh. III. 13, another three kinds of citta-pariṇāma, viz., dharma, lakṣaṇa and avasthā are explained.

14. kṣaṇa-tatkramayoḥ saṃyamād-viveka-jaṃ jñānam—YS. III. 52.

15. YBh. III. 52 (p. 176, ll. 2-5).

16. Dasgupta ibid., p. 44.

17. YBh. III. 52 (p. 176, ll. 5-7). See Dasgupta, p. 44.

18. śabda-jñānānupāti vastu-śūnyo vikalpaḥ——YS. I. 9.

19. YBh. III. 52 (p. 177, ll. 1-3).

20. YBh. III. 52 (p. 176, l. 8).

21. YBh. III. 52 (p. 177, ll. 3-5).

22. YBh. III. 52 (p. 177, l.5f).

23. As to Vārṣagaṇya, a full discussion is done by Chakravarti, ibid., pp. 135-141 ; Takagi, "On Vārṣagaṇya" p. 139f.

24. Akbh. V. 27 (p. 301, l. 1f). This phrase is already read in the Chinese translation of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* (Taisho, Vol. 27, p. 997a). See Imanishi, "Indian Philosophy and Discussion on Causality", p. 453f.

Cf. *Bhag. Gītā* II. 16. The first half of this verse is quoted in *Vivaraṇa* III. 13. p. 250.

25. *Akbh.* V. 27 (p, 298, l. 17 and p. 299, l. 1f).

26. *Akbh.* V. 27 (p. 300, l. 1). Vasubandhu, after criticizing the view which divides three time-series by the idea of action, refutes from the side of the Sautrāntikas the four reasons which testify to the existence of the three time-series : 1) Because of teachings of the Bhagavān, 2) Because a knowledge happens with two co-operating causes. 3) Because a knowledge has an object, 4) Because any heed has an effect. The quotation of Vārṣagaṇya's is included in the refutation of the fourth one.

27. *YBh.* IV. 12 intro. (p. 193, 1. 5f). As to the phrase of Vārṣagaṇya, see Chakravarti, ibid., p. 140 and 198.
28. atītânāgataṃ svarūpato'sty adhva-bhedād dharmāṇām—*YS.* IV. 12.
29. *YBh.* IV. 12 (p. 193, 1. 9f).
30. *YBh.* IV. 12 (p. 194, ll. 1-5).
31. See text.
32. As to the opinion of the Sautrāntikas, see note 25.
33. *YBh.* IV. 12 (p. 193, 1. 10f).
34. *YBh.* IV. 12 (p. 193, ll. 12-14).
35. *YBh.* IV. 12 (p.193, ll. 14-16).
36. These three proofs are possibly under influence of the four reasons of the *Sarvā*sti-vā*da* excepting the first one.
37. te vyakta-sūkṣmā guṇâtmānaḥ——*YS.* IV. 13.
38. *YBh.* IV. 13 (p. 194, 1. 9-p. 195, 1. 1).
39. *YBh.* III. 13 (p. 129, 1. 5).

GLOSSARY

Important technical terms in the Yoga Philosophy

(figures refer to the source)

abhyāsa : habitual practice : the exertion for the steadiness in the state of *nirodha*.
YS. I. 12, 13, 18, 32 ;

avasthā : state or condition : of the phenomena. YS. III.13.

avidyā : nescience : the recognition of misconception.
YS. II. 3, 4, 5, 24.

avidyā (avijjā) : ignorance ; the main root of evil and of continual rebirth : Vin. I. 1 ; III. 3.

asaṃprajñāta : unconscious : the state of concentrated mind which based on the *abhyāsa* on cessation of conception and wherein only *saṃskāra* remains.
YBh. I. 1, 18, 19, 20.

asaṃprajñāta (asampañña) : lack of intelligence : D. III. 213 ; Dhs. 390, 1061, 1162, 1351.

asmitā : I-sense : the awareness of individual personality of the feeling of identity of *buddhi* with *puruṣa*.
YS. I. 17 ; 11. 3. 6 ; III. 47 ; IV. 4.

āśaya : latency or residua. YS. I. ; 24 ; II. 12. ; IV. 6.

āśaya (āsaya) : abode, dependence on : S. I. 38 ; Vin. III. 151 ; J. II. 99 ; Milin. 257.

āsana (āsana) : sitting, a seat : M. I. 46I ; Vin. I. 272 ; S. I. 46 ; A. III. 389

āsana : posture : the third of the eight limbs of Yoga : the motionless and agreeable form of the body.
YS. II. 29. 46. ;

bhāvanā : cultivation : of the mind towards happy, miserable, virtue and sinful creatures. YS. I. 28, 33 ; II. 2,33, 34 ; IV. 25.

bhāvanā (bhāvanā): cultivation of mind, culture: Vism. 130, 314, 317.

buddhi: intellect: the intellectual function of mind. YS. IV. 21, 22.

buddhi (buddhi): wisdom, intelligence; D. III. 165.

citta: mind: the basis of intellectual and emotional activity; that which involves Sāmkhyaic *buddhi*, *manns* and *ahaṃkāra* and six *vijñānas*. YS. I, 2, 30, 33, 37; II. 54; III. 1, 9, 11, 12, 19, 34, 38.

citta (citta): the meaning which emphasizes the emotional and conative side or "thought" more than its mental and rational side is rendered by intention, impulse, design; mood, disposition, state of mind, reaction to impression.

dharma: attribute: the characterized modification of the mind or the attribute of the substance. YS. III, 13, 14, 45; IV. 12, 29.

dharma (dhamma): *nissatta-nijīvatā* or "the phenomenal" as opposed to "the substantial", "the noumental", "animistic entity": one of fourfold definition of *dharma* by Buddhaghosa in DhsA.

dhāraṇā substainment: the mind's fixation on a particular object. YS. II. 29, 53: III. 1.

dhāraṇā (dhāraṇa): bearing in mind, rememberance: Vin. IV. 305; M. II. 175.

dharmin: substance: of the phenomena. Ys. III. 14.

dhyāna: meditation: the continuous flow of similar mental modification. Ys. I. 39; II. 11. 29; III. 2; IV. 6.

dhyāna (jhāna): meditation. It is the technical term for a special religious experience reached in a certain order of mental states. It was originally divided into four such states: D. I. 34. sq.

dṛśya : seen : the material principle or the objective side of the phenomenal world. YS. II. 17, 18, 21 ; IV. 21, 23.

draṣṭṛ : seer : the self-intellect principle or the basis of the subjective sides of human being. YS. I. 3 ; II. 17, 20 ; IV. 23.

duḥkha : pain : the feeling of pain, of which causes are three : *prināma* (change), *tāpa* (misery) and *saṁskāra* (subliminal-impression). YS. I. 31, 32 ; II. 5, 8, 15, 34.

duḥkha (dukkha) : unpleasant, painfull, causing misery.

ekâgratā : one-pointedness : the one-pointed state of mind. YS. III. 11, 12.

ekâgratā (ekāggatā) : concentration, capacity to individualize, contemplation, tranquility of mind : S. V. 21, 197, 269 ; A. I. 36 ; IV. 40 ; Dhs. 11; Vism. 84 ; cpm. 16, 178, 237, 240.

guṇa : quality : the constituent qualities of *drasya* which are three in number : *sativa, rajas, tamas* each has the aspect of brightness, activity, and inertia. YS. I. 16, ; II. 15, 19 ; IV. 13, 32, 34.

guṇa (guṇa) : constituent part, ingredient, component, element.

Isvara-pranidhāna : dedication or devotion to God. YS. II, 32.

karma : action or deed : that which involves action of either mind or body and also its latent state in the mind. YS. I. 24 : III. 22 : IV. 7, 30.

karma (kamma) : A. in subjective relation :

(a) character of interaction as regards action ; action or deed as having results : *phala* and *vipāka*; both expressions being either singly or jointly, either singly, jointly or independent.

(b) the effect of deed on the doer : the consequences fall upon the doer, in the majolity of cases expressed as punishment or affliction.

B. in objective relation : universal *karma*, law of cause and consequences :

(a) *karma* as cause of existence.

(b) *karma* as result or consequence.

(c) *karma* as cause-consequence : its manifestation consists in essential likeness between deed and result, cause and effect : "like for like" as the cause so the result. (d) the working and exhaustion of *karma*, its building up by new *karma*. and its destruction by expiration of old *karma*. the final annihilation of all result constitutes Arhatship.

kaivalya : isolation : the isolated state of the self-in-itself. YS. II. 25, III. 50, 55 ; IV. 26, 34.

kaivalya (kevalin) : one who is fully accomplishd or Arhant.

kleśa : affliction : the afflicted function of mind. YS. I. 24 : II. 2, 3, 12 ; IV. 28 ; 30.

kleśa (kilesa) : stain, soil, impurity, fig. affliction ; in a moral sense, depravity, lust. Its occurance in the *Pitakas* is rare ; in later works, very frequent, where its approx. tantamount to our terms, lower or unregenerate nature, sinful desires, vices, passions.

kriyā-yoga : yoga in the form of action : for the cultivation of *samādhi* and the attenuation of *kleśa*. YSh. II. 2.

lakṣṇa : temporal character : the temporal aspect on the phenomenal characteristics. YS. III. 13, 53.

lakṣaṇa (lakkhaṇa) : sign, characterisitics, mark ; specific attribute.

manas : perception : the emotional function of mind. YS. I, 35 ; II. 53 ; III. 48.

manas (mano) : mind, the 6th sense, As regards the relation of *manas* to *citta*, it may be stated that *citta* is more substantial, more elemental as the seat of emotion, whereas *manas* is the finer element, a subtler feeling or thinking as such : S. II. 94.

niyama : observeance : the second of the eight limbs of yoga ; positive phase of fundamental condition for yoga. YS. II. 29, 32.

niyama (niyama) : method, manner, practice : S. I. 196 ; III. 225 ; A. I. 122.

nirodha : restraint : the restrained state of mind. YS I. 2, 12, 51 ; III. 9.

nirodha (nirodha) : oppression, suppression ; destruction, cessation, annihilation with *nibbāna* : S. I. 136.

(nirodha-samāpatti) : attainment of annihilation : Paṭi. I. 97, 100 ; Milin. 3000 ; Vism. 702.

nirbīja : seedless : a state of restrained mind where the wisdom from *samādhi* and its samskāra become totally restrained and then all modifications of mind are restrained. YS. I. 51 ; III. 8.

pariṇāma : change : the existential form of change of phenomena. YS. II. 15 ; III. 9, 11-13, 15, 16 ; IV. 2, 14, 32, 33.

pariṇāma (pariṇāma) : change, alternation : A. II. 87 ; III. 131 ; V. 110 ; Milin. 112, 135sq. 304 ; Vism. 31.

pradhāna : primary cause : that which involves Sāṃkhyaic twenty-four *tattvas*. VS. III. 48.

pramāṇa : valid knowledge : that which includ *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *āgama*. YS. I. 6, 7 ; IV. 16.

prasaṃkhyāna : meditative discernment : a certain know-

ledge which eliminates *kleśa* and is obtained in the state of *dhyāna*. YS. IV. 29.

prāṇāyāma : regulation of breath : the fourth of the eight limbs of yoga ; regulation of flow of inhalation and exhalation. YS. II. 29, 49.

prajñā : wisdom : the perceptive knowledge born of *samādhi*. YS. I. 20, 48, 49 ; II. 27 ; III. 5.

prajñā (paññā) : intelligence, comprising all the heigher faculties of cognition : S. I. 13=165 (sīla, citta, paññā) ; Iti. 51(sīla, samādhi, paññā).

prakṛtī : material cause : that which involves Sāṃkhyaic eight *tattvas*. YS. I. 19, IV. 2, 3.

prakṛti (pakati) : original or natural form, natural state or condition ; primary, original, real : Vin. I. 189 ; II. 113.

pratyakṣa : direct perception : of the specific feature of the object. YS. I. 7.

pratyaya : conception : the form of the perceivable object in the mind. YS. I. 10, 18, 19 : II. 20 ; III, 2 ; 12, 17, 19, 35 ; IV. 27.

pratyāhāra : withdrawal of senses : the fifth of the eight limbs of yoga, which makes senses dissociated with their objects. YS. II. 29, 54.

praṇidhāna (paṇidhāna) : aspiration, longing, prayer : Saddh. 344.

puruṣa : self : the spiritual principle. YS. I. 16, 24 ; III. 35, 49, 55 ; IV. 18, 34.

puruṣa (purisa) : man.

samādhi : concentration : the concentrated state of mind or the means to get the state. YS. I. 20; 46, 51 ; II. 2, 29, 45 ; III. 3, 11, 37 ; IV. 1, 29 .

samādhi (samādhi) : concentration ; D. I. 209sq. ; A. III. 12 ; M. I. 301 : Dhs. 15.

samāpatti : contemplation : the perception in the state of *samādhi* relating to the object. YS. I. 41, 42 ; II. 47 ; III. 42.

samāpatti (samāpatti) : attainment : Paṭi; I. 8, 20sq. Nd. 108, 328. S. II, 216, 222.

saṃprajñāta : conscious : a state of concentrated mind, by which the knowledge acquired is fixed firmly and restrained. YS. I. 17.

saṃprajñāta (sampajāna) : thoughtful, mindful : D. I. 37 ; II. 94sq.

saṃskāra : subliminal impression : the latent impression in the mind. YS. I. 18, 50 ; II. 15 ; III. 9, 10, 18 ; IV. 9, 27;

saṃskāra (sankhāra) : constituent potentiality : Franke, Dhīga, translation, pp. 307sq., esp. 311sq. ; Cpm. 273-276.

sabīja : having seed : a state of concentrated mind which has object as seed. YS. I, 46.

saṃyama : the repeated practice of *dhāranā*, *dhyāna* and *samādhi* on the same object, YS. III. 4, 16, 17, 21, 22, 26, 35, 41, 42, 44, 47, 52.

saṃyama (saṇyama) : restraint, self-control, abstinence : S. I. 121, 169 ; D. I. 53.

smṛti : memory : that which retains or recalls the experienced objects. YS. I, 6, 11, 20, 43 ; IV. 9, 21.

smṛti (sati) : memory, recognition : D. I. 180 ; II. 292 : intendness of mind, wakefullness of mind : D. I. 19 ; III. 31. *satipaṭṭhāna* : D. II. 83, 290sq.

vairāgya : detachment : the mental activity of getting rid of desire. YS. I. 12. 15 ; III. 50.

vairāgya (virāga) : absence of desire : D. III. 130 sq.

vāsanā : subconscious impression : the latency of *saṃskāra*. YS. IV. 8.

vasana (vāsana) : that which remains in the mind, tendencies of the past, impression : Sn. 1009 ; Milin. 10, 263.

vicāra : the perception of subtle element as object. YS. I. 17.

vicāra (vicāra) : investigation, examination, consideration, deliberation : Vism. 142.

vikalpa : imagination : the abstract knowledge based on language. YS. I. 6, 9, 42.

vikalpa (vikappa) : thinking over, considering, thought, intention ; Nd. 97, 351.

vipary aya : misconception : the erroneous knowledge based on unreal things ; equivalent to the fivefold *kleśas*. YS. I, 6. 8.

viparyaya (vipariyesa) : reversal, contraries, wrong state : Kv. 306.

vitarka : the perception of gross element as object. YS. I. 17, III. 33. 34.

vitarka (vitakka) : reflection, thought, thinking : Vism. 142 ; D. II. 227 ; III. 104, 222, 287.

viveka-khyāti : the discriminative enlightenment of *puruṣa* and *buddhi*. YS. II. 26, 28 ; IV. 29,

vṛtti : function : the modification of mind. YS. I. 2, 4, 5, 10, 41 ; II. 11, 15, 50 ; III. 43 ; IV. 18.

vṛtti (vuttii) : mode of being or acting.

vyutthāna : fluctuated : the fluctuated state of mind. YS. III, 9, 37.

vyutthāna (vuṭṭhāna) : rousing, rising out ; M. I. 302 ; S. III. 270.

yama : restraint : the first of the eight limbs of yoga, by which gross impurities of ordinary mind are removed. YS. II. 29, 30.

yoga : restraint of function. YS. I. 2.

yoga (yoga) : pondering, concentration, devotion. M. I. 472 ; Dh. 209 ; Milin. 3 ; Vbh. 324.

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